What Allies and Partners Expect from a Biden Administration

*GMF Experts, with an introduction by Rachel Tausendfreund*

**Transatlantic Policy Implications of the 2020 U.S. Election**

The Trump years have not been easy on allies and partners. Trump’s “America First” transactional approach to foreign policy upended assumptions and destabilized relationships. But the Trump approach was not all, and not uniformly bad for all partners. Both in New Delhi and Warsaw partners found productive ways to work with President Trump’s team and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan found in Trump a “kindred spirit,” according to our Ankara chief Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı. For Paris, Trump’s fights with Europe and disregard for NATO were seen as helpful prodding for greater European ambitions.

Yet many would agree with Portugal’s foreign minister, who recently said at the Foreign Policy Forum in Berlin that allies “were treated by the Trump administration not as allies, but as enemies.” The Biden administration promises to reintroduce many familiar faces, from Antony Blinken as Secretary of State and Linda Thomas-Greenfield as UN Ambassador, and some welcome stability. President-elect Biden has made it clear that he wants to repair America’s relationships and reclaim U.S. leadership by example. Biden’s efforts will be welcomed and supported by partners and allies, but—as you will read in the country portraits below—it will not be easy going.

*Rachel Tausendfreund, Editorial Director*
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Transatlantic Economic Cooperation After Trump

The election of Joe Biden will put a committed transatlanticist in the White House. No longer viewed as a hostile entity, the European Union can again be a valuable ally to the United States and seek influence on relevant U.S. policies, not least with regard to trade and China.

The Trump administration launched a head-on assault on the global trading system, though in fairness to it the World Trade Organization (WTO) was already partly paralyzed by the time Trump took office. It has already been a generation since the last global trade negotiation round was completed, but the demise of the WTO has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Its crucial dispute-settlement mechanism has now ceased to function, due to a multi-year U.S. veto on new appellate judges being appointed. The Trump administration just before the election also blocked the appointment of Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as WTO Director-General.

The EU has always stood by the multilateral trading system, and if Biden is serious about revitalizing many of the international organizations Trump shunned, he must join the EU and the rest of the world in reforming and reviving the WTO. This means at least dropping the veto against Okonjo-Iweala, working with the EU and other WTO members to agree to appoint new appellate judges and reform the dispute-settlement mechanism, pushing forward the recent U.S. agreement with the EU and Japan to confront Chinese trade practices in the WTO, and working with the EU and others to establish a WTO-compliant carbon border adjustment framework so that members can take action against climate change without suffering competition setbacks in the global market place. Only with a once again functioning WTO can trade, in the post-pandemic context, return to its role as a major driver of global economic growth.

The last four years have seen a significant deterioration of bilateral transatlantic trade relations, even if the volumes transacted remained impressive. The Trump administration targeted European steel and aluminum exports to the United States via alleged national security concerns. It constantly threatened to levy high tariffs on imports of European cars and car parts. And it did nothing to solve long-standing transatlantic trade disputes over issues like aircraft subsidies, data privacy, corporate taxation of Internet services providers, or various sanitary and phytosanitary standards.

For the transatlantic economic relationship to be reset and the EU to be as valuable a partner for the United States as possible in any economic confrontation with China, the Biden administration will have to engage constructively on many of these disputes. Bogus steel and aluminum tariffs must be removed. The recent imposition by the EU of $4 billion of WTO-sanctioned retaliatory tariffs over U.S. subsidies to Boeing is a reminder that it is time to finally fix mutual aircraft subsidies concerns. Biden will also have to end the Trump administration’s last-minute stalling of the OECD global corporate-tax reform process and ensure that participation for U.S. firms is not optional. Otherwise, national EU (and elsewhere around the world) digital services taxes will quickly proliferate, poisoning the transatlantic trade relationship.

The formative foreign and economic policy challenge for Biden will be managing the U.S. relationship with an increasingly authoritarian China. He has made it clear that he will use democracy as an organizing principle in the defense against rising authoritarianism and corruption as well as to advance human rights. The EU—except perhaps a coupe of members like Hungary and Poland—will be a natural ally in this. Recent European
government decisions to limit or exclude Huawei from 5G networks illustrate how European political assessments of China are moving closer to that of the United States. There is no good reason for why the EU in general, when asked, should not support the United States in economic confrontations with China, including on issues like sensitive technology exports, demands for restrictions on Chinese government subsidies and—should circumstances in Hong Kong or Xinjiang (or Taiwan)—deteriorate further, also on potential economic sanctions against Beijing.

Data privacy and the business models of the world’s largest technology firms has been a frequent source of transatlantic tension, whether regarding the legal of transfers of Europeans’ private data to U.S. located services or the competition policy crackdown launched by the European Commission in the mid-2010s. Following the implementation of data-privacy laws that are quite similar to EU rules in California and other U.S. states, new federal legislation looks increasingly likely and could move the United States closer to EU standards. While the access of U.S. intelligence services to Europeans’ personal data will remain highly contentious, new federal-data privacy legislation could serve as a firmer foundation on which to establish new jointly agreed pathways for data-driven transatlantic trade. If so, the EU should approach such a process constructively. The same is true for the building federal and state level antitrust investigations of the practices of the largest American technology firms, which may in the end be more successful than EU actions to date.

The start of the Biden presidency is likely to quickly engineer a strong rebound in favorable European public opinion of the United States, not least because he has pledged to return the United States to the Paris Climate Accord and move aggressively to further reduce U.S. carbon emissions. The possible lack of a Democratic Senate majority, however, risks stymieing his climate aspirations. If the EU moves aggressively to increase its emissions price and the United States does not implement similar measures, carbon border taxes on U.S. exports to Europe will become inevitable in just a few years. It would be impossible for EU leaders to grant Biden a request for any material exemptions.

Joe Biden’s election means Europe and the world have avoided a nightmare scenario, and it makes a return to a constructive transatlantic relationship possible. Yet, the world is different than it was four years ago, and the U.S.-EU relationship must see new gives-and-takes to work as well as in the past. Hopefully, Biden and EU leaders are conscious of the opportunities in front of them.

Jacob Kirkegaard, Senior Fellow

**Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden**

After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration.
The anticipated shift is likely to be most profound from the perspective of the EU and its institutions. Among member states, there was always a spectrum of views about Donald Trump. The outgoing administration's approach enjoyed a degree of support in right-wing and nationalist circles, including several governments in Central and Eastern Europe. For some, this was a matter of ideology. For others it was a cooler geopolitical calculus. In general, however, the Trump administration was derided for its brash unilateral style as much as its policy choices, most of which were at odds with EU preferences. The list of sharp differences ranged from climate policy to trade, from Iran to the World Health Organization.

Above all, Trump and his key advisors were seen as dismissive of, or even opposed to, the idea of the EU itself. For them, international politics seemed to be about nation states, often individual leaders—some seen positively, most seen negatively. The traditional U.S. attachment to the “European project” had become the preserve of a foreign policy elite with little influence on Trump and his circle. A Biden administration should spell a return to the traditional balance in transatlantic relations, with the EU itself taken seriously again alongside relations with France, Germany, and others.

On substance, there is a realization that it may not all be smooth sailing across the Atlantic. Trade and digital policy are widely assumed to be the most challenging areas. Indeed, there is some concern that Biden may find it difficult to move away from the protectionist stance that has taken hold in recent years, against the backdrop of similar pressures in Europe and elsewhere. On other fronts, the outlook is for closer consultation and convergence. EU leaders will welcome a U.S. return to the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization. Biden has signaled a desire to bring the United States back into the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. A Biden administration is assumed to be more interested in and willing to assist with a host of problems on Europe's periphery, from Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

In some respects, NATO was one of the areas least affected by Trump's approach to the world. The U.S. military presence in Europe has grown modestly but steadily; a trend that began under President Barack Obama. U.S. complaints about defense burden-sharing were nothing new, even if the style was more abrasive. But from the start, Trump spread anxiety about the solidity of the U.S. commitment to European defense. It never quite came to a disavowal of Article V, and Trump would have faced a very tough bipartisan battle if he ever wished to leave NATO as he hinted on more than one occasion. By contrast, it is assumed that a Biden administration would put NATO back at the core of U.S. strategy. In policy terms, the emphasis on increased European defense spending will surely continue. There will be a tougher and more predictable line on Russia, coupled with an interest in new arms-control arrangements. Biden is a well-known figure in NATO circles. For the alliance, a Biden administration will be a return to the known world and an energizing element for the institution.

Of course, the general enthusiasm in EU and NATO circles should not obscure some looming, difficult debates. Biden's foreign and security policy team is likely to include a host of individuals who know Europe well. They will likely pay closer attention to democracy, media freedom, and the rule of law, with all this may imply for relations with Turkey, Hungary, and others. There will be no enthusiasm for Brexit, and new initiatives with the United Kingdom will be far from the top of the agenda. The fashionable interest in European strategic autonomy, spurred by the experience of the Trump years, is unlikely to evaporate. Many in the EU will continue to seek a longer-term hedge against a changeable United States. China will still loom large as
a strategic competitor for the United States and Europe. This will inevitably affect EU and NATO interests. The extent to which Washington and Brussels will be on the same page with regard to China remains an open question, although the outlook for transatlantic alignment on this front is surely better with a Biden administration.

There is great hope that President-elect Biden will visit Brussels as one of his first overseas trips. He will find a city eager to confirm that a transatlantic reset is possible.

Ian Lesser, Vice President and Executive Director, Brussels

Europe Hopes Biden Will Reset on Iran and Tame Turkey

The Middle East and Mediterranean having been the region where President Donald Trump most blatantly broke with established international consensus, European countries rejoice over the prospect of an end to four years of inflammatory rhetoric and disruptive policy turns that left Europe's southern flank at constant fever pitch. At the same time, they are painfully aware that many of Trump's blunt moves cannot be undone easily or at all.

While most European governments will breathe a sigh of relief over the United States’ return to a more traditional brokerage role in Israel/Palestine by bringing the Palestinians back to the table and restoring aid, they will not expect any deeper reversals here. The Biden administration will reverse neither the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem nor the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan, respectively, is seen in Europe as one of the few positive outcomes of Trump’s presidency. Deeply worried that this normalization came at the expense of the Palestinians, however, European countries look forward to the Biden administration putting Palestinian rights and concerns firmly back on the agenda.

The most obvious joint priority for Europe and the Biden administration in the Middle East is putting relations with Iran on a healthier footing, starting with the United States returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which it left in 2018, as Biden has repeatedly pledged to do. That said, Europe does not live under the illusion that a Biden presidency would resemble an Obama third term. Most European capitals are aware that the basic idea underlying the JCPOA—isolating the nuclear dossier from broader regional issues with Iran—is over. They do not expect the United States to rejoin the agreement without conditions or further demands for renegotiation. Regional issues will be on the table; the question is about when and how. Widening the scope of dialogue with Iran needs to be carefully sequenced, bearing in mind the country’s presidential election is set for June 2021, and the related margin and preparedness of negotiation of any subsequent Iranian government. Policymakers are juggling different options for sequencing quick mutual freeze deals (sanctions relief for nuclear compliance) between Biden’s inauguration in January and Iran’s presidential election. Given the Trump administration’s refusal to collaborate with Biden’s transition team and the fact that the next administration’s priority will be mending things at home, there is reasonable doubt as to whether Biden will be able to make the necessary moves at the right time. Thus, from a European point of view, while a Biden presidency will not necessarily mean a return to the JCPOA as it stands, it most certainly—and more importantly—means a return to joint transatlantic diplomacy toward Iran.
A second area where European countries hope for teamwork with the Biden administration is on taming a volatile Turkey, whose aggressive forays from the Aegean Sea to Nagorno-Karabakh a divided EU has been unable to contain. The ongoing dispute between Turkey and Greece over maritime delineation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which brought the two NATO allies to the brink of direct military confrontation this summer, remains of particular concern for European countries. In pre-Trump times, disputes between Turkey and Greece were typically resolved by a firm U.S. hand, most recently in 1996 when frenetic shuttle diplomacy by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke diffused the risk of military escalation. Over the last couple of years, however, long-standing disputes in Aegean Sea morphed into a complex bundle of intersected conflicts involving various sovereignty issues, gas exploration, the Libyan civil war, and broader geopolitical dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the face of this metastasizing challenge directly involving two of its member states, the EU has been scrambling over the best strategy to get Turkey in line without putting at risk the 2016 migration deal with Ankara or the integrity of NATO.

Concerned over any erosion of NATO’s ability to deter Russia, the Biden administration might seek to take a more hands-on approach on the conflict between Athens and Ankara in the context of a reviewed Turkey policy. Biden's advisors have underlined the resolution of the Eastern Mediterranean quagmire as a fundamentally transatlantic problem that must be tackled jointly. The degree of active U.S. leadership on this issue is less certain, however, not least given that the new administration's leverage over Turkey will ultimately be limited, especially if it moves forward with sanctions over Turkey's purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile system early on. Therefore, even a more active and cooperative role by the United States is unlikely to be a game-changer.

Kristina Kausch, Senior Fellow

How Berlin Can Help Biden—and Itself

The debate in Germany following the U.S. presidential election circles around two themes: “Joe Biden is not Donald Trump” and “the future is not the past.” That, of course, bears explaining.

An oft repeated phrase in Berlin is that there will be no return to a transatlantic status quo ante, even under a traditionalist President Biden. This is certainly true: even if Biden wanted to return to some golden age of liberal hegemony, chances are he could not do it. Donald Trump’s abdication of leadership and the United States’ consequent loss of power and influence are real. Both cannot just be undone. The sense of overreach is real in the United States in 2020 just as it was in 2016, and Biden will need to adapt to this reality. Therefore, the future is not the past.

Consequently, analysts in Berlin expect Biden to borrow from Barack Obama’s playbook and lead from behind. He is expected to concentrate on China, the core strategic question. He will plan for “less Europe”—not in a disruptive fashion, not erratically, not by happenstance, and not by fiat, but rather by design and by consensus.

Some observers conclude that Biden and Trump only differ in style and tone. They both agree that Germany should spend more on defense, should say goodbye to Nord Stream 2, and should follow the United States’ lead on China policy. But this is a misreading. While it is true that Trump and Biden are reacting to the end of
Pax Americana and that they both criticize Germany, their motivations and their goals could hardly be more different. Trump wants to destroy the liberal world order; Biden wants to reform and renew it while reducing the United States’ footprint. For Trump, allies are parasites; for Biden they amplify U.S. power. In other words: Joe Biden is not Donald Trump.

With Biden in the White House, German transatlanticists will face a like-minded person. And, while the strategic center of the world is shifting to Asia, he will be the most pro-Europe president since George H.W. Bush.

The Biden presidency presents an opening for Germany and, by extension, for Europe. But windows of opportunity close at some point. Biden will in all likelihood be a one-term president. It is conceivable that he will be succeeded by a Republican. Therefore, joint projects need to be planned with a bipartisan consensus in mind. Only then can Germany hope to repair its relationship with the United States and put it on a new, long-term footing.

A simple “kiss and make up” will hardly suffice. The United States has to bring something to the table as well. Trump deeply alienated many Germans. His policy vis-à-vis Germany consisted largely of demands, threats, insults, tariffs, sanctions, and troop withdrawals. There was a sense that he singled out the country. While 23 NATO members do not meet the 2 percent spending goal yet, all the dismissive talk from the Trump administration has been about Germany.

The United States’ Germany policy has changed several times since the Second World War. It went from “keeping the West Germans under control” in the late 1940s and 1950s to “integrating and empowering the West Germans” from the 1960 to the 1980s, to “trusting the Germans” post-1989, and then to “blaming and punishing the Germans” since 2016. In Germany, this latest phase has eroded trust in the United States, as polls show unmistakably.

Biden faces the unenviable task of being the fixer on the U.S. side. He will need to be ready to take some symbolic actions to mend fences with Germany and also convince Americans that Germany is not just the taker and the United States the giver in this relationship. Many Americans seem to need reminding why this relationship is in their own best interest.

The goal of a reset should be nothing less than a new transatlantic bargain for the 21st century. This cannot be achieved by Germany and the United States alone. It must be a European-U.S. agreement in NATO. However, this will be impossible without Germany’s active input. A new Atlantic initiative must contain three core elements: trade, China and NATO.

First, Germany and the United States should propose for NATO to revise its strategic concept. As a consequence, Washington would renew its commitment to the alliance but also reduce its role in Europe. The asymmetry within NATO would slowly end and Europe should gain more military weight. To achieve this, Germany would have to present an ambitious spending plan, which it has avoided to date.

Second, China policy should be coordinated. If Biden abandons Trump’s radical policy of economic uncoupling in favor of a more realistic strategy, it will be easier for Germany to take U.S. security concerns into account. In future, China policy will be successful only if Western democracies work together. A commis-
sion headed by the U.S. vice president and a vice president of the European Commission should define the common goals.

Third, the World Trade Organization should be revived. European countries largely share the U.S. critique of the organization, but not Trump's tactic of paralyzing its dispute-settlement mechanism. If Biden reverses Trump's policy of sabotage, European countries can support the United States' ideas for reform. A reformed dispute-settlement mechanism will make it possible to jointly pressure China to give up its unfair trade practices.

This is an ambitious plan. A single U.S. presidential term may not suffice for its implementation. At the same time, Biden needs quick successes to show his voters that cooperation beats confrontation. Germany should help him by joining some of the projects that are at the top of his list. This should be easy because many of these could just as well have been designed in Berlin: re-entering the Paris Climate Accord, launching an arms-control initiative, reviving the negotiations with Iran, and putting democracy back at the center of foreign policy.

Immediately after Biden takes office, the German government should start a G-7 initiative to herald the end of coronavirus isolationism and to focus on joint crisis management. The goal would be to remove all trade barriers and duties on medical equipment, ensure global distribution of vaccines, and establish a global early-warning system for pandemics. The collateral upsides would be to allow the United States to lead an internationalist project right away, to reintroduce the idea of the provision of global public goods, and to end the Trump-induced hibernation of the elite club of Western democracies.

The greatest danger to the transatlantic relationship today is passivity and lack of ambition. Business as usual will not cut it.

This article is translated, adapted, and expanded from an article published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper on November 9, 2020.

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Vice President, Berlin Office

A Sense of Foreboding in Ankara

There is a sense of foreboding in Ankara regarding Joe Biden's presidency. Presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan appeared to be kindred spirits and Trump went a long way in protecting Ankara against the bipartisan consensus in Congress to sanction Turkey. The government in Ankara will have a long list of expectations from the Biden administration, mostly things it would like it not to do. The two most critical ones are not sanctioning Turkey and not revitalizing the U.S. cooperation with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria.

Turkey has paid for and received S400 missile defense systems from Russia, a transaction that falls under the scope of the U.S. Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA.) Despite bipartisan pressure from Congress to implement sanctions immediately, Trump has held off on a decision. Other pieces
of legislation for sanctioning Turkey were put on hold by Senate Majority Leader Mitch O’Connell in line with Trump’s approach. However, Turkey was removed from the F35 program and two jets it had paid for were not delivered. Another ongoing legal challenge is an indictment by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York of Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank for allegedly setting up a scheme to evade sanctions to Iran. This process could potentially lead to a massive fine imposed on Halkbank by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Turkey’s economy is in a very vulnerable state and CAATSA sanctions or an OFAC fine could have a severe impact—and the two combined could be devastating. The government will expect the Biden administration to help on these two issues. If that help is not forthcoming, President Erdoğan can be expected to call early parliamentary and presidential elections, asking voters to “rally around the flag” in the face of an external attack.

Turkey regards the PYD as the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the EU, and organic links between the PKK and PYD are hard to miss, with the latter having the upper hand in the relationship. Therefore, the decision of the United States to work with the PYD against Islamic State in Syria has been one of the biggest thorns in the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Turkey delivered heavy blows to the PYD through its Operation Olive Branch in northwest Syria in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in northeast Syria in 2019. Operation Peace Spring also led to the decision by the Trump administration to downsize the U.S. support to PYD. While the situation currently looks sustainable for Turkey, a decision by the Biden administration to revitalize cooperation with the PYD would almost certainly escalate tension. Hence, Turkey will expect the Biden administration to disengage from the PYD.

The Biden administration will also have a long list of expectations from Turkey. The two most urgent ones will be to realign with NATO policies and to deescalate in the Eastern Mediterranean. When people talk about Turkey drifting away from NATO, they are usually talking about its relationship with Russia, but that relationship, which can be characterized as competitive cooperation, is a complicated one. The two countries have launched a rapprochement after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2015, and Turkey has acquired S400 missile defense systems from Russia. On the other hand, they are engaged in proxy wars in Syria and Libya (and briefly in Nagorno-Karabakh.) The Biden administration will expect Ankara to get rid of the S400s and contribute to U.S. efforts to contain Russia.

Turkey has lately been relying on its military to manage the challenges it faces in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the intervention in Libya and the mobilization of the navy around Castellorizo Island being cases in point. The Biden administration can be expected to pressure Turkey to refrain from this policy in the future and even to take a more pro-Greece position.

One of the red lines for Turkey will be the Biden administration asking Ankara to normalize its relationship with the PYD. There is a broad consensus in Turkey that the PYD is an offshoot of the PKK and, given that Erdoğan is practically ruling through a nationalist alliance, such a course of action would diminish his chances of winning the next presidential election.
As summarized above, therefore, mutual expectations between Turkey and the Biden administration will not go beyond not making an already bad situation even worse.

Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, Director, Ankara Office

**With a Biden Administration, Poland Expects Continuity in Security and a Return of Democracy**

In Poland, there were different reactions to Joe Biden's victory. The state media and some members of the governing Law and Justice party emphasized that the results were not yet official and showed concern that a Biden administration might be less favorable toward Poland than that of President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, the opposition and the expert community touted the return of the United States to stronger engagement in NATO and closer relations with the EU, and they engaged in a frank discussion about Poland's position vis-à-vis the next administration.

Poland's top priority is maintaining and potentially enhancing security and defense cooperation with the United States. Trump's presidency has been fruitful in this respect, and there are high hopes in Warsaw for maintaining this. The United States is militarily present in Poland through the European Reassurance Initiative and as the lead nation of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. To emphasize the hope for continuity in this realm, President Andrzej Duda ratified the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provides for a further increase in the number of U.S. troops stationed in Poland, on November 9. He expressed the hope that this was “a symbol of contemporary Polish-U.S. relations, calm, independent of all political storms and political processes.”

Having enjoyed a very close and beneficial relationship with President Trump, the government is in the process of figuring out a bilateral agenda with a Biden administration. Poland will welcome strong U.S. engagement in NATO and a U.S. president who does not question or qualify Article 5. For Warsaw, this should be coupled with the strengthening of deterrence vis-à-vis Russia on NATO's eastern flank.

While Joe Biden has declared his will to approach Russia from a position of strength, there is a degree of worry in Warsaw about his administration's eventual policy and the degree to which it will be coordinated with Central European allies. One recent open letter signed by 103 U.S. foreign-policy experts suggests a policy that would not be good for Poland. The unease with which Poland's government and opposition view a possible U.S.-Russia reset is lessened by Biden's criticism of Russia's interference in U.S. elections and of the destructive role it is playing in Ukraine and Belarus. Biden's team has also signaled skepticism of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, though they are likely to use persuasion rather than sanctions to stop the project, given the simultaneous goal of rebuilding relations with Germany.

The future U.S.-Polish partnership will focus on security, economic, and energy cooperation, but it will also be impacted more severely than in the past by Poland's adherence to the principles of human rights, freedom of the media, and rule of law. Poland and the United States see eye to eye on supporting the democratic processes in Ukraine and Belarus. Biden has voiced support for Belarus's opposition in its campaign against President Alexander Lukashenko and understands the need to support Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence.
Poland is well positioned to be a linchpin of regional security in Central and Eastern Europe, and it can be a pillar of support to the next administration in its approach towards Ukraine, Belarus, and the region. It can also continue to be a partner in strengthening NATO and in deterring on the alliance’s eastern flank.

France and, in particular, Germany rejoice over Biden’s declared multilateralism and his goal of reengagement with NATO, the Paris climate agreement, the World Health Organization, and Iran. However, once the honeymoon period is over, Europe will face the resurfacing difficulty of agreeing on a common stance on European sovereignty and defense. Divergent views on the degree of involvement of the United States in European defense and security, coupled with upcoming elections in Germany and France, will make it difficult for a Biden administration to engage with allies, despite his best efforts. Therefore, Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw should all be asked to come closer to a common stance on these key issues.

The government in Warsaw fears that it will be unfairly treated by Washington and is braced for challenges, especially when it comes to respect for democratic norms. It would like to have a relationship with the United States that is purely based on common interests and geopolitical realities. The majority of the opposition, though, acknowledges that the relationship has to be built on the common values and democratic norms underpinning the transatlantic alliance. In fact, many are critical that over the past four years of the Trump administration these have not been a significant topic of Polish-American discussions at the highest level. It is actually a reason why relations with the United States has for the first time become a polarizing issue in Poland’s domestic politics. The Biden administration will have to manage talking to Poland as a friend about the challenges of Polish democracy and being received as an unwanted voice that does not respect the country’s sovereignty.

Michael Baranowski, Director, Warsaw Office Director, and Marta Prochwicz-Jazowska, Program Coordinator

**Biden’s Victory Means Cautious Optimism in Paris**

Following the election of Joe Biden, the feeling in Paris is one of cautious optimism. France will welcome the return of the United States in the multilateral world order but will also expect this not to hinder its drive to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy. Its main priority is to reset the transatlantic relationship around a shared agenda on climate change, data, trade, and terrorism.

Fighting climate change will be a priority for Biden, who has announced his intention to rejoin the Paris Agreement immediately. This aligns with the trends signaled by French and U.S. public opinion in the Transatlantic Trends 2020 survey, which identified climate change as one of the most pressing global challenges, requiring closer transatlantic cooperation.

On trade, France was just slapped with U.S. tariffs on French products and expects smoother trade ties with under a Biden administration. The fight on big tech led by the European Commission is supported by Paris, which will not waver. France expects its intentions to tax the U.S. digital giants to find support within the Biden administration.
On terrorism and foreign policy, France will look for a reliable military partner in the United States, especially concerning West Africa and the Middle East. The Biden administration continuing with President Donald Trump’s commitment to “end America’s endless wars” will influence France to strategically redefine its engagements abroad.

Overall, France remains wary of how efficient the incoming administration will be in rebuilding trust. Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has already warned that “nothing will ever be like before.” This sends a clear warning to the next administration that it should spend considerable time working toward rebuilding the transatlantic relationship, well beyond communicating that everything is going back to normal. Additionally, while welcoming the return of U.S. global leadership, France might regret that some of its efforts to alert European countries to the need to rethink Europe as a geopolitical power might be trumped by an ambitious return of Washington in European affairs. In any case, this reset expected by Paris might not happen right away, as the Biden administration’s focus will most likely be on domestic issues.

France has been and will remain one of the United States’ key allies. It will welcome a return to the Paris Agreement and will definitely push for an overhaul of the relationship with Iran. Greater caution coming from Paris can be expected, too, as the last four years have proven, again, that any long-standing efforts to work toward common goals can be easily reverted with executive orders implemented by a later U.S. administration. France will remain a stable pillar of the multilateral world order, but it will not hesitate to stand its ground on some key national interests such as the issue of taxing U.S. tech companies.

Despite the deep ideological divides separating Presidents Emmanuel Macron and Trump, “America first” proved useful to France, which showed an increased appetite for working with Europe first. Trump’s criticism of NATO bolstered Macron’s push for European strategic autonomy and invocation of the need to focus on common interests. Yet, despite some proposals, especially in the realm of defense where France launched the European Intervention Initiative, European countries remain divided. France has managed to slowly push its European partners, including Germany, toward a more ambitious definition of European sovereignty, but many still favor the United States’ security umbrella and NATO, regardless of who sits in the White House. For example, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany led Warsaw to propose their relocation to Poland and the establishment of “Fort Trump.” This divide between the EU countries and temptations to bilateralize collective security will carry on in the next years. France’s priority in the upcoming four years will be to keep on trying to mobilize and structure the EU strategic debate. It worries that the signals sent by a Biden administration that “America is back in the game” might put an end to this momentum.

Given that Europe’s “wake up” moment never really arrived, in spite of a few initiatives and proposals—the United States’ return might mean apathy or inaction from countries that were anxiously waiting for it to “be back in the game.” Partners blindly aligning themselves with Washington’s interests will be met with pushback in Paris. Preventing such frictions will require a clear iteration of the next administration’s strategic interests in Europe, allowing France to clearly position itself and rethink its European strategy.

Many divergences between France and the United States preceded the Trump administration: President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia was perceived as an acceleration of declining interest in European affairs. “Leading from behind” in Libya and the “red line” episode in Syria remain stark reminders for Paris that Europeans need to seriously think about their security without necessarily always including the United States.
France’s push for more strategic independence means that it will not necessarily be aligned with U.S. interests. For instance, Macron’s push to reset the relationship between Paris and Moscow has been conducted without too much interference from Washington, but the next administration might not be as conciliatory. Moreover, frictions between France and Turkey will remain, and Paris will expect the Biden administration to be tougher with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose latest success in Nagorno-Karabakh, with NATO remaining on the sidelines, does not bode well for the future of the Franco-Turkish relationship.

Milan Seghier, Program Coordinator

India Looks forward to the Stability and Familiarity of a Biden Administration

The news of Joe Biden winning the U.S. presidential elections has generated much optimism in New Delhi and, given her familial ties to India, Kamala Harris as vice president has attracted an unusual amount of public attention across the country. Even though U.S.-India relations fared quite well under the Trump administration, Prime Minister Modi was quick to send congratulations to the new president-elect. Commentators in India have also shifted tone, welcoming back the “traditional” approach to presidency and a return to stable policy, as opposed to Trump’s erratic approach.

Observers of U.S.-India relations all foresee a continuity in the partnership, with Biden building on the advances in ties achieved under the Trump administration. The trajectory of U.S.-India ties has been steadily improving over the past two decades, even under ideologically different U.S. administrations. Policy circles in New Delhi are already highlighting Biden’s track-record of pro-India policies, both as the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and later as vice president. Biden is not an unknown for Delhi, as Tanvi Madan notes, and many in his cabinet would be known faces for India. Even though he will be constrained by a Republican Senate and face the uphill task of building back the economy in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, Biden’s long foreign policy track record is seen as a net positive, and many hope he will be a “foreign policy” president. The initial signs coming out of the Biden camp—recommitment to U.S. leadership and promise to “heal” partnerships and reinvest in alliances and multilateral institutions—are being received well not only in India but among all partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite these positive signs, there are still some open questions for India and others in the region. The most important one perhaps is: Where will the Indo-Pacific fit in president-elect Biden’s packed foreign policy agenda? This strategic region, which is home to some of the world’s most dynamic economies and critical trade routes, has also become a battleground for influence with the rise of an assertive and at times aggressive China. Even though the Trump administration’s approach was not always consistent and at times counter-productive, the Indo-Pacific did emerge as a key foreign policy priority for Washington. Many now wonder whether Biden’s priorities of repairing the transatlantic partnership and mending ties with European partners will take precedence over India and others in the Indo-Pacific. In the early days of the presidency, India will look for signs of U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the Quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad), which includes the United States, India, Japan and Australia. In his calls with the leaders from the region, President-elect Biden has confirmed the U.S. interest in a “stable and prosperous” Indo-Pacific, but it remains what shape the Biden administration will give the policy. Will it center solely around China, or will it focus on strengthening alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific? After the transactional approach of the Trump
presidency, the region will welcome a U.S. policy that is clear, consistent, and backs rhetoric with resources and viable alternatives to China on trade, technology, and infrastructure.

Second, and on a related note, India will also closely watch Biden’s China policy. The military conflict brewing on the India-China border has shifted India’s security and defense priorities and has been a major factor propelling India to seek closer ties with the United States and other partners. While there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington around many China-related challenges, New Delhi will be watching closely for tone or tactic changes. Will climate change emerge as a more important priority than balancing China? Biden will have to walk a fine line between constructive engagement and confrontation. India, like many in the Indo-Pacific, would like to see a United States that works closely with allies and partners in dealing with China-related challenges.

India will also have to do its part in engaging the Biden administration, and as some argue, work even harder than under the Trump administration. India’s increasing protectionism, difficulties in trade negotiation, and backsliding on human rights will certainly be thorny issues. On a positive note, India has the opportunity to broaden the basis of its partnership with Washington beyond defense and security, by engaging on areas which were largely ignored by the Trump administration, including climate change, reforming global institutions, and global pandemic response.

Overall, Biden does have a unique opportunity to engage democracies and like-minded partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific on the China challenge. With Europeans waking up and becoming increasingly critical of China’s international and domestic policies, and realizing that they have a role to play in the Indo-Pacific, this could be an area where transatlantic and Indo-Pacific priorities converge.

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