Brussels Forum

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The Future of Conflict

Mr. Nik Gowing: Good morning, everybody. As you're taking your seats and settling down before President Komorowski arrives and you have the next session on the Future of Conflict, can I just underline to you--could we have a little bit of quiet, please? This is a serious announcement about what's going to happen at 11:15. And this partly by popular demand to talk about things which are not necessarily on the formal agenda. Can I remind you it's called the mystery session? And my job is to try and hear from you, including the young professionals who are joining us, what's on your mind about what has not been talked about, and you are all the panel. And there will be no panel.

So, can in encourage you, if you have an idea at this moment, as I said yesterday, use BF Connect, go to the agenda, look at the session, which is Mystery Session, and put in a public comment. Because what I want to do right at the beginning is say what are your ideas so you create the agenda for just under an hour of discussion. That's at 11:15. Please help me. I can't talk to myself for an hour standing up here.

Dr. Karen Donfried: Good morning, everyone. It's great to have you here on the last day of our 10th Brussels Forum. But we could not be more excited than to

be opening today with remarks from the president of Poland. I am extremely privileged to be introducing President Komorowski. I think you will know that there is an election coming up in Poland in May, presidential election, so we are particularly grateful to him for having made this trip to Brussels at this time. And I think of, as all of us also know, he is the most trusted politician in Poland today.

One of the themes of this forum over the weekend has been evolution and the past 10 years. And when we think about Poland's role, it is really remarkable how Poland has become such a significant member of both NATO and the European Union. And as we think about Poland's role and Poland's voice in these institutions over this decade, I think there are two markers coming up that are so significant. In the NATO context, we are on the road to Warsaw. There will be the first NATO summit in Warsaw next summer and this is certainly such a significant achievement for the alliance and for Poland. And as we also are here in Brussels, home of the European Union, we're also well aware that for the first time the European Council has a Polish president as well. So there are many things that remind us of the significant role that Poland is playing in our transatlantic community and in the world.

I also want to underscore what a terrific friend President Komorowski has been to the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He spoke at GMF during his Washington visit in 2010, and we were very honored to have him open GMF's

office in Warsaw in 2011, and he has continued to be a wonderful supporter of all of the work that we do and we are so grateful for that.

As I mentioned, Poland is a key member of NATO, and in that context, but also in so many others, Poland is an important ally of the United States. And I think we all took note when President Obama visited Poland last June, on June 4, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first free and fair election in Poland. That is such a striking vignette as we think about the neighborhood in which Poland lives, and in particular the situation in Poland's neighbor Ukraine. And I know that all of us are much looking forward to hearing President Komorowski's remarks both on the state of the European security order and the state of the transatlantic relationship.

So, with that, I would ask you all to join me in welcoming President Komorowski.

President H.E. Bronislaw Komorowski: Ladies and gentlemen, on the 22nd of March 1945, exactly 70 years ago in the decisive operation in the Western front, American and British troops embarked on the passage over the Rhine River in the vicinity of Oppenheim, and the same time Polish troops, arm-in-arm with European and American allies, were liberating also those lands, Northern Belgium, Southern Netherlands, from the yolk of those who, in the name of insane ideology

shaking the very foundations of the European civilization, wanted to subdue the entire continent to their hegemony.

The Poles were bringing then freedom to the liberated nations of Western Europe, but unfortunately, they themselves were not able to reap the fruit of their victory. Western Europe, after decades-long history of strengthening of national algorithms (ph) and the Darwinist approach and international relations finally trying toward united and not a divided European nations to where its common values towards securities-based prosperity and cooperation with neighbors. We, the Poles, and also many other nations of our part of Europe landed on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain and we could only follow these integration processes from afar. We could follow them and so, to tell you the truth, we could only envy. We could do this until the moment of the regaining of our freedom at the turn of 1989 and 1990.

With attention and obvious sense of envy, we admired the successes of Western Europe, the successes which were possible thanks to the cooperation and security provided by the United States, thanks to the NATO umbrella. When finally we were also given a chance to join the community of free nations, many were inclined also in Poland to believe in Fukuyama's "End of History" in the version of the universe triumph of liberal democracy and peaceful cooperation of countries in that globalized world. Today, however, we can see and we today we

repeat, according to the Polish experience, that the foundations of our security have been seriously shaken. We must state the fact openly. The post-Cold War period of the dividend of peace is over.

Today, the problem of security manifests itself with its own might. From energy security through the defense of our citizens from the acts of terror, the support for territorial integrity of countries that are close to us up to the necessity to strengthen our own defense in the face of the return to the use of force in our direct neighborhood and our region and international relations.

Last Wednesday, Tunisia became a scene of a brutal and cowardly terrorist attack. It's been a year now since the armed occupation of Crimea. It was an anniversary of the event that was the first forced annexation of a territory of another state in Europe since the Second World War. By perpetrating this unprecedented act of (inaudible), Russia challenged European security and order. By the same token, Russia undermined the trust that is so important for the European continent, based on the Helsinki Final Act. Those events prompt an in-depth reflection on the entire Western policy towards Russia. For too long, we were illusioned in the West that Russia and its own interests will accept our offer to get involved in the network of various connections with the Western world and will go down the path of modernization and democratization. For too long, we wouldn't see, in the Kremlin, the rebirth of tendencies to stifle liberties, to think in

terms of the policy of force, in terms of the policy of zones of influence to the revision of the post-Cold War order in Europe.

Ten years ago already, President Vladimir Putin defined the collapse of the USSR the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century. This is how he defined a process, which in Poland and all over central and eastern European Union and I believe all over the United Europe, is seen as a source of freedom and a development of the whole Europe. It is worthwhile remembering that for years, there has also been an increased financial effort of Russia for the development of their armed forces and they have invested over four percent of their GDP.

Therefore, a new way of thinking is needed, a new long-term transatlantic strategy towards Russia. The strategy that could unite the west in the face of a new challenge which affects the key values and interests of the European community, Euro-Atlantic community. This strategy that would combine the efforts of the leading institutions on both sides of the Atlantic, both the European Union and NATO. I hope that it will be one of the top conclusions of this year's Brussels Forum.

Concurrently, it is for the first time that we are confronted with the hybrid toolbox in a conflict applied on such a scale and this format, starting from the propaganda machinery through cyber-attacks, provocation or energy blackmail. The intensity of the information warfare we experience is unprecedented since the

Cold War. This war is waged on it by mass media, but also research institutions of dubious connections and served by your politicians.

This war has an objective to cast a seed of doubt as to our reasons and (inaudible) and create divisions in the transatlantic community. All these actions, however, would not have brought results if it hadn't been for a threat of using regular armed forces and the military force. And actually, it was the case, ladies and gentlemen. In the period of such a great uncertainty, it is difficult to strengthen the unity of solidarity of the poorly understood West. It is absolutely a must, however, and the challenge is all the greater that by strengthening the transatlantic community, at the same time, we have to seek common answers to geostrategic problems in all our neighborhood. And in today's globalized worlds, problems of one member of the Euroatlantic community soon or later may escalate and become problems of the entire west. And the result of that, we, the Poles, but also many other nations of our region of Europe neighboring Ukraine not lose from our radar screen the challenge that's immerging, for example, south of the European borders. It is worthwhile remembering that among victims of the Wednesday's attack in Tunis, there were also Polish people. These challenges, both in the east and in the south, will be raised during the upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw. That is why already now we have to try to seek the right answers.

The different threats, though diverse, their nature is different. The nature of the threats is different in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, or in Ukraine. However, they have one common denominator and this denominator is the contempt for international order for human rights, for the rule of law and for the idea of civil liberties. The contempt for people who desire freedom, people who want to be a democratic nation, to think the world of the western values. It is not a coincidence that the original target of the western terrorist attack in Tunisia was the Parliament. It is not a coincidence that those Ukrainians went out (inaudible) in Kyiv proclaiming that they were sovereign and their own state provoked fury in a powerful neighbor, which opted to launch an unprecedented aggression in Europe, the return to the imperial policy of force, the drive to keep neighbors in servitude and dependence, denial to recognize civilized rules of the law and international relations. There are concerning remembrance to the darkest periods of the history of Europe of the 20th century, the war ongoing for a year. As for Russia, a brutal attempt to trample not only the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but primarily sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation to deprive it of its dreams to repair their state, dreams of their membership in the Euroatlantic community of nations.

It simply puts a hold to the aspirations and dreams of Ukrainians to find their place in the world of Western values. In the times when we have to face these fundamental challenges, Europe and the United States share the responsibility for

the strength of the transatlantic bond and for NATO, which has played and I hope will continue to play a pivotal stabilizing role also in the global international order.

Thus, in spite of disputes that emerge now and then, we should not cease in our efforts to strengthen the transatlantic trust, which is sometimes violated or questioned. That is a huge task for governments and civil society institutions, both sides of the Atlantic, including, as I can see, for the German Marshall Fund.

The alliance in its stabilization role is based on a strong fundament, a strong foundation, which is the Washington Treaty, the readiness to reach out and help one another, should the need arise. In Article III of the Washington Treaty, member states committed themselves that by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. These commitments form a constitution of our thinking of Europe's security and transatlantic bonds.

It is important that last NATO summit in Wales and in Newport reconfirm these commitments. I hope that we will not be short of consistency in implementation of the decisions of the Newport Summit. It is a question of not only effective mechanisms that would stop the possible aggressor, it is about the credibility of the alliance. The implementation of Newport's commitments is the question of the credibility of NATO.

Our commitments are also very important in terms of defense spending. They are as important as other Newport commitments and those Newport commitments must be implemented and all their aspects concerning the defense infrastructure proposition logistics, as well as specialized systems that would allow for the fast and effective response. What is equally important is the development of our credibility by means of actual growth of the level of financial engagement and the development of the power of the alliance. In particular, it is about the allocation by NATO member states of at least two percent of their GDP to defense.

I know that one can and one should point out the volume of the defense budgets, but at the same time, we have to remember that at the time when NATO spoke to it as two percent of GDP, which, in many countries, is much lower. And Russia, at the same time, consistently, for many years, the level of the funding of their own armed forces is about four percent of their GDP.

We can't turn a blind eye to this crude reality because this crude reality decides upon our relations here. I would like to say that I'm proud that Poland reached the level of two percent of GDP devoted to defense already in 2001. I am proud of that because I believe it's really worthwhile thinking ahead and not responding only to the situation that has happened.

We are counting on our allies to undertake a similar effort and we are grateful to such countries as Estonia that has already raised their defense budgets

timely. In our part of the world, we understand perfectly well that defense cuts can simply backfire quite fast. They can backfire an unprecedentedly higher cost to pay in case of decreasing our security today. And it can imply also the possibility to lose our sovereignty tomorrow. In the history of our part of Europe, it has happened many times.

Just as no one doubts that there is the need to invest in a better future of our children, so no one should doubt that the investment in security is an invaluable part of this investment. We remember that is the cooperation with the United States and NATO umbrella has created the necessary security space for the development of Western Europe.

Today, when we are again facing security challenges, NATO must remain an effective military alliance so that it could provide us with the possibility of making decisions without yielding to threats, threats even because of the sense of our own weakness. Deterrence is not the antithesis of cooperation and dialog, but it is the necessarily complementation for the armed forces in the world that disregard their commitments if they sense the weakness in their partners, including military weakness, or if they sense indecision or lack of determination. The history of Europe of the 20th century offers us a painful lesson that concessions in the face of violence are taken by an aggressor as encouragement to continue the aggression.

We also should remember this in the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

Ladies and Gentlemen, geologists say that in over 200 million years, Europe and America, the continents will merge. But we should ask ourselves a question. Why wait so long? We can, today--today, we can unite Europeans and Americans. We don't have to wait for geology to do the job for us. Let's not waste this incredible--difficult, but incredible opportunity. We must act now. The bonds of Europe with North America should not be limited to security alone. They should also be connected with what is the foundation of security, which is economy and politics.

Soon after the war, the Marshall plan let Western Europe rise from ashes and American cargo planes helped the people of west Berlin survive that Soviet blockade. Poland was not able to get the benefit of the Marshall plan, but I believe that here in the GMF, that has the name of this eminent politician, it is worthwhile saying that, today, it is Ukraine that needs a new Marshall plan to support, to carry out difficult reforms. The biggest threat to Ukraine is not only the military division of Taman, what is their greatest enemy is their own weaknesses and the weakness of the system. The fate of Ukraine, the chance of Ukraine to carry out the deep reform and transformation is also the key to the future of the whole Eastern

Europe. And I believe that it is also the key to the future of the whole Western world.

That is why I believe that a new Marshall plan is a difficult challenge, but it is incredibly important. The new momentum for the transatlantic community should be provided also by common economic space in the face of the TTIP. In Poland, we realize perfectly well that the execution of the TTIP is difficult for all the parties. But from the Polish perspective, from the perspective of the Polish observation of history as well as the future, it is something which is most important to take up from the perspective of the strength of the Western world in the future and the Western world, only if it is strong can be safe and secure.

It is not just a trade deal. It is a missing link of the transatlantic community, a product of civilizational magnitude, if you want to keep the viability of our community, let us invest in the success of this incredibly important idea. When the gravity of the world is shifting towards the Pacific, we should give the Western world more stability and more security by means of strengthening the transatlantic relations, the keeping of political, military, economic and social transatlantic bonds is, in my opinion, the best investment in our common future and our common security.

Today, when Europe is surrounded by cowards from the south and from the east by authoritarian regime, the system which is increasingly brutal for people

who are longing for freedom, more than ever we need perseverance in our striving to assure security and conditions for prosperity and welfare across the transatlantic space.

Our shared future and the future of our common values shall depend on it and here, we really have to show that we are courageous, bold and we have to face up to those great challenges. Thank you very much.

Dr. Karen Donfried: President Komorowski, thank you so much for those very thoughtful remarks about the challenges we face, both from the east and from the south, for your suggestions on how we might (inaudible) those challenges, whether it's increase defense spending or deeper transatlantic cooperation. And I admit I'd never heard the merging of Europe and the U.S. geologically, but it's a wonderful metaphor. And the president is on a tight schedule, but he very kindly has agreed to take a couple of questions so we will turn it over to you. Who would like to ask the first question? Please. And please introduce yourself. The mic will be coming.

Mr. Josh Rogin: Thank you. My name is Josh Rogin. I'm (inaudible) "Bloomberg View". Mr. President, we're told that for (inaudible) eastern front has been bolstered (inaudible) disproportionate to the (inaudible).

H.E. Bronislaw Komorowski: Well, first of all, it is about the implementation of Newport's decisions. We all know that between making a

decision and then implementation of the decision, there is a long and uneasy way to follow, whether those decisions are implemented in the practice of NATO, we will be able to evaluate during NATO summit in Warsaw next year. What is most important for us is not only the footprint, the presence of NATO's installations, we believe that it is important, of course, first of all, from the perspective of the effectiveness for the execution of the contingency plan that we have without a defense infrastructure, without pre-positioned equipment and logistics, the execution of the contingency plan in case of crisis can be quite difficult. The pre-positioned logistics, like (inaudible), ammunition, different stores for logistics, it's very important and necessary for everyone to have the conviction, including the potential aggressor to have this conviction, that NATO is truly determined to execute contingency plans.

Except for the contingency plans, we believe that is what is fundamental is the existence of the defense plans that would be much deeper and detailed for all those very complicated questions of defense.

Another thing is the necessity to confirm, by means of the presence of NATO troops. I'm talking here about this permanent continuous presence of NATO troops to confirm NATO's determination. And it is happening, although there is still this discussion underway whether we call this presence permanent or continuous or rotational. Poland really appreciates very much the decision of

NATO concerning this continuous presence, but we do not want to be treated as a country that, from the perspective of the observation of our powerful Russian neighbor, any limitations connected with the membership in NATO. Poland also gives quite much for our potential. For example, we have deployed a significant number of troops to NATO operation in Afghanistan. And today we are also participating in the air policing mission to protect the airspace over the Baltic states. So any investment in the defense system in Poland, the security of Poland, leads also to the growth of our engagement in common operations for the security of other countries of the alliance.

Dr. Karen Donfried: Thank you very much and I'd seen a second hand here. This will be the last question.

Unidentified man: I would like to ask you, I understand why you are talking maybe about the military side or as the alliance side, but if, when you are in the conflict with different partner, you should try to have the conflict on a field where you (inaudible) and the military field is probably not the field where NATO is as big an advantage in comparison to Russia. I think that we have to restore the advantage, but not as (inaudible) and if we try to pull it back to the economic field and political field, what are Poland's suggestions to make clear to Russia that this conflict, they can't win. Democracy might be slow, but in the long run, there is (inaudible) today, more than 80 percent of Germans say we can't trust Russia.

More than half of them say we need to invest more in our defense. (Inaudible) so what is Poland's proposals that we get the conflict on the fields where we have a far bigger advantage?

H.E. Bronislaw Komorowski: I agree with you largely. I agree that the Western world should use these elements of its arsenal where it has a decisive supremacy. Certainly, the Western world is mainly better off in the field of economy and sometimes it is important for us to remember that the Russian economy, the size of the Russian economy as equal to the Italian economy, with all due respect to the Italian economy and Italian achievements, but the size of the whole Russian economy is equal to the economy of Italy.

In terms of the demographic potential, Russia has 15 million people more than Japan, it's neighbors. So these proportions are not really shocking that they don't really give grounds for great respect. The economic power of the Western world should be definitely taken advantage of as much as possible to build mechanisms to discourage Russia and other countries from their possible aggression. The problem is that with these proportions of the economic power, Russia, however, decided to use their armed forces. Russia decided to go with the armed solution towards Ukraine and Russia was successful in its attempts, with all this disproportion of the economic power. So the Western world has a problem, which is connected with the fact that the Western world has lesser possibility to

mobilize Western resources and use them in confrontation. The Western world is less determined and there is a more difficult mechanism for making agreements.

What is an additional strength on the side of the West is the unity. Even if some weaker decisions, less determined, but the weaker decisions, if they are the decisions of the united Western world, they are always better and they work better. The problem is that a possible success of the policy of using force by Putin against Ukraine will be an encouragement not to be afraid that the West would use its great economic power, that using pressure organized in different manners one can be politically successful without risking too much. That is why the policy of sanctions is so important, but it's relatively mild.

I believe that Russia feels most painfully the decrease of the prices of oil and this is not an element of sanctions. That is simply the outcome of the trends that are taking place in the global economy and it will be something Russia will be limited by. But for the time being, Russia, with all these disproportions of the economic power, is successful because of its determination and the early launching of the processes of the modernization of their armed forces and their capabilities. Russia has been modernizing their armed forces for over eight or nine years now and it has been consistent. It has invested a lot in their defense capabilities and Russia wants now to get dividend from their defense investments and this is the Russian advantage.

Dr. Karen Donfried: President Komorowski, it has been a privilege to host you this morning. Thanks from GMF for being here and I know everyone will want to thank you for your thoughts.

Unidentified woman: Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Mr. Steven Clemons from The Atlantic.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Good morning, everyone. What a powerful session from the President of Poland. I was going to do this differently this morning and start with a focus on unconventional war, but he set up so very interestingly this question in a very avant-garde way and made one of the most provocative suggestions, which is merging the United States and Europe. You don't hear that every day from a leader from a European country. That might lose votes at home in many places, but I think we're going to set up a question with our friends in AV right now so pull out your cell phones and we're going to answer a question that addresses the transatlantic relationship and the question of what is the biggest challenge facing the transatlantic relationship. So could we pull that up on this screen? And our four responses are that we have up here, and you may have better ones that you can tell us about later, but what is the biggest challenge to the transatlantic community? Russia, spying, climate change or the economy? Let's see how this comes out.

Will we get a big musical crescendo here? And the answer, the economy, interestingly. Michael Froman's session with the trade minister yesterday might have been the most popular session of the Brussels Forum. So Russia, 40 percent. Spying, 4.8. Climate change, 4.8. And the economy, 50 percent so that's clarifying. I think that when we now begin thinking about the questions we're going to discuss today, which is the future of conflict, it's something *The Atlantic* magazine, of which I'm Washington editor-at-large, has been thinking about for some time.

I don't see David Ignatius in the audience, but sometimes the audience you want to have are not people in ties. I see Jeff Sessions is out of his tie, thank you. But when you read a David Ignatius novel--oh, you're here. Yeah, yeah. I was just--will you stand up for a minute, David? I was just going to comment that we needed people in black t-shirts and who had tattoos and earrings and the hacker community, because David Ignatius' novels, the last two of them, "Blood Money" and "The Director" are very interesting, their pression (sic) in terms of this question of the future of conflict, because they take us out of the old silos of just thinking about conventional warfare in its old forms. And so when you begin thinking about the kind of conflict that--I'm going to sell at least 200 copies of the book here, David. You see things about financial intelligence. You look at the ability to track the connection to drones, a very, very different treatment of asymmetric challenges. And I think that David has done among--and there may be

other novelists in the room that we don't know about, that are able to look beyond the conventional ways that we've thought of conflict, and move into arenas there. It's as rich and diverse and innovative in many ways as what we've seen in the financial sector. Everything that is happening digitally in businesses today is now happening, as well, in the world of war. And we have four stunningly great panelists to discuss this.

Just to my left, General Philip Breedlove, who is the supreme allied commander of Europe. It's great to have you with us. Michele Flournoy, co-founder and CEO of the Center for New American Security, formerly the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. She's sort of, in my mind, the shadow secretary of defense, since we all know she was kind of asked to run the Pentagon and deferred. Not many people like that in this room. Yang Jiemian is the president emeritus of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. And Marwan Lahoud, who's the chief strategy and market officer for Airbus. Please give a round of applause for our great panel.

So, General, I'm going to ask you to start, and help lay out this question as you see it. You probably have, at hand, more resources than anyone I can think of in the world to run a conventional war. But take yourself out of that hat for a minute and begin giving us your insights into this question of a hot war as you see it unfolding in the future.

General Philip Breedlove: Well, thank you. And thanks for having me back. Had a great visit last year and I look forward to a great conversation this morning. So I thought I would pick up in a place that the president sort of introduced. He called it the "hybrid toolbox." So I thought I would open my remarks today just addressing this hybrid war, or some would call an unconventional warfare.

And frankly, to start off, to sort of demystify it, there is this feeling that it is something new and exciting or different. And it is different, but really, it is a collection of tools that we've seen in warfare before. We in the military like to use a simple model when we teach in our schools. We keep everything very simple. So we use a model called DIME, diplomatic, informational, military, and economics. So, as we dissect this hybrid war or this unconventional war that we see being waged today, the new things are how these tools that we have recognized from before are now put together and used in new ways to bring new kinds of pressure diplomatically to attack a capitol, to attack the credibility of the leadership of a nation, diplomatically to try to disassemble those support mechanisms for our capitol, those alliances, those agreements, and other nations that are a part of helping a capitol.

So, first, in a diplomatic way, to attack credibility and to try to separate a nation from its support mechanisms. Informationally, this is probably the most impressive new part of this hybrid war, all of the different tools to create a false

narrative. We begin to talk about the speed and the power of a lie, how to get a false narrative out, and then how to sustain that false narrative through all of the new tools that are out there, the social media tools, the way that we can use the internet and purchasing and employing those informational tools that get this narrative out.

Militarily, of course, the military tools are relatively unchanged, but how they are used or how they are hidden in their use, is the new part of this hybrid war. How do we recognize, how do we characterize and then how do we attribute this new employment of the military in a way that is built to bring about ambiguity? Employed to bring about ambiguity. And that ambiguity, then, to either be embraced by those who want to embrace it or attacked by those who see the subversiveness of it. And then, if that sort of unattributable use of the military doesn't work, and the objectives are not being met, then a more overt use of the military.

And then finally, in the economic realm. How to bring pressure, not only in the more recognized economic ways, but in energy, in the use of bringing pressure against loans and things. So this new hybrid war really is across that spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military and economic, just a new way to bring old tools together to bring pressure against--

Mr. Steven Clemons: How much of that falls within your purview as you--

General Philip Breedlove: So precious little, frankly.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Um-hum.

General Philip Breedlove: Diplomatically, of course, we have an alliance that has great diplomatic pressure or capabilities, I guess I should say. But in the military, that's not our--quite our forte. Informationally, I think it's--some is a part of the military business because it's important that in an informational world--

Mr. Steven Clemons: Do you have a team of kind of black-shirted gothic, you know, goth hackers at hand?

General Philip Breedlove: No, in fact--

Mr. Steven Clemons: Do you want some? David knows some.

General Philip Breedlove: We'll leave that for other elements of the government or of the alliance. No, but what the military needs to do is to use those traditional military intelligence tools to develop the truth. The way you attack a lie is with the truth.

Mr. Steven Clemons: I guess the one question I had as you go through and you give us a roster of the way you look at how conflict is unfolding and these other dimensions of both how to respond to it, but also what you're seeing, because we're seeing, you know, particularly in Russia, Ukraine, kind of a gray war, you know. Unbranded soldiers, folks coming in, materials coming in, that Russia denies are its own. I mean, it reminds me of the '50s, '60s, and '70s when both we

did that kind of thing, but also the Soviets did that, in the sense that you have-- we're playing conflict in the shadows. The military dimension where you have, has serious resources, but it looks as if these other dimensions, perhaps which aren't under your shoulder, are less resourced than the military side.

What do you think we need to do to sort of alter our frame of thinking of conflict that we're not doing today?

General Philip Breedlove: Well, I think that you have to attack an all of a government approach with an all of government approach. The military needs to be able to do its part, but we need to bring exposure to those diplomatic pressures and return the diplomatic pressure.

We need to, as a Western group of nations or as an alliance, engage in this information warfare to, again, the way to attack the false narrative is to drag the false narrative out into the light and expose it.

Militarily, our tools are, again, available, but they have to be a policy first, a policy decision--

Mr. Steven Clemons: And Dr. Jiemian, I want to jump to China for a minute and I have. You share with us how China looks at the unfolding nature of conflict today, particularly in its non-traditional forms. And why don't you offer a critique of what General Breedlove just shared?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: I'm Chinese. Chinese opens our remarks by three ways. First, the world, the second, the history, the third is old saying.

So how about our world view now? The Chinese, the mainstream, thinks that nowadays is a combination of both traditional and a non-traditional security threat. China is facing great threats from both sides. Look at China's periphery. We had Afghanistan war and the bombing and the shelling and the China Burma border and also, the terrorist attacks at the very heart of the capitol, Tiananmen Square. So, we failed this very pressing threat.

The Chinese history, this is the 70 year anniversary of the end of World War II. China suffered a great deal during World War II, but stood firmly with our American allies, our European allies and others. We won the war against fascism and we cherish it very much, especially during the past 35 years of opening up and the reform. China enjoyed great successes in social improvement and economic progresses.

So we value this saying that peace for rising and peace for development. And certainly the oldest saying, Chinese oldest saying is a big reservoir. You can pick up whatever you like, but a good test is what most Chinese are picking up. And that is you have a better neighbor than a far distant relative. So we want to create and preserve the peaceful and amicable involvement. Of course, we are

facing a lot of problems and challenges and look at the other end of Eurasia, that is Europe, NATO and the transatlantic.

As the president of Poland said, it might be millions of years that transatlantic merge together, but for Eurasia, we are already together. So we benefitted a lot from the great works by Dr. Brzezinski, of his brilliant strategic thinking and so we pay close attention. We want to work with our American and the European strategists to look at the new phenomena and try to find common standings in meeting with these great challenges. And of course in the meanwhile, we have to work out our differences.

Mr. Steven Clemons: You know, with General Breedlove's comments on hybrid war, hybrid conflict, information war, I feel as if I need to ask you to what degree you're worried about what you see Russia doing in places like Ukraine, perhaps east Moldova, other places where this rise or exploitation of ethnic nationalism, ethnic separatism in certain conflicts, causes China worry or not. Or do you think Russia is just a great, great country, just, you know, doing what's--comes naturally.

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Well, Steve, it's very complicated. Look back into 20 years when the Soviet Union was disintegrated. There was a time that both the West and Russia tried to come together. And at a point of time even the United States and the Russians were called each other allies. But now what happened?

We saw the Ukraine crisis. And China's standing is very clear. First of all, we believe in and keep to the principle of non-interference. Secondly, we should look into the far more complicated historical and the present backgrounds and the conditions. And thirdly, let us think if there's still something that we can do for that, for instance, Russia and United States, and the European countries work together on the chemical weapons in Syria. And P5 + 1 worked on the Iranian issues.

So China would like to listen to both sides and try to reason. And China hopes that the last thing we want to see is the re-happening of the blocking between the east and the west. And this is not a final time that there is no point of return. So we should still work harder on it. According to the Chinese tradition, old medicine philosophy, if you build up the positive in the proportion, the negative will be subdued. Thank you.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Interesting. Michele Flournoy, I'd like to ask you to sort of take us further into this arena. I know that CNAS has done a lot of work in the issue of the future of conflict in nontraditional ways, but cyber. We haven't talked about space, we haven't talked about a lot of the other evolving ways, and you've also done some thinking about the kind of gray conflicts that we're seeing. So what do you see as the sort of litany of kind of new challenges that we should be considering? And secondly, because you've thought so much about policy and

resources, how do we need to begin matching resources and strategy to these evolving threats?

Ms. Michele Flournoy: So I think, you know, hybrid warfare is in the future going to come in many different flavors. We're used to seeing it at the low end of the spectrum of conflict, you know, from our experience as allies in Afghanistan, the counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and so forth. We're now, in the case of Russia-Ukraine, seeing a very powerful state actor, militarily powerful anyway, employing hybrid warfare in cross-border aggression and so forth. You can imagine in the future even more intense forms of hybrid warfare that also include more traditional use of conventional power.

But I think part of what we have to anticipate is that none of this is sitting still. There's a lot of technological change, capability development, that's going on that's going to change the face of warfare as well, whether it's increasing use of robotics and autonomous or semi-autonomous systems, the development of directed energy weapons, much more robust capabilities in cyberspace, same in space, and on down the line. I mean, we could spend a whole session talking just about how technology is going to change the face of warfare in the future.

But I think the most important point is the one that General Breedlove started with, is, by definition, wherever it falls on the spectrum of conflict, hybrid warfare requires tremendous integration. And most importantly, the prevention and

deterrence of this kind of warfare requires the tremendous capacity for integration. And I think where we are weakest, at this point, is in that integration and particularly the informational elements. Mainly, because in democratic systems, those elements are not owned by the government. Those are freely operated. It's a free and open media. It's social media that's unconstrained and not in the hands of government and so forth. So I think it's that the informational dimensions and the integration aspects that are going to be pose the greatest challenges in the future.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Now, when Thomas Schelling received the Nobel Prize for economics for his work in game theory and strategic gaming between the Soviets and the United States, he said, you know, people think that what they did is came out with a mathematical code that mimicked human decision-making. He said that wasn't the case at all, that you had to actually teach the Soviets in that case the sort of thinking. It was a culture that grew up around it. It was a powerful speech that Schelling gave. And when you talk about these different technological changes and shifts as contributing at some level the deterrence, when I hear "deterrence," the other side needs to know on what basis it's being deterred or what it should fear or what the consequences are. So how do you, taking what Schelling said at one point, how do you begin taking these various elements of new technology being brought in, information systems being integrated, and sort of communicate in a sense to your adversary, whomever that adversary might be,

either a state actor or a non-state actor, that they're going to pay certain kinds of consequences and thus begin to develop an ecosystem where deterrence can return? I think it's a real challenge. I don't think deterrence is easy in this world when everything looks so chaotic.

Ms. Michele Flournoy: No. I mean, I think we have to start in each case by really trying to understand what a potential adversary's or actor's calculus is. And how do you best affect that calculus, both with incentives to do the right thing, but also potential costs should they choose to do the wrong thing? And that may go far beyond the military domain. It may get into the economic realm or the realm of political relationships and isolation versus integration.

And so I do think you have to think it through very carefully, you have to be asymmetric in how--too often we think in terms of very conventional response. We have to be more asymmetric in our thinking about how to affect the calculus of others. And then, we have to be willing to communicate that.

I think after more than a decade of war, with all of the economic challenges that Europe and the United States have been facing in recent years, I think there is a wariness, and sometimes that wariness translates into a reluctance to ensure that we are making the necessary investments and communicating clearly to be effective, even in deterrence.

Mr. Steven Clemons: General, I saw your stars stand up on that one. Did you want to comment real quick?

General Philip Breedlove: I think I'll let that--

Mr. Steven Clemons: Okay. Marwan, I want to bring you in. Marwan Lahoud with Airbus. As I understand it, about 25 percent of Airbus' revenues are in the defense space, you know, everything from C4 and missiles and aircraft. How do you look at this broad question? When President Komorowski was also talking about the issue of defense spending and looking at this question of how much is too little. And so I'm interested in your perspective. I'm sure you want to see increase in defense spending. But how much is too little when it comes to your thinking about what's needed?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: If we look at that question from the strategic standpoint and realize that our environment is characterized by revival or, I should say, survival of large-scale challenges, they have always been there, ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. If we assume that we have a shift from warfare to terror, if I'm more precise, bringing terror in the living room of each of our citizens, because terror has always existed. And last, if we consider that strategic information warfare is growing, all our networks, all our networks, are under threat. And we put that in perspective with--

Mr. Steven Clemons: Has Airbus been hacked?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: Yes.

Mr. Steven Clemons: By Russians?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: Yes. I don't know.

Mr. Steven Clemons: By Chinese?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: I don't want to know.

Mr. Steven Clemons: By Americans?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: I don't want to know.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Got to keep it fair.

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: We are subject to, say, more than one attack a day? Keep in mind that 1.5 million people fall in cyber crime daily, 600,000 Facebook pages are destroyed daily. So this is the size, this is the magnitude of the cyber attacks or cyber criminality. But back to my point, if we consider that the defense spend has grown by 1.7 percent over the last three years in the world, that Russia average increase in defense spend is 10 percent over the last three years and we consider that Europe is still in the defense cut logic, I say it is too little.

I say it is too little because what is expected is the following. The West will need coalition, will look for supranational legitimacy, and will operate all around the planet. It is not that we can limit the intervention or we can limit the areas, the places where the West will have to protect itself.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Interesting. Let me ask you all a question. I want to go to the audience here shortly and just involving you and if you're not, I may just actually call on the senator or others and, you know, without much notice. So be prepared. But what occurred to me was, if you look at Iran, for instance, today, and one of only big criticisms of Iran are the development of transnational terror networks or networks operating through proxies. There's a lot of debate here in the room about Syria. Syria, to me, has looked like a civil war with a proxy war built on top of it, which is what makes it such a hard knot to untie. But there are big players operating through proxies. The United States--I asked this of Bill Burns, our former Deputy Secretary of State, the other day--seems to not play that role very well anymore. We used to operate through proxies in various conflicts, we would have agents that we would fund, we would move in these various ways. We've tried, to some degree, with moderate Syrians, hasn't worked out so well. But I'm interested to jump back at Michele for a moment, saying, has the United States--when you look at Russia, you look at Iran, you look at other players, the Saudis who are operating so actively in the world through proxy groups, but we're not. When we talk about involvement, it's directly Americans, it's directly American drones or American boots or American money, American weapon systems, and we're not playing the role the Russians are of (inaudible) much

anymore. And I'm interested in whether or not you think that is a mistake, that we ought to go back to our toolkit of (inaudible).

Ms. Michele Flournoy: You know, it's true the United States does not support terrorist networks throughout the world.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Well, no, not terror networks, but--

Ms. Michele Flournoy: Well, that is what Iran is doing. And, you know, and I think there is, you know, it's arguably what, you know, the kind of proxy war that Russia's waging in Ukraine is not something the United States would embrace either. That said, I think, to take your question more seriously, you know, I think it's a little bit of an overstatement, in that I think when you look at, for example, our counterterrorism approach around the world, you know, as President Obama laid out in his last speech on counterterrorism, there is an element where we are really trying to work very closely with partners on the ground, whether it's Somalia--it was Yemen before the coup and the revolution there. But there is an element of trying to build the capacity of local partners to be able to deal with challenges on their home turf.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Are any of those going well right now?

Ms. Michele Flournoy: Some.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Some?

Ms. Michele Flournoy: Some. The ones you don't read about. But I do think that it is not a concept that the U.S. embraces as much as it has in past historical periods, and I think there may be times when we miss opportunities. For example, in Syria, I think the prospect of providing support to a moderate opposition was much more viable three or four years ago than it is today.

Mr. Steven Clemons: General?

General Philip Breedlove: Well, I think I would agree with everything that has been said. And I would go back to some of the premises we discussed a little bit before, and actually had a great conversation in the anteroom before about the problems that you face trying to carry on one of these proxy wars today, the power of social media and the other things that are used to make sure that everyone understands what's actually happening. It makes it a little difficult.

Mr. Steven Clemons: You know, recently Minister (inaudible) of France was in Washington, saying that he worried that we were not paying enough attention to terror networks in Africa, that they were already trying to reach out, this was some months ago, to groups like ISIS, swear loyalty, mimic their behavior. They were beginning to do beheadings and coming and learning the social media techniques, developing agencies that would essentially promote and market their materials. Which is part of, to a certain degree, of the non-state actor hybrid war that you're talking about. But how big--are we missing--are we going to be engaged, General?

And, you know, Dr. Jiemian, in Africa, China has such substantial assets and people and investments. Do you worry about an evolution of a kind of new form of conflict, some of what we've been seeing in the Middle East and whatnot, but growing more rapidly and evolving in Africa? General?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Oh, yes. And China is showing great concerns. For instance, three years ago, we had the great evacuation from Libya.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Right.

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Yeah. And then, now we still have tens of thousands of workers in Iraq. People--

Mr. Steven Clemons: And is China doing anything proactively itself in cyber or dealing with some of these campaigns on social media? Are you doing some of the things that the U.S. and Europe are doing with regards to these groups?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: No. Because--

Mr. Steven Clemons: You're just letting it all happen.

Dr. Yang Jiemian: No. China, technically speaking, is in the lower (inaudible) than the United States and Europe and our influence is very limited. But we are very much concerned that if the beheading or burning-people-in-the-cage happens to the Chinese workers in Iraq, that the whole society in China will be burned as well. And we also think that, nowadays, we are facing a very different situation, even compared with 2001 when 9/11 happened. At that time the terrorists

were only cells and invisible, but now, they are physically--they even organized a so-called state and they are waging so the many battles and giving the threats. So China would like to work with the Americans and the Europeans to combat this new situation.

Mr. Steven Clemons: General?

General Philip Breedlove: Well, I would just turn the answer a little bit to what I would call two things that we are uncomfortable doing in the West. First of all, we are uncomfortable in entering into an information warfare or exchange to try to counter these false narratives because we find it hard to organize how we will shape information, apart from telling the truth. And so we have--

Mr. Steven Clemons: You're saying we're uncomfortable, but should we develop that comfort level?

General Philip Breedlove: I think what we should develop is the comfort level to actually engage. We can't win if we don't engage, if we don't get on the field. And right now, we can't find our way on the field to do this business. The other thing I would say is we're uncomfortable with the speed at which this happens.

In the West, we tend to wait until it becomes a really big deal before we engage. And I think what we learn is that if we were to engage earlier, when the problem is smaller, we might be able to deal with it quicker. So I think the

problems are just we're a little uncomfortable with engaging at speed and we really haven't developed in the West, although we have the best information systems in the world.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Marwan?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: Yeah, I would like to add to that. This is a main change. The compression of events in time. Everything goes much faster because of the information networks, the social media. This is what makes proxy warfare almost impossible. This is why the proxy have taken their autonomy. And time is so short so we need to react quick.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Just before I go to the audience, last question, General. But I have been blown away by the issue that ISIS has apparently incorporated 18,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters, you know, speaking 60 different languages, many of whom have had no battle experience before and turning them into what ISIS has done. We've spent hundreds of billions of dollars training in various countries around the world with some success, but some failures, some significant failures, where brigades have just collapsed and where there's now a call for very high--what are they getting right in their ability to amalgamate and turn such dissimilar, untrained people into a fighting force that seems so effective versus what we're doing?

And I think that comes back right down to that nexus of the future of conflict because they're doing that we find difficulty in doing with constituents who have a lot to lose in these areas. What do you think the answer is here?

General Philip Breedlove: Well, I don't know that I do know the answer, but I will say this. They are able to reach and find what is important to these people, what motivates these people and then they create an ability to fill that need initially through the social media, Internet, et cetera, et cetera. And then, when they bring them onboard, they continue to address these basic wants that of value, of purpose, a sense of something as part of a larger good. And they, whether it's right, wrong or indifferent, they are able to reach into these people and find that motivation.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Michele, your thoughts?

Mrs. Michele Flournoy: Can I just comment on this? I think that's absolutely right. You know, ISIS has figured out how to strongly motivate and incorporate a certain genre of people. I think when you look at the forces we have trained and to the extent there have been failures, it's not because we did the military training poorly. It's because those forces were not connected to, were not motivated to defend their government because they saw the government as illegitimate or non-inclusive or nonresponsive to the needs of the population. So it's that political dimension. It's the legitimacy of the power that they're serving or the cause they're serving that has led to the cases of collapse when they've occurred.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Fascinating. Let me go to the audience and draw in here. We're going to go right here.

Ms. Xenia Wickett: Hi, I got a two-part--sorry, Xenia Wickett from Chatham House. I've got a two-part question. The first one is on timing, and this is to the general specifically. You've just mentioned how events happening far faster than they were in the past, and yet if we look at NATO, we're not talking about speeding up our decision-making in any meaningful way. Why is that not on the agenda? I mean, I understand it's hugely politically difficult. Why is that not on the agenda? The other is I want to move to a different type of conflict. And one of the questions at the beginning was natural disasters.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Right, climate change.

Ms. Xenia Wickett: Exactly. We can see those coming. You say we've got to move faster. We know that water is going to be an issue. We know that natural earth minerals is going to be an issue. We know that energy is an issue. Why is it that we're unable to take the steps now that, as you said, will be far easier now than in the future? It's a different type of conflict, but it's going to be huge--

Mr. Steven Clemons: I mean, in this room, very few people thought that was a serious challenge. I mean, four percent. I just wanted to note that, that in even in this room, it didn't rank highly. So the question is decision-making speed in NATO, General.

General Philip Breedlove: So, actually, I think there's more good news here than you may recognize. I think overtly you see then, on the military side of NATO, we have moved to increase our speed of response and our readiness for response. It's bigger than the very high readiness taskforce that you hear about. We are actually changing the responsiveness of the entire NRF and in a small kernel of that very high-readiness taskforce, the VJTF. And we have before the NAC now, a series of decisions that would speed up my ability to bring that to the field.

But you, I think, are asking a tougher question, and that is the political decision to employ. And there are nations in the NAC that are calling for just that conversation. How do we politically match what the military is now going to be able to do in its reaction speed? And that's going to be a great debate.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Marwan, did you want to respond? No. Dr. Jiemian, I want to ask about the question about climate change and have you address that because China--President Xi--President Obama came out, initiated a big leap for China in which it agreed to bind itself to targets in 2030. But on this issue of climate change as a national security issue, do you think China is stepping forward and is going to continue to do things that--because China is the country that matters most in terms of bringing on new carbon. So where are you in that?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Thank you. I think both China and the United States are the largest two countries facing with the challenge of climate change. And there is

a process. At the beginning, China was taking up this matter only from the technical term. But now we look at it more from the social, political and comprehensive way. Not only concerned with our country, but with the world. So that is why China and the United States agreed during President Obama's last visit in November.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Let me challenge you a little bit. I have the sense that China has to be dragged into these issues like climate change because it feels as if it's giving up growth, it's giving up economic empowerment of its people and that you have to find a way to bring it, but that China is sort of a semi-reluctant partner in this. And I'm interested in whether you think that, one, you can tell me I'm wrong, and, two, whether you see China stepping up much more robustly as a real leader in this. Like Bob Zoellick once said, it's time for China to stand up and become a responsible international stakeholder. Here's a great way to do that. So is there a way that you can move ahead of the rest of the world rather than just being--meeting it at par?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Well, you see, the answer is yes and no. As I said, it's a long process. When we read the novel of Charles Dickens, the foggy city of London, and then when I look at pictorial picture books about Los Angeles in the '60s and the '70s, and this was an unfolding process of a country with development. China experienced this part, but now we are at more understanding

and knowing period, so that China wants to be with the mainstream, and, if possible, we would like to be ahead.

For instance, China works hard and succeeds somewhat in using the solar energy and the wind energy and the Chinese citizens now have second sort because we understand the middle class now is one of the contributors for these things. So we are asking ourselves what an individual could do to reduce it, to contribute more positively to the climate change.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Thank you, thank you. We'll go right here. Yes.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: Masa Ishii, ambassador of Japan to Belgium. Can I just get back to the traditional threat for the time being?

Mr. Steven Clemons: Sure, conventional war's on the table, too.

Mr. Masafumi Ishii: And bring up Ukraine. And this is a question--I have another question going to Dr. Yang. What makes Ukraine truly a global issue in my mind is that that touches the basic principle which is shared by most of the responsible global players. That is, you're not supposed to change the status quo unilaterally by force. My question is, is China going to be able to sign to this principle? My belief is that I'm sure you can and you do already, simply because you're already playing a very responsible role in the global scene, but also because you don't want to see Crimea happen in Xinjiang or Tibet.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Right. Quick thoughts.

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Yeah, of course, China does not want to change the status quo by military means or by force. I know China wants to be part of the international order, the peace and the development.

Mrs. Michele Flournoy: You encouraged us to--

Mr. Steven Clemons: Yeah, Michele?

Mrs. Michele Flournoy: --engage each other, so.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Yeah, go ahead.

Mrs. Michele Flournoy: So, if that is true as a principle, how do you explain Chinese actions vis-à-vis Philippines and some of the disputed areas there? Recently, the kind of intimidation tactics vis-à-vis Vietnam? I mean, the impression that China is giving the rest of the world with some of its maritime activities in disputed areas is not that you're going to negotiate the resolution of those peacefully, but that you're willing to use your more significant power to try to change the status quo unilaterally.

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Well, you see, this is your reading. My reading a little bit different. Well, see, the maritime disputes long existed. And before 1978, the South China Sea disputes won't be a problem. But only after the 1970s, there were a lot of reasons, including China's rising and other neighboring countries paying more attention to the maritime territorial disputes, et cetera. And China wants to work with them. And 10 years ago, we reached agreement with the core, the

declaration of conduct DOC with the ASEAN countries. And within that 10 years of time, China did not change the status quo, but the other way around. And now, we are working with the COC, code of conduct. And, of course, this is the dispute which we do not like to see. And China does not want to intimidate the others. But it is same true, China don't want to be intimidated either. So, it's very complicated to cut the loss for a short. I think the best way is both China and ASEAN countries, four of them, should work together on the double track thoughts for South China Sea peace and that the development of China. And ASEAN should work together. And then, for the territorial disputes, China and the (inaudible) countries should negotiate. Thank you.

Mr. Steven Clemons: We're going to do a lightning round of questions here. Michele, are you convinced?

Ms. Michele Flournoy: I think it would be a very--if what you say is true, it would be very powerful for the Chinese government to pledge to all of the ASEAN countries and its southern neighbors that it would not--it is pledging not to change the status quo unilaterally by force.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Can you deliver that back in Beijing? Okay. Let's go to the lightning round. Right here. We're going to go really quick. I promise to hit as many of you as I can.

Ms. Theresa Fallon: Theresa Fallon, European Institute of Asian Studies. A question for Professor Yang. In your opening remarks--and this, I want to remind everybody, this is about the future of conflict. You remarked that China feels squeezed on both sides, Afghanistan and Burma. But it's interesting that you mention Burma, because as we know from the media, there was a bombing recently by accident of four civilians in China. Do you really feel that threatened by Burma? If you could expand on that, thank you.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Threat by Burma. Do you have a question? No, no question. I can't believe that, but, yes, right here.

Ms. Teri Schultz: Hi. Teri Schultz. I'm a journalist with National Public Radio and CBS News. This for (inaudible) and possibly for Michele also. This morning, we heard that ISIS has published the home addresses of U.S. military personnel and called on lone wolves to attack them. I'd like to get your response to that. And also, Russia is now threatening Denmark that, if it joins the Missile Defense Shield, it could possibly be attacked. That sounds like old warfare.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Bomb at ships.

Ms. Teri Schultz: Yeah, old warfare. Interested to get your comments on that.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Great.

Ms. Teri Schultz: And also Josh Rogin asked about defensive weapons. Were you--

Mr. Steven Clemons: Now, we're gonna stop right there. Yeah. Sorry, sorry.

Ms. Teri Schultz: It's lightning round.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Sorry, I know. Lightning round with others. Yes.

Mr. Tim Ridout: Tim Ridout, I'm a Fellow at GMF, and this is for Michele and General Breedlove. When it comes to the question of U.S. cyber doctrine, do you see a need for declaratory statements, clarification dealing with problems of attribution? You know, what is the U.S. position? I think clarifying would alleviate some ambiguity in that strategic realm.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Let me get one more since you're all right here. Well, okay. We'll come back.

Ms. Suhasini Haidar: Hi. I'm Suhasini Haidar. I'm a journalist from India with "The Hindu" newspaper. My question--really picking up on Mr. Yang said about the fact that the P5 talks with Iran, had they come a little earlier or been pursued more vigorously a little earlier, may have also had a kernel of conflict resolution in terms of Syria. And referring to what Secretary of State John Kerry seems to have indicated in an interview from last week, the idea that now it may, in fact, be possible to open some kind of dialogue with the Syrian regime, with Assad himself. I'd like to ask General Breedlove if moving from the future of conflict to

the future of conflict resolution, is that going to be the only option when it comes to dealing with ISIS?

Mr. Steven Clemons: Okay. Let me start with Michele. Responses, Michele?

Ms. Michele Flournoy: So couple of things. I think that we are all alarmed to read the story about ISIS publishing addresses of U.S. military personnel, and I think that it speaks to the kind of tactics they will use and that we have to be prepared for, both in terms of protecting our personnel, but also doing the very important and hard work of, you know, engaging communities at home, making sure that the radicalization process has lower chances of succeeding at home and so forth. And I think this is even a bigger problem for Europe, frankly, than it is for the United States.

On cyber doctrine, I don't know that it's helpful to think about doctrine, per se, but I do think that there is so much confusion about what we do and don't do and what's legal and what's not legal that it is worth trying to provide a little bit more transparency and explanation and to talk about rules of the road. There are certain areas where we should be trying to take certain cyber activities off the table, particularly between nation state actors, and I think negotiations and discussions along those lines would be very, very welcome.

Mr. Steven Clemons: General?

General Philip Breedlove: So on the business of ISIS putting out there this information, I guess I would ask back, why would we expect anything different or less? This is just one more of their sensational tools.

Mr. Steven Clemons: You were telling me you've got trollers on Twitter. Do they troll you on Twitter? Does ISIS troll you on Twitter?

General Philip Breedlove: I have no idea who trolls me, but I get trolled pretty good. Every time I say something, the first five things that pop up are all the negative about it.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Got it. Okay.

General Philip Breedlove: But back to this--one more thing on the ISIS. I mean, what we have seen across the last several months is that every time they take a defeat on the battlefield or every time they're under great pressure on the battlefield, they come up with some big splash like this, putting out something to take. You know, this caliphate, I think, is under great pressure and so they try to divert attention from what's happening on the battlefield by putting out one of these great splashes.

To the Denmark and TBM, this is just the next step. Romania came under great pressure when they became a part of European phase adaptive approach. Poland is coming under great pressure. And now, anyone else who wants to join

into this defensive capability will come under this diplomatic and political pressure. Remember the hybrid war remarks.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Dr. Jiemian, Burma?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: When I said Burma, I didn't say China was squeezed. However, because China and Burma share the long border and because of the recent bombing we have already had about 60,000 refugees flooding into the China part. I visited the border several times. You cannot defend it. There is a village with two nationalities, so this shows great consent that China thinks that the northern part of the local fightings would affect China as well as Afghanistan.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Marwan, did you want to give a quick comment on the cyber doctrine issue? Would that be clarifying and helpful to you in industry or do you find it irrelevant?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: Our experience in Airbus Group is that we can only be strong when there is cooperation between allies. We've seen that between the French, the Brits, the Germans, the Spaniards. Whenever these four that are the main locations of our company are cooperating, we are strong. And whenever they are not, and there a few instances where they are not, here is a great weakness.

Mr. Steven Clemons: How do you see the trend going? Christophe von Marshall, a minute ago, said that a year ago you wouldn't have seen the attitudes in Germany you're seeing today. When you look at the transatlantic alliance,

sometimes everybody is on board. Sometimes they're not on board. Do you sense that there is more disarray down the road or more cohesion?

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: There is a higher awareness for the need of cohesion. This is good news. We need to see that turning into action. For the time being, it's just polls and results. We need to see that in the action plan.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Terrific. Okay. These are going to be real lightning round because we've only got a few minutes, but Steve Erlanger right here.

Mr. Steve Erlanger: Thank you. Very quickly, if I may, for Ms. Flournoy and General Breedlove. When the U.S. with Israel created Stuxnet, it broke a taboo. Do you regret that now? Do you think it's opened up an area of cyber warfare that perhaps would have been best shut?

Mr. Steven Clemons: Great. Let me get Senator Sessions. You nodded. Make it good. Make it a good one.

Senator Jeff Sessions: I think I was recovering from jetlag maybe. This has been great. I appreciate your efforts in the conversation. Perhaps we could briefly have a thought about can Europe be more militarily with their defense budgets because it's a huge economy. It's as large as the United States, and we just approved a $600 billion defense budget. And the money is pretty wisely used.

Mr. Steven Clemons: And you think Europe is just not up to par?

Senator Jeff Sessions: Need to do more. I don't think there is any doubt about it.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Yeah. I'm trying to turn this into a tweetable moment.

Senator Jeff Sessions: Europe needs to do more.

Mr. Steven Clemons: There you go. David?

Mr. David Ignatius: I want to make sure that my colleague Josh Rogin's question is asked of General Breedlove. General, the question of whether the U.S. should send additional defensive arms to Ukraine is very much of the moment. You spoke out clearly about it in the past, suggesting you think that this should be done. What do you think now? Would these weapons be stabilizing on the battlefield or destabilizing?

Mr. Steven Clemons: Great. We'll take one last question. Who had their hand up over here? Okay. We're going to--go ahead, Christoph. Make it short. Last time, you were way too long.

Mr. Christoph von Marshall: Okay, try to make it short. Since we talked about hybrid warfare and also information warfare, I'm puzzled about the totally different information, what is happening with Minsk. I hear the German government say, well, it's implemented. I hear NATO say, no, it's not. We can see that heavy weapons are moved out, but moved in somewhere else. But when we try to ask you, give us some proof, it never happens. This is not good for the German

public that we have so different approaches and information. Why can't you tell us more? Don't you have the information or, say, a reason not to release the information you have?

Mr. Steven Clemons: Okay. Information systems, we've got was Stuxnet a mistake, European defense budgets and the question of whether we ought to be doing more to send lethal arms, lethal aid to Ukraine. Why don't we start? And we're going to use this as our final closing comment, so you can ignore everything that just said and go your own direction. But General?

General Philip Breedlove: I'll choose two of those to respond to because others can respond to the others better than I. On the issue of defensive arms, what I have said, actually never publicly, is what I have recommended. But what I have said is that I do not think that any tool of U.S. or any other nation's power should necessarily be off the table. In Ukraine, what we see is what we talked about earlier, diplomatic tools being used, informational tools being used, military tools being used, economic tools being used against Ukraine. And so we, I think, in the West, should consider all of our tools in reply. Could it be destabilizing? The answer is yes. Also, inaction could be destabilizing. I mean, we've seen a series of increased actions in all four of those tools of power, military to include, it continues. So I think that's the other question that our nation should look at is inaction and appropriate action.

The last, to the question about Minsk, is it implemented or not, I think that lots of nations have very different views on that. As far as NATO, we have a NATO-agreed set of intelligence that is put out by what we call the NIFC, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre. And the view from there is much what you said and that is that we do see the weapons moving. We do not know that they have moved off the battlefield, but we know that they are moving. We continue to see disturbing elements of air defense, command and control, resupply, equipment coming across a completely porous border. So there are concerns about whether Minsk is being followed or not, and that is all a view of NATO's Intelligence Fusion Centre.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Michele Flournoy.

Ms. Michele Flournoy: Two comments. Steve, while I can't address the particular case you mentioned directly, I will say that in the future we're going to see again and again situations where presidents, other leaders, facing very difficult situations will look at cyber tools or cyber options as alternatives to kinetic action. And for a variety of reasons, those cyber options may look quite attractive. When those decisions come up, I do think it's very important that we think about the precedent being set and we think about the example being set for others. We should assume that others will soon have similar capabilities, and we need to think

through the first, second and third-order consequences. We're playing chess, not checkers.

On the European defense spending, I just wanted to pick up this point. I think we all understand the economic situation that Europe has been struggling with, but this is critical, to not only see our allies spend more on defense, but to get more for what they spend. I think it requires a much deeper conversation about how we're going to divide up the labor, how we're going to collaborate to feel the spectrum of capabilities we need and so forth. So not only spend more but get more for what we spend.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Dr. Jiemian?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: To conclude, I would say from an Asian perspective, number one, when I came here I was wondering why NATO succeeded and survived this past 70 years. At the end of World War II in Southeast Asia, we had CENTO, but it ceased to exist, so there must be some different conditions that we have to take into our minds.

Second, how Asian-Pacific region build while learning from transatlantic alliances and other relations. I think perhaps the (inaudible) plus formula ought to be a good way of enhance our mutual understanding and trust to make this part safer. Whereas, for the most part of the Asian-Pacific region, we are still immune from wars and battles. We must work on it. Last, but not least, while China, United

States and Europe could work together, I think we need a more strategic dialogue. We need more professional military dialogue so we know each other better. China is still growing so we are still on the learning curve. This is why we must learn from it.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Can you give me 30 seconds on what China learned from Stuxnet?

Dr. Yang Jiemian: Quite a lot. First of all, good networking and second, very good one and a half and a second track dialogs. The third one, when you come together, you discuss things to the point. And this is why and how China should learn. And by the way, we want to learn more about China, as well.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Not sure that was about Stuxnet, but we'll come back to that another time. Marwan.

Mr. Marwan Lahoud: I just want to agree with Senator Sessions. Not just because Airbus is settling in Mobile. The Europeans need to spend more, spend better, you're right, but they need to spend more. Two numbers and I will finish on this. Defense industry in Europe between 2002 and 2014 has lost 400,000 jobs. So you have 400,000 people working in other areas or not working. And the second number I want to leave you with, Europeans are working on joint helicopter, 14 allies having 23 different versions with 6 different assembly lines.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Wow. I just want to say, in conclusion, this has been a wonderful, wonderful conversation and we could go on for many more hours and, I think, find it riveting. But besides referring to David Ignatius's interesting novels, which give us a sense of what's possible and what could be really destabilizing and very different when it comes to conflict in the future, I also want to refer to speaking of Brzezinski's books that have made a very clear point that we're shifting from the clarity and cohesion and the sense of structure to something much more disordered, much less order and structure. Despite that fact, institutions like NATO, which were just a few years ago, sort of looking at their navel, you know, their belly-button and saying, do we have any reason to exist? Now, very clearly, in a semi-conventional way, NATO has found real reason to come back.

But I think to challenge ourselves, sometimes it's useful to look beyond the silos of the conventional and begin looking at--Bill Joy wrote an article in Wired Magazine some years ago that many of you might remember called "Why the Future Doesn't Need Us." And it wasn't a comment on conflict, but it was a comment about technology, about the massive increases in supercomputing, the massive increases in genetics and genetics work, the massive increases in things like nanotechnology that could be put to work, but in ill ways by others, where great casualty incidents could be caused by very small players in the international system. And I think all of those have been highly (inaudible) in asking some of

these questions about the future of conflict and where we might go. So thank you all very much. General Philip Breedlove, Michele Flournoy, Yang Jiemian and Marwan Lahoud, thank you very much for joining us.

Ivan Vejvoda: And please thank Steve Clemons also for a great job.

Mr. Steven Clemons: Thank you very much.

Ivan Vejvoda: Thank you very much. Well, this has been a really incredible beginning of the Sunday morning of our final day with President Komorowski and with this incredible panel that we've had here. Thank you so very much. We will now go for a half-hour coffee break, but I would like to remind you that the next session with Nik Gowing is really the opportunity for you all to become even more engaged than you have been over these past two days. So please come back fired up with good caffeine and we'll see you here in half an hour. Thank you.