Bulgaria, Albania and Kosovo: A Partnership Whose Time Has Come

This article was first published on MrEast.eu on July 21, 2026.

Bulgaria’s relations with Albania and Kosovo are unusual in the Balkans. They are not burdened by territorial disputes, competing historical claims or a legacy of bilateral conflict. This gives Sofia, Tirana and Pristina political space for cooperation that is rare in the region.

That potential has not gone unused. Bulgaria recognized Kosovo on March 20, 2008, later upgraded its liaison office in Pristina to an embassy, and has consistently supported Kosovo’s participation in regional and international forums. Sofia regards the development of a stable and democratic Kosovo as an important component of the security architecture of the Balkans. Bulgaria’s relationship with Albania rests on the 1993 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, while Albania’s 2017 law on the protection of national minorities formally recognized the Bulgarian national minority, establishing a legal basis for the preservation of its identity, language and culture. This is a significant point for Sofia, particularly given the difficulties and discrimination faced by Bulgarian communities elsewhere in the region, notably in Serbia and North Macedonia.

Different European tracks for Tirana and Pristina

Now is an appropriate moment to give this favorable foundation a more coherent strategic direction. Albania has advanced rapidly in the accession process, opening all its negotiating clusters and, on July 14, provisionally closing its first three chapters: science and research, education and culture, and external relations. Kosovo’s position is different. It applied for EU membership in December 2022, but the Council has not yet requested a Commission Opinion, a necessary procedural step for the application to move forward. Its citizens have nevertheless been able to travel visa-free to the Schengen area for short stays since January 2024.

Bulgaria should not treat Albania and Kosovo as a single policy file. Albania is a negotiating state approaching the most demanding phase of accession, when formal alignment with EU rules must be matched by administrative capacity, effective institutions and credible implementation. Kosovo requires a different kind of support: sustained advocacy for a European perspective that is institutional rather than rhetorical. Bulgaria’s role in the two cases is therefore not identical, but it is mutually reinforcing.

Bulgaria’s EU experience as a resource for neighbors

For Albania, Bulgaria can be a key partner because it has recent experience of the full cycle of European integration: accession negotiations, post-accession conditionality, Schengen membership and adoption of the euro. This does not make Bulgaria a model to be copied. Its value lies elsewhere, in a practical understanding of where administrative capacity, judicial credibility, regulatory enforcement and the absorption of European funds become decisive. Sofia should make that experience available through sustained official dialogue, exchanges between public institutions, and partnerships linking universities, business associations and civil society.

For Kosovo, Bulgaria should be among the EU member states arguing that procedural stagnation is not a policy. Leaving a membership application in indefinite suspension weakens the credibility of the Union’s commitment to Kosovo and to the Western Balkans as a whole. Bulgaria cannot resolve the divisions among member states over Kosovo’s status, but it can work consistently with the states that recognize Kosovo to support a clearer institutional path for its application and fuller participation in European and regional formats.

Security, connectivity and education as strategic pillars

There is also a clear security rationale for a more active policy. Bulgaria and Albania are NATO allies, and the relationship already runs in both directions. Albania contributes troops to the multinational battlegroup based at Novo Selo in Bulgaria, part of NATO’s forward presence on the eastern flank, while Bulgaria contributes a contingent to KFOR, the Alliance’s mission in Kosovo, whose purpose is to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all communities. More regular Bulgarian-Albanian consultation on defense, resilience, military mobility and critical infrastructure protection would build habits of coordination that outlast any single crisis, while Bulgaria’s KFOR presence provides a ready framework for practical security contact with Kosovo.

Connectivity and economic ties should form the second pillar of the policy. Bulgaria and Albania have already identified transport, energy, tourism, education and trade as areas in which their political dialogue should produce more concrete results. The priority should be implementation rather than the creation of additional declarations: reliable transport links, compatible administrative procedures, greater commercial visibility and better conditions for investment.

Albania’s progress toward EU membership reinforces this argument. As its regulatory and market structures align more closely with those of the Union, Bulgaria has an interest in ensuring that its firms, ports and universities are present in a neighboring market that will become more deeply integrated into the European economic space. The relationship should be reciprocal. Bulgarian businesses should look more seriously toward Albania, while Albanian companies and investors should come to see Bulgaria not merely as a nearby country but as an EU-based partner and gateway to wider European markets, to the benefit of both societies.

Education deserves equal attention. Scholarships, joint programs, research cooperation and professional exchanges do not produce immediate headlines, but they create the networks through which relations become self-sustaining. Bulgaria’s universities in Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna can offer attractive opportunities for Albanian and Kosovar students, especially in medicine, engineering, law and information technology. The exchange should work in both directions. Bulgarian students and researchers would benefit from stronger ties with universities in Tirana, Pristina, Peja and Korça, deepening a Bulgarian knowledge of Albanian society, politics and culture that remains limited despite the growing strategic importance of both countries. A policy built only around ministerial visits will remain shallow; one supported by academic, professional and cultural links will acquire constituencies beyond government.

Such a strategy should be formalized and bipartisan. Bulgaria’s recurring domestic political instability makes continuity especially important, and a policy dependent on one minister’s initiative is unlikely to survive a change of government. Relations with Albania and Kosovo are among the few areas of Bulgarian foreign policy where strategic interest and domestic political feasibility largely coincide.

Bulgaria does not need to invent a role in Albania and Kosovo. It already has diplomatic goodwill, relevant accession experience, a direct interest in regional security and a record of political support. What is still missing is a clear decision to treat these assets as part of a sustained policy toward Albania and Kosovo, rather than as occasional and separate bilateral engagements.

A stronger partnership with Albania and Kosovo would be a measured investment in Bulgaria’s positive influence within the EU and NATO, in the security of Southeast Europe, and in the long-term political and economic integration of the Western Balkans.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.