How to Politicize a Military

Where is the line between legitimate changes to personnel policy and military politicization? Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s speech on September 30, titled “State of the Force”, argued that the widespread firing, replacement, and reshuffling of general officers across the force was to ensure “accountability” and was “overdue”. Yet, as Hegseth acknowledges, his critics have been more likely to call the unprecedented personnel changes at the top levels of the Department of Defense a political purge.

Despite his assertion that the reshuffle is about accountability, there is far more evidence to suggest that Hegseth is using the shake-up to forcibly remove or retire leaders who disagree with his worldview, and to promote senior leaders who agree with his policy preferences. The administration has yet to offer any public rationale for how the more than 30 general officers who have been either outright fired or sidelined failed to meet expectations. Hegseth’s personalinterventions into promotion lists have also been similarly devoid of performance-related rationale and instead appear to disproportionately target women, people of color, and officers who were responsible for executing the previous administration’s more controversial personnel policies, such as leading DEI officers or encouraging soldiers to get the COVID vaccine. And the Secretary’s attempts to pressure promotion boards into promoting unqualified candidates—such as his own personal aide—suggest that the personnel shake-ups are less about necessary restructuring than finding ways to reward those who have demonstrated personal and political loyalty.

These actions will almost certainly have profound and negative effects on the readiness and effectiveness of the US military. While the United States is blessed with a deep bench of qualified officers, the changing incentive structure will necessarily have downstream effects on retention, professionalism, and readiness. One has only to look at the effect of political purges of the military in Poland to see how quickly changes in personnel incentives can erode readiness and compromise military effectiveness.

Poland’s Cautionary Tale

A recent book by Edyta Zemla, one of Poland’s foremost military analysts, argues that the changes led by the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) led to “An Army in Ruin.” When PiS took power in the Polish Parliament in 2015, it enacted sweeping personnel changes across the armed forces to remove an unprecedented number of senior officers. Over the first two years, a remarkable 36 general officers left the force—either by resigning or because they were dismissed—which comprised approximately a quarter of the senior leadership. Disfavored officers who could not be fired outright were transferred to obscure posts or the reserves until they reached retirement age. In 2016 alone, 200 colonels (or more than 15% of colonels in the force) left service after realizing they were likely to be forced out by the ruling party.

PiS’ Justifications for the firings changed over time. At first, they accused the general officers of being politicized themselves in favor of the previous party, Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), and deridingly called them “PO generals”.  When observers pointed out that there was no indication those general officers had been anything but professional, PiS accused them of being corrupt or of being Communist sympathizers. It is noteworthy that at no point did PiS provide any evidence in support of their accusations.

By contrast, the major personnel shake-ups allowed PiS to replace dismissed officers with party loyalists, regardless of qualifications. Minister of Defense Antoni Macierewicz redesigned the promotion system to reduce education and training requirements while imposing additional “loyalty” tests for promotion. In one case, a general officer was relieved of command because he failed to receive one of Macierewicz’s aides with appropriate pomp and circumstance. Macierewicz further took advantage of a promotion system that allows for an officer to be promoted two ranks in a single promotion to elevate loyal colonels to levels deep into the general officer corps. The ministry further attempted to buy the loyalty of more junior soldiers with the promise of a 6-10% pay increase while extending the time soldiers are allowed to serve without having to being promoted. This strategy—selecting senior officers based on loyalty while creating political loyalty amongst the junior ranks—quickly created an officer corps that understood its professional rewards would come from political loyalty rather than demonstrated excellence in the field.

The changes had profound consequences for Polish military readiness. Military modernization effectively ground to a halt in the first years under PiS as it focused on fanning the flames of ideological wars in the ranks. Former ministers and opposition figures warned that new commanders’ lack of experience and education invited Russian aggression and made modernization efforts all the more difficult. In 2018, former Chief of the General Staff Gen. Mieczysław Gocuł warned that because of the structural changes to the military and security services, Poland no longer had a national security management system. Even as it increased defense spending in response to Russian aggression, concerns remained both in Poland and the United States about the Polish military’s ability to man, equip, and operate modernized technology. 

Parallels and Politicization in the US Department of Defense Today

The parallels from Poland should be obvious to even the casual observer of US defense policy. By targeting individual officers who were responsible for implementing the policy priorities of the Biden administration, Hegseth is effectively punishing officers for following the lawful orders issued by the previous commander-in-chief. By pushing for the elevation of personal aides who otherwise do not meet requirements for promotion, he is privileging personal connection over merit. And by firing general officers who worked well with the previous administration without any evidence of wrong-doing, he is sending a powerful signal to the rest of the force that their futures will be shaped by political sponsorship. 

Already we are seeing evidence that officers are responding to the changes in incentives. In July, The New York Times reported that the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl Caudle, attempted to win favor with Hegseth by repeatedly violating professional military ethics—and secured the Navy’s top job as a result. Most recently, Hegseth’s pick to serve as the Army’s next chief of staff, General Christopher LaNeve, is reportedly facing resistance in Congress because of his lack of experience and perceived (political) pathway to promotion.

Presidents and cabinet secretaries have the right to set policy, including personnel policy. However, the policy prerogatives of an administration do not and have never included the right to punish service members for their compliance with and participation in the lawful policies of a previous administration, nor to question them about their agreement with controversial policy decisions. Put simply, American military officers cannot be retroactively assessed on performance according to the current administration’s policy preferences. What’s more, they must not be screened based on their personal opinions about political leaders or their own policy preferences.

Ultimately, Hegseth’s actions are leading service members to believe that they will be rewarded for partisan behavior while in uniform. When the administration rewards partisan acts by service members and punishes professional obedience, it encourages other young officers to ignore their professional obligations and undermine the military’s nonpartisan ethic. And contrary to common assumptions, the partisan displays will not always be in favor of Republican preferences. On July 2, an Air Force major was arrested on the steps of the Capitol while advocating for the impeachment of Donald Trump in uniform. Prior to his arrest he had been escorted by a Democratic member of the House of Representatives. When partisanship is rewarded by political elites, it is a threat to good order and discipline no matter who is in charge.

Preserving Non-Partisanship in the Military

There is a reason why political leaders since the establishment of the modern army have sought to keep the US military non-partisan: Military careers are long and necessarily span administrations and policy changes. 

The Senate should therefore reject the politicized promotion lists that Hegseth is offering until the Department of Defense can offer a clear, compelling, and nonpartisan rationale to explain why so many officers who had been judged worthy of promotion by their professional peers were singled out and removed post hoc. The Senate’s primary responsibility in reviewing nominations—particularly at ranks below the 3- and 4-star level—is to ensure a fair, transparent, and merit-based process for determining who should be promoted. In addition to expediency, this is the reason why promotions can be approved by voice vote and in bulk: The Senate is confirming the integrity of the process rather than any given individual’s record of service. And when the process is broken, Congress has an obligation to step in and require transparency. To do otherwise is to signal to every member of the US military that Congress endorses Hegseth’s approach, and validates the compromised process by which candidates were selected. In this case, wholesale rejection of the lists is the only appropriate remedy to restore confidence in the integrity of the system.

Moreover, Congress should exercise its oversight responsibility to determine how deeply the promotion process has already been politicized, and take legislative steps to ensure the process remains nonpartisan and merit-based. Congress should further require that any dismissal of a general officer above the rank of 2-star be accompanied by a written explanation, complete with supporting evidence, of why the president lost trust and confidence in the individual. Civilian control of the military includes congressional control, and members of Congress must hold the administration accountable for its politicizing actions—both as a signal to the rest of the force that participation in politicization will not be rewarded and as a rebuke to ongoing efforts.

Nonpartisanship and political independence in the promotion process must be protected. When military leaders are selected for promotion based on their partisan policy preferences rather than the merit-based judgement of their peers, it erodes trust in military ethics, kneecaps American leadership abroad, and compromises national security decision-making. Service members must be able to trust that those ordering them into combat have been judged most qualified by their own peers in the profession rather than by political audition. Allied and partner nations must also be able to trust that their American counterparts are in fact masters of their profession rather than political appointees. And military leaders must be able to offer professional military advice even if it conflicts with the partisan beliefs of the civilian leadership—anything less is a sure recipe for disastrous decision-making about war and national security.

American military leaders today are by and large imbued with a strong sense of professional ethics and committed to expertise in their craft. But promotion and career incentives still matter, and Hegseth’s politicized processes will do lasting damage if left uncorrected.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.