Withdrawal or Recalibration in the Middle East?

Just one day after US midterm elections that saw a historic Democratic wave, Republican Vice President J.D. Vance was quick to point the finger. In a post on X, Vance––who is eyeing his own presidential bid in 2028––claimed that the Iran war and its domestic reverberations were the reasons for Republican losses. Beyond the electoral fallout, the war has revived an older question about America’s place in the Middle East. 

Even as Washington pours military resources into the conflict, planned drawdowns, exposed vulnerabilities at its Persian Gulf bases, and a war-weary electorate are again pushing it toward a recalibrated security role in the region. What that may be will be determined in the months and years ahead, but the shift is already reshaping how America’s Middle East partners plan for their own security and seek new partnerships.

The second Trump administration released its National Security Strategy in November 2025, laying out its foreign policy priorities. The Middle East, which had preoccupied the Biden White House since late 2023, was relegated to the document’s final pages in a reflection of its desired de-prioritization. “The days in which the Middle East dominated foreign policy” were over, according to the document, and the region was “emerging as a place of partnership, friendship, and investment”. A year on, it is evident that the US attempt to reorient away from conflict in the Middle East—the second since 2011—has not succeeded. 

Indeed, it might appear counterintuitive to discuss a possible American retreat from the Middle East while hostilities continue there. The United States remains engaged in on-again, off-again fighting with Iran that shows few signs of heading toward a durable offramp. In addition to economic tactics, Washington focuses on maintaining high levels of military pressure on the Iranian regime to force concessions from Tehran.

In the weeks leading up to the conflict, the United States undertook the largest military buildup in the Middle East since 2003. It included three aircraft carriers concurrently at sea in late April. More recently, in early October, Washington sent a new group of ships carrying some 10,000 troops. The United States has also reportedly moved new interceptor systems to several countries in the region, probably to boost regional defenses ahead of new strikes. 

Yet Washington since early this year has withdrawn from positions as part of longer-term planning efforts. Trump has made good on his first-term promise to withdraw US troops from Syria. In April, the United States handed over its last major base in the country to the interim Syrian government. And in October, the remaining US military—some 1,500 troops who had stayed on to fight ISIS vestiges—left Iraq. The withdrawal 23 years after the United States first invaded that country to topple Saddam Hussein followed an agreement the Biden administration made in 2024.

Concerns over military vulnerabilities and Iran’s retaliatory attacks since late February have also led the United States to recalibrate its regional presence. Before launching the Iran war, Washington evacuated personnel from Qatar. The same occurred at other Persian Gulf bases, including those in Kuwait and Bahrain. Iran’s repeated targeting of Naval Support Activity, a key US Navy support station in Bahrain just 140 miles from Iran, forced a hasty evacuation of troops and their family members there. In September, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle told servicemembers that they would not be “getting back in there anytime soon”. The Pentagon has not publicly provided insight into base damage, but The Wall Street Journal estimates that 274 structures at 24 installations with a US military presence across the Middle East were damaged during the war’s first six months.

Iran’s attacks, and Washington’s inability to effectively reestablish deterrence against Tehran’s proliferation of low-cost, innovative drones and missiles, have prompted new debates about the United States’ rebuilding its old posture. The Pentagon reportedly has little interest in reconstructing damaged sites. Former defense officials argue that the war necessitates either a complete military withdrawal from the region or a westward redeployment. Other observers caution that such a withdrawal would undermine American influence in favor of Iran. They also assert that a credible and sustainable presence could revolve around a smaller footprint “built around access rather than permanent presence”.

The US midterm elections, which offered a strong repudiation of Trump’s policies, are likely to further stir political debate on the conflict, its implications, and US security involvement in the Middle East. Vance’s X post also argued that Republicans would need to “end the war”, “put America First”, and “change our relationship with Israel”. Indeed, among Democrats who flipped Senate seats, won open seats, or kept their congressional seats, the Iran war and its domestic financial implications—as well as the US relationship with Israel—loomed large. Several newly elected House Democrats ran on explicitly antiwar platforms, reflecting current American public opinion. 

Questions about the durability and reliability of longer-term US security commitments have spurred regional actors to diversify partnerships and enhance their autonomous capabilities. In early August, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Agreement, a joint defensive security arrangement whose Article 2 has drawn comparisons to NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitment although much uncertainty about the parties’ obligations remains. Two months later, Qatar signed the Badr Agreement with Pakistan, Türkiye, and Indonesia. It focuses on building domestic defense capabilities and increased defense-tech collaboration. Persian Gulf countries have also concluded new bilateral defense deals. During a tour of the Middle East in March, officials from Ukraine, which has faced Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia, signed 10-year air defense agreements with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 

Other European actors are entering the fray too. In the wake of renewed hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom announced expanded defensive support for Riyadh. Greek and French defensive support has centered on the port city of Yanbu, which has emerged as a critical alternative route for oil flows from Saudi Arabia to Europe. Paris’ military commitment, which reportedly includes soldiers, radars, and defense systems, coincided with a Saudi commitment to ship almost 100,000 tons of diesel per month to France. 

European security commitments come with their own levels of uncertainty. Greece recently agreed to extend the deployment of its Patriot missile system in Saudi Arabia. Monthly reviews will determine whether the defense battery will remain in place. For France, upcoming elections—which the far-right National Rally (RN) is expected to win—will likely determine future regional engagement. Though the RN has not published a dedicated foreign policy strategy, the party will probably view security support through its narrow conceptualization of national sovereignty.

For now, none of these arrangements offers a clear security alternative to the United States. The hedging, as a result has taken place around Washington rather than in its absence. Meanwhile, for the United States in the months and years ahead, the issue of retreat or recalibration will again center on the role it can and wants to play in a region that it has repeatedly tried to leave behind.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.