NATO IN A WORLD OF DISORDER: MAKING THE ALLIANCE READY FOR WARSAW

ADVISORY PANEL ON THE NATO SUMMIT 2016

Rapporteurs: Michal Baranowski and Bruno Lété

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Foreword. ................................................................. 1
Executive Summary .................................................. 2
Introduction to GMF’s NATO Summit 2016 Advisory Panel .......... 4
NATO’s Strategic Vulnerabilities Before and Beyond Warsaw. ........ 5
Deliverables at the Warsaw Summit: Unity and Ambition ............ 10
Looking Ahead: A Rapidly Evolving Security Landscape and
Implications for NATO .............................................. 15
Foreword

NATO matters. Threats emanating from Europe's east and south give particular urgency to the Alliance's next summit, scheduled for Warsaw in July. The nature of these threats ranges from military to economic to cyber to energy security. The 28 NATO Allies must decide how they want to tackle these threats and what role they want to see NATO play.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Alliance succeeded in realigning its priorities with the realities of the changed security environment. The challenge for the allies in Warsaw will be to decide on next steps on the path laid out in Wales by generating the political will to implement new and expanded forms of cooperation among NATO member states. NATO leaders need to engage with their domestic publics to explain the current security environment, as well as the utility of defense policy and the armed forces in meeting present and future threats. Such engagement is critical to preserve and extend NATO's unity of purpose and solidarity of action.

GMF has a long tradition of contributing energy and ideas to the transatlantic debate on security and defense issues. GMF experts write publications and offer analysis year round, and regularly bring together groups in formats such as the Transatlantic Security Task Force and the Mediterranean Strategy Group.

The NATO Summit Advisory Panel is GMF's latest signature initiative on transatlantic security, leveraging our unique network of contacts and offices on both sides of the Atlantic. The members of the panel engaged in a much-needed debate on the security challenges we face and on possible policy solutions. The report of the NATO Summit Advisory Panel offers concrete ideas and actionable recommendations to address the most pressing issues on NATO's agenda in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit. We hope the report will spark vigorous debate and creative thinking, and that you will find it useful in your work.

Sincerely,

Karen Donfried
President
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Executive Summary

To successfully adapt NATO to a rapidly changing security environment, the Warsaw Summit should consider the following recommendations in its overall assessment:

• **Place two rotating brigades on NATO’s Eastern Flank.** Russia has adjusted to NATO’s Readiness Action Plan by implementing an effective anti-access / area-denial strategy from the High North, to the Baltics and the Black Sea. In the Baltics and in Poland, Russian military capabilities are sufficiently advanced to prevent NATO from easily reinforcing its Allies in case of a crisis. The Warsaw Summit must therefore shift Alliance strategy from small, mobile reinforcement to a larger, more autonomous forward presence with key capabilities in air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Considering the overwhelming Russian military force ratio in the region, rotating a force the size of an allied brigade, one in the Baltics and one in Poland, would be a start.

• **Develop a more robust role in the South.** In Warsaw, NATO can take a number of steps to strengthen its southern posture. First, beyond the tasks in the Aegean, NATO can create a stronger capacity for warning, surveillance, and response against trafficking in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean by deploying Global Hawk RPAs as NATO assets from the Naval Air Station in Sigonella. Second, new initiatives must be created to deter risks to Turkey’s security and territorial integrity, including the growing Russian military presence in the region. Finally, greater political support and resources must be devoted to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. In general there is substantial — and often unrecognized — openness and willingness in the Arab region for greater cooperation with NATO.

• **Increase NATO’s preparedness regarding hybrid threats.** Today a majority of NATO member states, if not all, are confronted with new forms of warfare based on criminal or hybrid operations. Strong NATO engagement on non-linear threats is therefore critical because NATO cannot present a united front if certain allies feel inadequately protected in this domain. The Warsaw Summit can set the Alliance on the right path by increasing human capital and financial resources for NATO’s various civil and military intelligence units, by granting the Supreme Allied Commander Europe more powers to authorize some of the preparatory response procedures, and by seeking a NATO-EU Memorandum of Understanding for closer cooperation on hybrid warfare.

• **Update NATO’s nuclear policy.** The doctrine and conditions for crisis management enshrined in the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, plus a number of other basics of the previous nuclear debate, are no longer valid. The Alliance should proceed in two steps. At the Warsaw Summit, Allies should agree on wording that highlights the need for nuclear deterrence against any threat to NATO territory in order to reassure the most exposed member states. After the Summit, NATO should enter into a nuclear debate comparable to the process that led to the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, in order to redefine the contribution of NATO’s nuclear forces.

• **Revitalize the partnerships and Open Door policy.** NATO partnerships and enlargement must be reassessed. The Alliance would see its action radius beyond its borders drastically
reduced if it allows many of its partnership connections to wither on the vine; this includes status of force agreements, overflight rights, and intelligence-sharing arrangements. NATO enlargement must be understood as a political project, and the process cannot be reduced to a negotiation over legal conditionality or technical criteria. Concluding NATO integration in the Balkans should be a priority. Placing the Open Door back at the heart of allied policy will project NATO's credibility and resolve beyond its borders.
Introduction to GMF’s NATO Summit 2016 Advisory Panel

As a core element of its mission to strengthen transatlantic cooperation, GMF addresses the key questions affecting the future of the global Atlantic security architecture. NATO remains an essential transatlantic link and force multiplier for the United States, Canada, Europe, and partner nations. Consequently, the future of NATO remains among the West’s highest security priorities and a focal point of GMF’s work.

In this spirit, GMF decided last year to create, in partnership with NATO Public Diplomacy Division, a high-level advisory panel to formulate recommendations around themes that will be on the agenda of the NATO Summit 2016. The panel members — a group of experts and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic — analyzed and identified policy solutions for pressing issues, including collective defense, defense investment and innovation, enlargement and partnerships, the future of the transatlantic bond, and the new security environment.

During the last quarter of 2015, the panel travelled to Berlin, Rome, Washington, DC, and Warsaw in order to engage with local policymakers and opinion-shapers. This publication summarizes the general view and findings of the panel and formulates a set of actionable recommendations toward the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016.

Members of the Advisory Panel

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From the Holy League to the Triple Entente to the Warsaw Pact, history shows us that there is nothing sacred about the durability of an alliance, no matter how successful or long-lived it has been. NATO, perhaps, will not be an exception to that rule. Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several reasons. Most often failure stems from the inability of the original association to adapt to the changing nature of the threat it is supposed to counter. Or failure follows after the members begin to question either the capacity or willingness of their allies to fulfill their obligations, or when the leading power within the association can no longer sustain a disproportionate share of the costs, or offer material inducements, to make alignment more attractive. NATO today faces a mixture of all three risk categories. It has adapted to many new circumstances in its environment, but to endure, NATO still needs to tackle a few vulnerabilities in the coming months and years.

**The East-South Balance has Become Critical**

If the Alliance is to remain relevant, the growing risks and threats emanating from Europe’s eastern and southern periphery will need to be addressed. The 2014 Wales Summit already provided an initial military response to some of the challenges in the east, and in the wake of Russian escalation strategies, the Alliance has continued to adapt its deterrent potential in the region. In contrast, even after years of deepening chaos and conflict in Europe’s southern neighborhood, alliance leaders are only now beginning to focus in earnest on the question of strategy toward the south. Mediterranean security — long part of the NATO calculus but rarely at the forefront — has become a pressing concern in light of risks emanating from North Africa and the Levant. This does not mean that equally pressing challenges in the east and the north should be neglected, or that concepts developed to counter a resurgent Russia will be readily transferable to the south. The sheer diversity of challenges in the south, and the lack of a single focal point for planning, complicates the task.

This reality confronting NATO with a political challenge. Transatlantic partners need to deal with the potentially divisive question of priorities: NATO needs to look south without weakening its commitment to deterrence and defense in the east and north, where Russian risks remain at the center of the strategic calculus. With NATO’s July 2016 Warsaw Summit on the horizon, managing the east-south balance will indeed be critical to preserve Alliance unity. Spain, Italy, and Greece put a premium on Mediterranean security. Portugal looks south, but tends to view the Atlantic space as the center of gravity for Alliance cohesion. Poland, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, and Romania understandably put the Russian challenge first. France has an enormous stake in security in the Mediterranean and south to the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, but remains ambivalent about a leading role for NATO there. Turkey is a leading stakeholder in a credible NATO approach to security on its Middle Eastern borders, but Ankara is equally concerned about countering Russia in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and in Syria — a concern greatly reinforced by Russian air and naval operations along Turkey’s borders. Ultimately, NATO’s “swing states” — the United States, U.K., Germany, and France — will be decisive in managing this balance. The growth of the Russian factor in the south is an additional source of risk — including the risk of an accidental clash — but may also prove a unifying element across NATO’s geography.
Collective Defense still has Deterrence and Reassurance Gaps

The wars in Georgia and Ukraine have shown that hard power is still very much a factor in the future of European security architecture. And in the new European landscape, the crucial terrain is no longer found in central Germany, but most prominently along NATO's eastern flank from the Baltic states to Poland, and along Turkey's border with Syria. But despite the significant steps taken at the Wales 2014 Summit, NATO, as presently postured, would struggle to defend the territory of its most exposed members. The “Newport Package,” based on the logic of reinforcement, turned out to be only a temporary solution and is insufficient in the current situation. A recent RAND study concluded that “Russian forces could reach the outskirts of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in 60 hours” and that “NATO would need a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy-armored brigades — adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities” to prevent Baltic states from being rapidly overrun by Russian forces.

In Poland, NATO faces another potential flashpoint with the so-called “Suwalki Gap,” after the Polish town of the same name. This narrow strip of land connecting Poland with Lithuania has become a prime target of Russian access denial strategies, powered by the presence of thousands of Russian troops, S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and modernized maritime forces in the enclave of Kaliningrad to the northwest and the construction of a new Russian airbase in Belarus to the southeast. In fact, Kaliningrad has now become the most militarized region in Europe. If Russia were to storm the Suwalki Gap, NATO would lose essentially the only land link between Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the rest of the European mainland. Moreover, Moscow's military build-up of army, air, and naval capabilities in the Black Sea region and in the Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to shift the regional balance of power if left unmatched. The downing of a Russian warplane by Turkey at the border with Syria indeed shows that the risk of direct military conflict is increasingly sliding to NATO's southern flank as well, and questions remain whether the current contingencies under the Readiness Action Plan would suffice to counter aggression simultaneously in the east and the south.

Beyond these conventional military gaps, NATO must also reconsider its nuclear policy. NATO's current nuclear consensus still builds on the 2012 “Deterrence and Defense Posture Review” and is based on the condition that Russia is a partner of NATO that will not use its nuclear capability to threaten the Alliance. In the light of Moscow’s current nuclear reasoning, these conditions are no longer valid. Russia increasingly uses its nuclear posture as a means of messaging. Flying nuclear-capable TU-95 bombers close to NATO’s borders or including nuclear escalation in conventional exercises are signals of intimidation and nuclear resolve. Consequently, NATO must put the nuclear dossier higher on the agenda than it is today and reassess the needs for nuclear deterrence in Article 5 terms.
Collective Security Requires More Emphasis on New Forms of Warfare

To endure as an alliance, NATO will need to adapt to the domestic preferences of all its allies and partners and respond to new external conditions. In 2016, a majority, if not all, member states are confronted with new forms of warfare based on criminal or hybrid operations that combine aggressive information and propaganda campaigns, social media exploitation, cyber-attacks, creeping infiltration of special forces, militias and weapons, terrorism, illegal trafficking, economic embargoes and sabotage, political and business networks of influence, and the exploitation of minority grievances. NATO is in a less than ideal position to deal with this variety of new threats and needs a different approach. Cyber defense, for instance, requires more systematic interaction with national intelligence services, more information-sharing, and supply chain management partnerships with industry; counter-terrorism efforts require stronger links between the military, police, and customs authorities, especially in disrupting trafficking in explosives and bomb-making technologies or impeding the flow of illicit finance. The new threats come in the form of networks and it takes a similarly well-organized network of international and cross-sector cooperation to defeat those threats.

The 2014 Wales Summit refocused NATO on the basics of conventional defense capabilities, such as heavy armor, fighter aircraft, and frigates, but it has to also stay in the game of 21st century threat response. This requires strategic foresight and analysis, good tactical intelligence, and the right Rolodex of public and private sector contacts to forge military-civilian spectrum of capabilities — from a 1950s-style big-platform, visible presence to 2016-style intelligence-driven, cyber-assisted, special forces and networked interventions. This evolution matters to the security of all Allies, and in particular to those member states whose security is not threatened by the prospect of a military invasion, but who face destabilization due to nonlinear challenges. A number of allied capital cities will start questioning the utility of the Alliance if NATO is seen as providing narrow military responses only. This would weaken the Alliance from inside. A strong NATO engagement in new forms of warfare is therefore critical; NATO cannot present a united front if certain allies feel inadequately protected, or feel that NATO cannot respond to their own security priorities.

Strengthen NATO’s Political Dimension

Today NATO is often seen as a military tool, but it must also be a political actor. The collective defense and crisis management dimensions of NATO can easily overshadow the political function of the Washington Treaty. More and more, the value of the Alliance is being measured in terms of available military equipment, in newly built infrastructure, or in whether or not member states contribute 2 percent of their GDP to defense spending. Naturally, this is an important aspect of NATO core business, but it also results in a state of mind where materialism becomes a quantitative means to justify the existence of the organization. The raison d’être of the Washington Treaty goes well beyond that, of course. The true relevance of the Alliance is based on its ability to unite liberal democracies in a volatile world and to assure the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area. Today, this essential political message is often concealed by a bureaucratic dialogue about military planning and budgeting. This trend
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leaves little space for NATO diplomats and administrators to think beyond collective defense. It hinders Allies’ ability to stand up as political actors against adversaries, to get involved in “soft” security challenges, or to have a serious dialogue with external partners. It also has a negative impact on public opinions in some of the NATO member states.

The truth is that audiences at home are divided on the desired image of NATO — while some find a militaristic NATO comforting, others find it off-putting. Even worse, today the public is in doubt about the nature of the Alliance and its fundamental objectives. In a 2015 article, Bruce Stokes of the Pew Research Center says “Sixty-six years after NATO’s creation, a recent Pew Research Center survey of people in nine NATO nations, representing the lion’s share of NATO defense spending, suggests public commitment to Article 5 ‘ain’t necessarily so.” So NATO must manage to do not only its core business of responding militarily to present-day security challenges, but it must also return to the basics of 1949 and serve as the hub where leaders of the two North-Atlantic continents can discuss solutions for major strategic issues, and where a public case is being made for the link between peace, prosperity, and the role of the armed forces. To be more effective, the Alliance must indeed retake the high political ground and make its original mission and core values — essentially described in the first five articles of the Washington Treaty — more visible internally and externally.

Partnerships and the Open-Door Policy Must Be Revalued

Overall, NATO’s partnerships have been a success story, largely driven until recent history by operational needs in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. However, in the post-ISAF period, this closeness to partners could begin to fade. In particular, if partners perceive the Alliance to be focusing on Article 5 core business and narrowing its vision to the European hinterland, they may lose interest. The Alliance would see its action radius beyond its borders drastically reduced if it allows many of these connections, such as status of force agreements, overflight rights, and intelligence-sharing arrangements, to wither on the vine. However, the wars in Georgia and Ukraine have shown that a partnership also has to mean something when a close partner of the Alliance faces aggression. It cannot be Article 5 or nothing. Partners come in many shapes and sizes; they require individual attention and a sense that NATO genuinely cares about their problems rather than seeing them mainly as force providers. Since the 2014 Summit, NATO has started to think more creatively about how it can help its partners to become more resilient against assailment or intimidation. But to do so more effectively, NATO still needs to better understand its partners’ objectives, and better work with partners to identify their desired outcome from this relationship.

Beyond partnerships, the wars in Georgia and Ukraine have also become examples of NATO’s dilemma with regard to Alliance enlargement. In the current security situation, the open-door policy seems to many member states an impossible promise to keep, at least in the short to medium-term. NATO enlargement has become a geopolitical inconvenience, a project hiding behind a barrier of legal conditionality and technical criteria. It should not be this way.

1 “NATO’s Rot from Within,” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/06/natos-rot-from-within/
The open-door policy must remain a political project and a highly symbolic message that has encouraged many nations in the past to push for modernization and reform. Moreover, NATO’s partnerships or enlargement promise should certainly not be rolled back because of certain member states’ fear of antagonizing Russia. Placing the open-door policy back at the heart of allied policy would project NATO’s credibility and resolve beyond its borders. It will require more political attention, and more human capital and financial resources.
The Warsaw Summit needs to be a summit of unity, as political unity lies at the core of NATO’s strength. But to succeed, it also needs to be a summit of ambition. Small, incremental changes will not do. Implementation of the Wales Summit decisions and marginal adaptation of the Alliance are not enough given the new security landscape the West now finds itself in. The Alliance needs to find answers to geographical challenges in the east, south, and the north, and in various domains of war from conventional, to terrorism, to cyber, hybrid, and nuclear. In the south, NATO needs to address non-linear challenges, where tools and strategies are far from obvious. In the east, the ideas for actions to counter the threat are much clearer, but less clear is whether the Alliance can muster the political will to address them.

Threats from the East

The eastern flank is where the Alliance remains the most exposed, both militarily and politically. With the annexation of Crimea and conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russia has showed that a war in Europe is not an idea of the past. A robust military modernization program, aggressive large-scale snap exercises near the border of the Alliance, and provocative actions against allies were met for now with Alliance’s reassurance measures through the NATO Readiness Action Plan. But as the Alliance adapted through strengthening rapid reaction forces, Russia adjusted as well. The Kremlin has focused on anti-access and area-denial capacity that has the potential to inhibit NATO’s military movement into, or freedom of action in conflict areas. By establishing what General Phillip Breedlove called Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD) bubbles in all NATO’s strategic directions (north, east, south) and doubling down on military modernization, Russia commands an overwhelming 10:1 force ratio on the northeastern corner of the Alliance. Adding to this a possibility of a tactical nuclear strike, Russia is increasingly undermining NATO’s strategy of extended deterrence in protecting its most exposed Allies in the East. Russia’s increasing highly integrated and advanced A2AD capabilities means that in case of crisis, the Alliance will not be able to easily reinforce its Allies. It might even happen that it would not be able to reinforce them at all. This dynamic means that the Alliance cannot rely solely on extended deterrence and small mobile forces, like the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), as was decided in Wales. In Warsaw, NATO must now shift its strategy toward an increased forward presence that would be in place before a conflict starts, and thus serve as a deterring and stabilizing force.

Nature of Forward Presence

Such force would need to be multinational in order to increase its political deterrence and defense value. NATO can avoid an internal dividing debate on “permanent presence” by using rotational forces. These forces would have to be combat-ready, which means that they have to be properly trained and equipped to address the threat in the region and to enhance the initial defensive capacity of the host country. The force would have to be large enough to conduct autonomous defensive operations for a period of time, before further reinforcement can arrive. The size of a brigade force, one in the Baltics and one in Poland, would be a start. Finally, in order to counter the A2AD threat, it would have to include advanced military
capabilities, among other air defenses; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and electronic warfare (EW). Moreover, this force should be incorporated into NATO defense plans. For military operational reasons, it should be located in Poland with a goal to guard the “Suwalki gap” and secure the only allied passage to the Baltic states in case of a crisis. Finally, a forward presence on the eastern flank should be underpinned by better ISR capabilities and development of a stronger capacity for warning, surveillance, and response. This could be achieved by increasing Airborne Warning and Control System flights in the region and creating a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for Global Hawks in Poland.

The Warsaw package at the next summit needs to make an ambitious step in this direction. Failing to do so would encourage further aggression from the Russian side. NATO’s best strategy on the eastern flank is effective deterrence. The probability of a limited war scenario in the Baltics is low, but the possible cost of inaction would be tremendous not only for the flank states, but for the Alliance as a whole. If Russia were to succeed in undermining the Baltics, it would present the West with a terrible dilemma: risk a war with a nuclear power, or lose credibility. In comparison, effective deterrence through robust forward presence is a low price to pay.

**Threats from the South**

The southern dimension of NATO strategy also merits a significant place on the Warsaw summit agenda. Mediterranean security has become a pressing concern in light of risks emanating from North Africa and the Levant. Terrorism inspired and led by the self-proclaimed Islamic State group (ISIS) and al-Qaeda from bases in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the Sahel is the most pressing threat. Maritime and human security risks are also part of the equation, closely linked to the flow of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean. And as Russia has become actively engaged in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, the problem of strategic stability and risk reduction with Moscow has acquired a southern dimension, despite keeping open the notion that Russia has some overlapping interests in the region — like the recent ceasefire in Syria. Adapting the Alliance to meet the diverse risks across a 4,000-mile land and sea flank is essential if NATO is to remain relevant. The close connection between instability across the southern periphery and Europe’s own internal security is a widely shared concern, especially in light of the November 2015 attacks in Paris and elsewhere, and the foreign fighter phenomenon.

A strategy for the southern flank must build on Alliance experience in crisis management and cooperative security. NATO can take a number of steps to strengthen its posture in this regard.

- **A commitment to give Mediterranean security, and southern challenges in general, a prominent place on the Warsaw summit agenda.** NATO can and should be a leading voice in the debate on the most prominent security challenges emanating from the south, including the rise of ISIS in Libya, and the implications for counter-terrorism and maritime security.

- **More explicit dialogue and coordination with the EU (and other relevant international institutions) to address the complex security problems in the south.** This is not a space
One important innovation of the adversary in hybrid warfare is exploitation of ambiguity, both of intent and attribution.

- Development of a stronger capacity for warning, surveillance, and response, taking account of the diverse and geographically diffuse character of possible contingencies in the south. The deployment of Global Hawk RPAs as NATO assets at the Naval Air Base in Sigonella is an important first step. More investments of this kind will be required.
- Assuring that measures adopted within the Readiness Action Plan, including VJTF and enhanced standing naval forces, can be employed in the south, as required.
- Consideration of new initiatives specifically to deter risks to Turkey’s security and territorial integrity, including growing Russian military presence in the region. Beyond surveillance tasks in the Aegean, NATO should be prepared to play a growing role in monitoring and countering trafficking in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean.
- Devoting greater resources to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and greater political support for these partnerships and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with Arab Gulf states. Highly capable partners such as Israel, and those keen to do more, including Morocco and Jordan, should be given special consideration. In general, there is substantial — and often unrecognized — great openness and willingness in the Arab region for greater cooperation with NATO.

Hybrid Warfare

While a “hot war” remains the high impact/low probability scenario, NATO faces ongoing efforts by antagonists, including non-state actors, to intimidate and destabilize member states through hybrid warfare. The notion of hybrid warfare is not new, but the scale, speed, and intensity of the challenge demands a new approach in preparing for, deterring, and defending against these threats. One important innovation of the adversary in hybrid warfare is exploitation of ambiguity, both of intent and attribution. For NATO, the ambiguity of hybrid campaigns present challenges vis-à-vis action that needs to be collectively addressed. The Warsaw Summit must adapt NATO’s resilience against hybrid warfare in three different ways.

First, NATO needs resources to be able to accurately and quickly detect and define hybrid actions. Work on indications, warnings, and situational awareness is critical. In this, NATO’s various civilian and military intelligence units, inter alia, could have a useful role. Allies and willing partners should continue to work on improving geographical expertise, updating threat assessments, and facilitating closer intelligence cooperation. Different pieces of the NATO intelligence architecture have to fit together to better understand the impact and significance of hybrid threats.

Second, NATO should aim for rapid assessment and effective decision-making. In order to achieve this, NATO’s crisis management procedures should be used to their maximum extent.
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) should also be granted more powers by the North Atlantic Council in authorizing some of the preparatory procedures. NATO should conduct crisis management exercises, and regularly include the hybrid dimension in exercises that test rapid decision-making procedures in complex and demanding scenarios.

Third, NATO needs to help build Allies’ resilience to resist and respond to hybrid campaigns. NATO can regularly assess the state of civil preparedness of member states, as well as encourage Allies to share best practices. Also, NATO Special Operations Forces have the capacity to provide SACEUR with a range of discrete capabilities across the crisis-conflict spectrum, including special intelligence and engagement with civil authorities. Moreover, NATO and the EU could work together to build small Resilience Support Teams, designed along with the host country to strengthen that country’s resilience. The EU and NATO should further synchronize their strategic messaging while sharing best practices and lessons learned. These different efforts could be officially summarized in an EU-NATO Memorandum of Understanding on Hybrid Warfare at the upcoming Warsaw Summit.

Related to hybrid warfare, NATO should also make a next step forward in cyber defense. Cyber should be recognized as a separate operational domain, and it should be integrated into military exercises on equal terms with other domains with necessary command and control, doctrine, training, and procedures. In this respect, information sharing among Allies within NATO has to become an objective in itself. Allies should identify information sharing as a clear requirement and task. More openness and better cooperation among Allies in this field would enable NATO to advance more swiftly on cyber training and exercises.

**Nuclear Deterrence**

NATO needs to update its nuclear policy. The doctrine and crisis management conditions enshrined in the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, plus a number of other basics of the previous nuclear debates, are no longer valid. Russia considers nuclear weapons to be an integral part of its military power and especially as a way to make up for its relative lack of conventional forces compared to NATO. Nuclear forces are also seen by Moscow as one of the few remaining elements of the former Soviet superpower status. Meanwhile, Russia increasingly uses its nuclear posture for messaging. In light of Moscow’s current nuclear reasoning, nuclear arms control in Europe — i.e. the mutual reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons — is no longer an option. In December 2014, Russia finally terminated the Nunn-Lugar Act, a pillar of U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation and a core instrument to help Russia in dismantling its excessive nuclear arsenal.

Beyond Russia, the settlement with Iran may have brought a compromise in order to contain Teheran’s nuclear ambitions. However, the agreement further permits the enrichment of nuclear material and thereby principally keeps the option of a clandestine production of weapons grade material open. The longer-term danger of Iran becoming a nuclear power cannot be excluded. As for North Korea, it is pursuing its nuclear weapons program, despite international sanctions and notwithstanding distinct criticism from its patron, China. In less
than a decade, Pyongyang may well have more nuclear warheads than France or the United Kingdom.

In light of these changes, the Alliance should proceed in two steps. At the Warsaw Summit, Allies could agree on a formula that highlights the need for nuclear deterrence against any threat to NATO territory in order to reassure the Allies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. And after the summit, NATO should enter into a nuclear strategy discussion comparable to the process that led to the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture review. This debate should focus on the following questions:

- What is the consensus in NATO on the future role and relevance of nuclear deterrence?
- How can NATO best communicate its nuclear deterrence messages? Which signals have to be sent to a potential aggressor? What should NATO’s declaratory policy be?
- Which kind of exercises, and in which frequency, are needed in future to assure crisis-proof nuclear consultation and decision-making processes if needed?
- What does it take to make U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for its European allies credible?
- Is the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear countries needed and if so, which hardware (weapons and means of deployment) is necessary?
- How much reaction time is necessary for the currently stationed U.S. nuclear forces, given that Russia is able to mobilize major conventional forces in a minimum of time?
- What is the relationship between nuclear deterrence and NATO missile defense capabilities?
For now, the North-Atlantic space still enjoys a relative degree of prosperity, security, and freedom unprecedented in its history. The violence of the first half of the 20th century and the end of the Cold War have given way to nearly three decades of peace and stability. Increasingly open borders, globalized trade and investment flows, new technologies, and the rise of non-state groups in international affairs are likely to continue to shape our post-Cold War era, while at the same time increasing our dependence — and so vulnerability — on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information, and other fields. In this complex environment, NATO’s members and partners will more than ever before need to work together if they are to tackle today’s complex security problems.

NATO Will Need a Political Strategy toward Russia

For many obvious reasons, Russia will continue to be considered a principal threat for European security in the next five years and beyond. For NATO, this threat crystalizes in the scenario of a “strong” Russia, as well as a “weak” Russia. In the case of a strong Russia, Moscow will succeed in bringing the country along a path to economic recovery and is likely to continue to fuel the crisis in Ukraine and Syria, and the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, in order to consolidate a more or less predictable military build-up of army, air, and naval capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic. Under the “weak” Russia scenario, plunging oil prices, international disinvestment in the Russian economy, and the evaporation of Moscow’s once-mighty sovereign wealth fund will destabilize the country. The risk for NATO in this scenario is the prospect of Russian leaders feeling encouraged to engage in illogical adventurism abroad to distract audiences at home from their deteriorating living standards.

In either scenario, Russian antagonism is likely to remain aimed at NATO and Western democracies and the negative spillovers of the post-Cold War period will keep the current state of play going for some time. In this regard, it is thus certain that NATO will continue to face a conundrum vis-à-vis Russia in the coming years. On one hand, the Alliance will need to offer a strong military response to the Russian escalation strategy. On the other, it will also need to de-escalate tensions with Moscow at the political level. The way out of this deadlock can only be found with a more constructive dialogue within NATO, and between NATO and Russia, on what a new European security landscape should be. The current military trends are worrying, and NATO needs new channels to avoid further escalation with Russia. Incident avoidance and incident management are key. But with the current stalemate in Ukraine or Syria, and the lack for the time being of any significant security dialogue between Brussels and Moscow, such a long-term perspective seems out of reach for the moment.

The challenge for NATO will be to avoid a situation where it finds it increasingly difficult to balance the imperative for defense and deterrence with a sense of détente and dialogue. The most realistic expectation could then be the resumption of a gradual dialogue with Russia on common challenges both sides already face and will continue to face in the future, for instance fighting terrorism or radical Islam. In this light, could NATO accept a transactional relationship with Russia that balances strategic competition in Eastern Europe with
cooperation elsewhere, say in Iran or Syria? Here the Alliance will need a clear and convincing vision for the future.

The South Will be a Key Test for Alliance Adaptation

At the same time, the instability on NATO’s southern flank is likely to continue to shape the internal security environment in Europe and North America, and security in the Mediterranean Sea itself for the next decade. Terrorism linked to Islamic extremism in the Middle East, Africa, and the sub-continent, including the phenomenon of foreign fighters, will head the list of “intermestic” challenges facing NATO in the years ahead. Human security and the criminal trafficking in migrants will also be part of this equation, with significant social and political implications for Europe. Clearly, these concerns are not limited to southern Europe, but are being felt across the European security space. The United States and Canada are stakeholders in these problems, even if the principal responsibility for their management continues to reside at the national level in Europe. Publics within the Alliance will rightly expect NATO to assist in the management of these challenges. The decision in February 2016 to deploy a limited multinational naval force to the Aegean to assist in the monitoring of illegal migration is a modest, symbolic step. NATO’s longstanding Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean is another important asset. It could well become critical if ISIS or ISIS-inspired networks attempt to launch future terrorist attacks on shipping or targets in southern Europe from bases in Libya or elsewhere in North Africa and the Levant.

The security environment in the south will continue to be strongly affected by the growing role of regional and external actors, acting directly or through proxies. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt have all been militarily engaged in the region’s ongoing conflicts, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. Without a lasting peace scenario for Syria, Turkey will continue to be deeply affected by the wars on its southern and eastern borders, and will be increasingly drawn into a struggle closely tied to its own internal security.

Russia is likely to consolidate its return as a Mediterranean security actor, in Syria and in less visible but still meaningful ways in Egypt and Algeria. One consequence of this will be the spread of NATO-Russia military risks southward to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. China, already an economic and political stakeholder in Africa and the Mediterranean, is likely to emerge as a more prominent player in regional security over the next decade. The May 2015 Chinese-Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean may be a harbinger of greater activism to come. To the extent that China progresses with its ambitious “One Belt, One Road” initiative for new continental and maritime links westward, this will likely reinforce China’s interest and presence in Mediterranean security in the years ahead. Ten years hence, it may be hard to avoid the Chinese factor in Mediterranean security and Alliance strategy.

Finally, strategy south will be the key test of NATO’s approach to regional and global partnerships. The Alliance has had a formal partnership arrangement with most southern Mediterranean countries since 1996. After 20 years, NATO’s seven-country Mediterranean Dialogue remains a valuable instrument for security cooperation and political dialogue,
alongside the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with the Arab Gulf states. Despite tremendous political change across the region in recent years, no partners have pulled out of these frameworks, and there remains a critical mass of interest in cooperation with the Alliance. Each of these partners has negotiated individual cooperation programs with NATO, and in general, there is an appetite for doing more, despite the complex public diplomacy surrounding cooperation in the south. In all of these relationships, including the training and assistance partnership with Iraq, defense capacity building will continue to be a core task.

This context, NATO allies can also do more to coordinate and place within an Alliance framework the wide range of bilateral assistance and capacity-building efforts underway in the south. Cooperative frameworks in the south can also be useful for mobilizing regional contributions to potential NATO operations in the Middle East and North Africa.

**U.S. and European Leadership Will Most Define the Future of NATO**

In its own way, the dynamic of the relationship with the United States will increasingly represent the traditional challenge for the Alliance and European security. While Russia’s intervention in Ukraine may have extended a strong U.S. leadership in NATO and Europe for the foreseeable future, history tells us that the transatlantic partnership needs to be revisited at regular intervals, and the moment for such review could be coming in the next coming years.

In the long run, the transatlantic relationship has to change. U.S. insistence on Europeans getting serious about increasing their contribution to Western military efforts and the gradual changes entailed by Washington’s “Asian rebalance” in Europe’s security environment are clear evidence that Europeans must look seriously at their own house.

Moreover, the U.S. hegemony may be the strongest the world has ever seen, but it still bound by certain limits. Washington cannot indefinitely support the burden of reassurance in Europe or its periphery, nor account for 73 percent of the total allied defense budgets. It can neither be the sole source of many strategic enablers, nor spend nearly four times as much per soldier as the European average. The United States is drawn into increasingly extensive strategic entanglements that force it to disperse its military forces across the globe and to spend a large share of its GDP on defense. The risk here is that the United States’ political and military influence around the globe becomes unsustainable once the cost of its international commitments necessitates domestic underinvestment. Certainly, we should expect the United States to remain an indispensable nation for another generation to come, perhaps even two, but will U.S. hegemony still stand in three generations?

Whatever the answer to this question may be, the outcome will present a daunting but unavoidable impact on the future of the transatlantic alliance.

Finally, we do not yet know how the European Union will respond to the rapid changes in its security environment, but its response will be a defining element for the future of NATO and the European security architecture. The Union has been struggling for some time regarding its role in the defense field when it talks about being an effective security provider: genuine commitment for a full-fledged European defense, full reliance on NATO, or a new division of labor with NATO on the security engagements both organizations are ready to take on.
But the current multiplication of crises in Europe’s neighborhood makes it necessary for the EU and NATO to have a serious discussion about their strategic objectives on this issue. The problem however is that NATO needs to engage with a European Union that is facing many uncertainties in the next coming years — anti-EU populism, migration crisis, terrorism upsurge, and economic underperformance. The simultaneous accumulation of these problems has the potential to bring formidable changes to the shape and future of the EU, and to prevent the EU from creating ground fertile enough to support a cooperative approach in its security policy. It looks therefore like the next few years of NATO-EU relations will continue to be bound by the EU’s own internal struggles.

**The Key Words for Warsaw: Unity, Solidarity, Strength, and Flexibility**

For the Warsaw Summit to be successful, the Alliance needs to address both the existential challenge in the east and the challenge of durable chaos in the south. Managing the east-south balance will be critical for NATO’s unity, while avoiding trade-offs will be crucial for NATO’s solidarity. The Alliance will have to find not only balance between member states’ diverse set of priorities, but also will have to create additional capabilities to address hybrid threats, crisis management, resilience measures, A2/AD competences, and the right quantity of conventional forces. The Alliance will also need to rethink its nuclear policy.

The Warsaw Summit must reinforce NATO’s credibility as a strong, even formidable, military machine, in the eyes of its members and partners — and antagonists. But to achieve this result, NATO will also need to continue to improve its force-multiplying functions, its effective command structures, and the enhanced interoperability between allies and partners. In comparison to the past, the security challenges of today require quick responses — necessitating flexible policy frameworks in which coercive reactions can be decided upon among networked actors. The Warsaw Summit has to mark the beginning of a long-term adaptation of the Alliance in a world that faces disorder for the foreseeable future.