



TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF NATO SERIES

ASSESSING LEADERSHIP IN TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION

Working Session
April 16-17, 2015, Paris

G | M | F The German Marshall Fund
of the United States
STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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About this Paper Series

For each session of the GMF Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO program, a series of analytical papers authored by selected participants is published, each developing different aspects of the session reflections. These papers are published individually and as a coherent series of comprehensive works dedicated to one major issue of transatlantic security cooperation. In this way, the GMF Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO program opens the debate to the public and feeds future discussions on transatlantic relations. The authors are solely responsible for the views expressed herein.

Partners

The Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO program and its related paper series were made possible through the generous support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additional support from Airbus Group and partnership with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also enabled the development of the project.

About GMF

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

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WORKING SESSION

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JUNE 2015

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ABOUT THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF NATO PROGRAM

The Aim

This project develops concrete and focused policy recommendations on transatlantic security issues. Its overarching goal is to reach out to a wide transatlantic audience about the future of transatlantic security cooperation and provide policymakers and experts with fresh perspectives and understandings of the global geopolitical challenges that unite the transatlantic partners and structure future policies of and towards NATO.

Three times a year, this program brings together a group of 25 to 30 high-level U.S. and European security experts, strategic thinkers, senior policymakers, and private sector representatives to explore the security priorities for transatlantic cooperation in the years to come and serve as a forum to stimulate much-needed transatlantic security dialogue on looming threats and possibilities for cooperation. Held under the Chatham House rule, each session highlights the areas where transatlantic cooperation should be improved and strengthened, with regards to specific challenges and taking into consideration the latest issues on the international agenda. The program ensures that we create the right discussion format to look at both broad and more narrowly focused issues and topics.

In addition, GMF convenes ambassadors to the United States from NATO member countries once a year, with appropriate representation from the U.S. government, to complement the three workshops. This unique platform provides an ideal opportunity for discussing current and future policies, identifying potential divides among member states that could lead to suboptimal policies, and working toward common policies.

This group also fills a clear void in Washington. EU ambassadors meet on a regular basis, but there is no other similar meeting that reflects the relevance of NATO in today's world and works

to build a deeper understanding of the debates and discussions that exist among Europeans and across the Atlantic, which is central to, among other things, continued U.S. engagement in European security policy. Ambassadors from European members and Canada also report the relevant insights from these engagements back to their respective capitals to inform the policy debate at home.

This ambassadorial roundtable (also held under the Chatham House rule) is convened after the second high-level workshop of each cycle to help serve as a steering group to set the terms of the forthcoming workshop's debates, and to gather valuable comments on the deliverables of previous workshops.

The Context

The format and the objectives of the program exactly fit an increasing European and U.S. demand to strengthen transatlantic understanding and cooperation in the security field. Indeed, the political consensus between both sides of the Atlantic can no longer be guaranteed when confronting new international challenges. The economic crisis has more specifically affected the development of concrete policy cooperation, as both sides of the Atlantic wish to redefine their military and diplomatic engagements in the world.

Consequently, this context has created a strong need for a high-level discussion among national security and defense strategists on emerging and potential security issues that Europeans and Americans will need to address in the future. These include both issues of grand strategy (i.e. the shifting military balance, future transatlantic burden sharing and common procurement programs, and the future of the use of military force) as well as very specific challenges (e.g. maritime security, energy security, Arctic issues, the rise of new military powers, and the future

of NATO). Any of these challenges could alter the dynamics of the transatlantic conversation and even the shape of the alliance. That these challenges are not singular snapshots in time but extend and often overlap, converge, and reinforce one another is reason for greater urgency in reinvigorating the transatlantic security dialogue.

The NATO Summit in Wales has served as a crucial transition point, one that structures the ambitions that transatlantic partners have for the organization and organizes the roadmap for the new secretary general. The project therefore will develop fresh perspectives on the main points that were discussed in Wales while also looking to provide insightful analyses and recommendations about topics that will structure the mandate of the new secretary general in the run-up to the 2016 Warsaw Summit and beyond, such as the ever-important link between security and economics (whether it concerns trade policy, industrial cooperation, or the future of programs such as Smart Defense), the evolution of the NATO-European Union relationship, the future of the enlargement policy, or the efforts that NATO will need to engage in terms of public diplomacy. More specific issues encompass NATO's ambitions and priorities in specific regions of the world from the Mediterranean to the Arctic. The working groups look at these issues through the prism of the Alliance's engagement with other foreign policy actors, such as the European Union or individual countries, and discuss the shape of the Alliance's competences in devising efficient answers to complex 21st century challenges, while reaffirming its unique and central status. GMF also makes use of its office network to keep abreast on the latest developments that impact the future of the Alliance, and uses this to ensure that the sessions are relevant to all the transatlantic stakeholders.

The Method

GMF has developed this convening and research project to be structured with three cycles of workshops over 36 months. Each calendar year, there are two signature high-level workshops, accompanied by one meeting of NATO-member state ambassadors who maintain a representation in Washington, DC, and followed by a smaller, high-level concluding workshop that serves as a scenario-planning exercise. The program's agenda is shaped by a core group of recognized experts in transatlantic security cooperation and European and U.S. officials, who decide during the concluding session the key security issues that should be discussed in the working groups.

Each high-level workshop is organized over a day and a half to allow the group to have an in-depth, frank discussion about topics that are of interest to the global security policy community, and more particularly the member states and partners of NATO, to develop concrete and actionable policy recommendations. GMF ensures that the conclusions are appropriately disseminated to various stakeholders of the transatlantic relationship to be further discussed and debated in the other forums organized by GMF, such as Brussels Forum, The Atlantic Dialogues, or other convening formats.

The GMF Paris office serves as the organizational platform for programming.

The dates of the 2015 working groups are:

- **April 16-17** (Paris): Assessing Leadership in the Transatlantic Security Cooperation
- **June 11-12** (Berlin): Improving Transatlantic Strategic Burden-Sharing
- **October 9** (Washington DC): NATO Ambassadorial Roundtable
- **November** (Paris): Rethinking Transatlantic Active Solidarity

The Paper Series

For each session of the GMF Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO program, a series of analytical papers authored by selected participants is published, each developing different aspects of the session reflections. These papers are published individually and as a coherent series of comprehensive works dedicated to one major issue of transatlantic security cooperation. In this way, the GMF Transatlantic Security and the Future of NATO program opens the debate to the public and feeds future discussions on transatlantic relations.

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2 AGENDA

Thursday, April 16, 2015

7:30-9:30 pm *Transatlantic Dinner*

Keynote Speaker: Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Secretary-General, NATO

Friday, April 17, 2015

9:00-10:45 am

Session I: The Terms of a Transatlantic Division of Labor

Location: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
La grande salle à manger
37 Quai d'Orsay, 75007

Has the economic crisis provided transatlantic partners with additional incentives to collaborate on common procurement plans? Are informal regional security arrangements or NATO policies such as Framework Nation Concept an answer to these issues? It seems that the deteriorating situations in Europe's eastern and southern neighborhoods have not created the conditions for certain countries to reverse decreasing defense spending trends. What are the levers that exist to reverse these trends, and to what extent do they harm transatlantic solidarity? How do these trends affect transatlantic ability to project power to the south and east of Europe, but also in Asia? What are the issues that continue to afflict the transatlantic relationship on defense economics, and what role do the EU and NATO have to play in making sure challenges can be met? What are the levers that the EU has to facilitate investment in defense? Shall these issues be a part of discussions in the months leading up to the Warsaw NATO summit?

11:00-12:45 pm

Session II: The Aims and Limits of Transatlantic Deterrence

While Europeans are more willing to accept the fact that U.S. engagement in Europe will remain limited for the foreseeable future, this has also reshuffled the distribution of power and influence

within Europe itself. How does this affect the way Europe conducts a united foreign policy and its ability to influence events in its neighborhood? To what extent does the Alliance's current strategic and military adaptation affect Germany's role as a security actor? Can and should German strategic responsibilities balance its economic power at the transatlantic level? And how would enhancing Berlin's role in foreign policy and strategic issues influence the transatlantic approach to security challenges? To what extent do European and U.S. strategic interests overlap, and can we infer from these a clear burden-sharing policy between Europe and the United States? Is such a division of labor a desirable state of play for transatlantic security cooperation? What does this mean in terms of capabilities, and how does it affect the way NATO and the EU work on new strategic frameworks? How does this influence the balance between southern and eastern-oriented members of NATO?

2:30-4:15 pm

Session III: Facing the Multiplicity of Threats: The Need for New NATO's Structure and Instruments?

What are the main challenges that the simultaneous major crises in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East pose for the structure of the Alliance? Can leading NATO countries manage the proper balancing act to meet these challenges? What capabilities will they require to do so? To what extent is NATO able and willing to develop the right tools to address multiple threats? What are the instruments that should be in the toolkit in order to meet the identified challenges? Will the Framework Nations Concept provide a useful blueprint for this? What are the key security issues that the transatlantic Alliance fails to address in a coordinated manner? How can this be harmful in the long term, and what will need to be addressed before the Warsaw Summit in 2016 to ensure that all NATO allies are concerned and committed? Do the United States and

European countries share the same dichotomy between urgent and important security issues?
Can transatlantic powers agree on strategic priorities in the short and long-term, and on the means used to address these?

4:15-5:30 pm

Prospective Analyses and Concrete Recommendations for the Future of Transatlantic Security Cooperation

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SESSION I: THE TERMS OF A TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION OF LABOR

Has the economic crisis provided transatlantic partners with additional incentives to collaborate on common procurement plans? Are informal regional security arrangements or NATO policies such as Framework Nation Concept an answer to these issues? It seems that the deteriorating situations in Europe's eastern and southern neighborhoods have not created the conditions for certain countries to reverse decreasing defense spending trends. What are the levers that exist to reverse these trends, and to what extent do they harm transatlantic solidarity? How do these trends affect transatlantic ability to project power to the south and east of Europe, but also in Asia? What are the issues that continue to afflict the transatlantic relationship on defense economics, and what role do the EU and NATO have to play in making sure challenges can be met? What are the levers that the EU has to facilitate investment in defense? Shall these issues be a part of discussions in the months leading up to the Warsaw NATO summit?

Scene-Setting Paper

"Transatlantic Division of Labor: A Washington Perspective," Derek Chollet, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Key Insights: Transatlantic division of labor requires complementary defense tools and a strong leadership to prevent division of labor from leading to the division of transatlantic security interests.

Defining the Institutional, Capability, and Diplomatic Prerequisites to Improve the Transatlantic Division of Labor

An appropriate division of labor between transatlantic partners would improve the efficiency of the transatlantic partnership on security issues and rationalize the costs of shared security responsibilities. It requires a deeper cooperation at a strategic level, and an actionable division of tasks according to national interests

and capacities, in order to serve the general good of the Alliance. In times of resource constraints, pressure to enhance the transatlantic division of labor is more acute, and this division of labor requires special efforts at the institutional, financial, and diplomatic levels from both the United States and its European partners.

At the institutional level, the transatlantic security partnership is founded on the complementarity of NATO and the European Union. Improving and deepening the strategic dialogue between the two institutions is an absolute necessity in order to develop a more rational approach to security responsibilities and thereby achieve a better division of tasks among partners. NATO's military relevance has been reaffirmed by Moscow's revanchist policies in Eastern Europe, and the EU has achieved a coherent foreign policy against Russia in Ukraine as well as on Iran sanctions. Investing in a strong NATO and a strong EU is the key to designing a comprehensive transatlantic strategy, which clearly articulates political, economic, and defense capacities. Both NATO and the EU can provide efficient frameworks to divide responsibilities and legitimize the actions of transatlantic partners.

Reinforcing NATO and the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy requires political support in member states, but also a greater effort in terms of defense capabilities. It is necessary not only that defense spending increase, but also that spending become more efficient and effective in providing the military capabilities NATO and the EU need to defend their interests and deter conflict in the broader region. The capabilities debate often seems abstract, and the 2 percent GDP criteria of NATO is a constant subject of tension between partners. However, the question cannot be avoided, and the need for military resources must be answered in order to build a credible security partnership. The transatlantic division of labor is highly affected

by the inability of some European partners to provide more capabilities, which hampers the extent to which they can actively participate in the implementation of a transatlantic strategy. NATO's 2 percent criteria is necessary but not sufficient, and the Alliance also emphasizes the need for modernization and research and development in national defense budgets.

A renewed effort by European countries to increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively, their defense capabilities is a priority to avoid further widening the technology and capacity gap with the U.S. military, and to enable sustained operations without heavy U.S. support. The Libya intervention provides interesting lessons: whilst the military cooperation between transatlantic partners was a success, operations also revealed significant capability shortfalls and new concerns regarding the European capacity to act single-handedly and in a sustainable manner in its neighborhood. A geographic division of labor, which would give strategic preeminence to European powers in Eastern Europe and North Africa, therefore depends on the European ability to significantly increase its defense capabilities.

The transatlantic division of labor also requires diplomatic and institutional creativity to design original types of cooperation. The NATO "Framework Nation Concept," introduced by Germany in 2013 and endorsed at the Newport Summit, represents an interesting way to spread the defense costs and mutualize the resources. Similarly, the "Readiness Action Plan," also approved in Newport, is a step forward to reassure Eastern allies and share the burden between partners. These forms of cooperation are concrete expressions of the Alliance's willingness to think in a holistic way and develop common exercises, while taking into account each partner's specific abilities. Today's threats, moreover, will require concerted action across domestic and foreign security policy domains. Like terrorism, hybrid warfare and international crime are

addressed both at the transatlantic level and at the national level by local police forces. Transatlantic partners should clearly establish their areas of lead responsibility to avoid duplication, i.e. what cannot be covered by NATO and the EU, as well as develop new forms of security cooperation at the national and the transatlantic levels.

Finally, the role of the United States should be clarified in order to build an efficient division of security responsibilities. The global strategic environment and the serious budget constraints (i.e. the Budget Control Act) have led to a redefinition of Washington's security priorities. The Obama administration has rooted its foreign policy in the building of strong partnerships and the sharing of responsibilities, thereby directly affecting the nature of the transatlantic partnership. Although U.S. engagement in Europe's security remains strong, European powers must continuously work to keep the United States interested in investing more in the alliance. The imbalance in military budgets is a matter of frustration in Washington, which needs to be sincerely addressed by European countries. The transatlantic partnership would also benefit from looking beyond the security realm, consolidating the Euroatlantic economic space through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Strengthening Leadership to Avoid the Pitfalls of the Division of Labor

A well-conceived transatlantic division of labor represents the first response to current resource constraints and a rational way of improving transatlantic responses to security issues. However, one must bear in mind that dividing the strategic labor could become counter-productive to the general objective of strengthening the alliance. It could foster a *chasse-gardée* mindset and eventually alienate partners from each other, as each country — or small cluster of countries — becomes responsible

for issues of respective interest, corresponding to each other's capabilities. The sustainability of the transatlantic partnership lies first and foremost in the *sharing of risks*, and therefore the sharing of responsibilities. The division of labor can serve the efficiency of the partnership as a pragmatic way to adapt to the contemporary economic and political environment, but it should not jeopardize the unity of the United States and European powers.

The ideas of division of labor and burden-sharing are also conceptually challenging, and can unintentionally block strategic dialogue between transatlantic partners. First, these notions often lead transatlantic powers to adopt a defensive attitude as they try to justify their own political or capability shortfalls. Constructive discussions are made even more difficult due to the lack of clear measures to assess each partner's efforts to share the burden of transatlantic security. NATO's military spending requirements do not provide any information on the actual use of capabilities in operations that serve the community's interests, and therefore cannot grasp its whole reality. Finally, the question of division of labor should not be addressed before agreeing on *what sort of labor* is to be divided. The United States and its European partners already share common security concerns in Europe's eastern and southern neighborhoods, but these concerns do not share the same level of priority in Washington and in Brussels, or even among European powers. Transatlantic partners need to clearly outline the tasks to be divided, and the issues that cannot foster cooperation since they are not among certain partners' priorities.

These pitfalls can be overcome by enhancing leadership at the transatlantic level. Indeed, division of labor should not mean setting security objectives without coordination. The United States plays a major role in leading the definition of common strategic priorities and the coordination with third party countries at the

global level, but also in incentivizing all European countries to assume more responsibilities and increase their defense spending. Washington still maintains a unique set of diplomatic and economic assets when working with European political leaderships — at the EU level as well as at the national level — which enable it to invest more in the transatlantic partnership. Improving U.S. leadership also means improving strategic communication among partners, especially when the United States hesitates, as some argue it has in Syria. The concrete implications of the United States "leading from behind the scenes" for Europe's security could also be clarified to avoid false expectations.

On the European side, key powers such as France, Germany, the U.K., and Poland should also work to encouraging other European powers to increase their financial efforts despite the economic crisis. The division of strategic costs between European partners, as in the case of the sanctions imposed on Russia, needs to be addressed by leading European powers. A strong intra-European leadership is crucial to increase the sense of ownership of the transatlantic alliance by European powers and a culture of more equal burden-sharing, and thus to avoid the feeling of U.S. domination on transatlantic foreign and security policies.

Finally, the recent events in Ukraine have also provided a new momentum for the transatlantic security partnership. The strength of NATO and EU strategic coordination is a vital deterrent to further Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. Whether via common institutions and frameworks such as NATO and the EU CSDP, or at the bilateral level, the United States and European powers have a new incentive to improve transatlantic strategic cooperation and foster dialogue on the division of labor. This is true not only when it comes to the multiple dimensions of hybrid and conventional warfare, but this momentum is also essential to improve

public diplomacy and obtain the support of the population for increased political and financial investment in security. The Ukraine conflict may not provide a long-term *raison d'être* for the transatlantic partnership, but it should help build structural mechanisms to share security responsibilities between the United States and its European partners.

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SESSION II: THE AIMS AND LIMITS OF TRANSATLANTIC DETERRENCE

While Europeans are more willing to accept the fact that U.S. engagement in Europe will remain limited for the foreseeable future, this has also reshuffled the distribution of power and influence within Europe itself. How does this affect the way Europe conducts a united foreign policy and its ability to influence events in its neighborhood? To what extent does the Alliance's current strategic and military adaptation affect Germany's role as a security actor? Can and should German strategic responsibilities balance its economic power at the transatlantic level? And how would enhancing Berlin's role in foreign policy and strategic issues influence the transatlantic approach to security challenges? To what extent do European and U.S. strategic interests overlap, and can we infer from these a clear burden-sharing policy between Europe and the United States? Is such a division of labor a desirable state of play for transatlantic security cooperation? What does this mean in terms of capabilities, and how does it affect the way NATO and the EU work on new strategic frameworks? How does this influence the balance between southern and eastern-oriented members of NATO?

Scene-Setting Papers

"Restoring Order: Deterrence in Europe in the 21st Century," Barry Pavel and Magnus Nordenman, Atlantic Council

"Deterrence and Great Power Revisionism," Tom Wright, Brookings Institution

Key Insights: The Ukrainian crisis and the massive use of hybrid warfare have challenged transatlantic deterrence principles inherited from the Cold War period, and questioned the transatlantic ability to deter contemporary unconventional threats.

Adapting Transatlantic Deterrence to the Contemporary Security Environment

Those who favor a "back to the Cold War" interpretation of the events in Ukraine in 2014-15 are off the mark. Transatlantic powers do not live in the same strategic environment that they did during the Cold War. Yet, the current debate on transatlantic deterrence roughly discusses the extent to which the lessons learned from the Cold War period are still relevant today. First, effective transatlantic deterrence requires adequate capabilities and thus financial resources. Although insisting on the 2 percent criteria may seem abstract and unrealistic, it is based on an accurate assessment of reality. Europe and the United States have seen their defense budgets dramatically reduced in absolute terms — and in terms of GDP — since the end of the Cold War. These reductions are all the more alarming when viewed against the increases in the budgets of powers such as Russia and China. The reductions in Europe have been the most serious, and the capability gap between the United States and Europe directly affects the credibility of transatlantic deterrence. The rhetoric of the Cold War, focusing on quantity and quality of hard power, is therefore still pertinent in order to encourage European powers to maintain and even increase their defense spending. Lower spending on defense made sense in the peaceful years after the Cold War ended, but is a luxury that Europe and the United States can sadly no longer afford. Lessons learned from the Cold War can help remind all transatlantic partners of the importance of capabilities in defining a deterrence strategy.

The role of nuclear weapons, which constituted a core element of transatlantic deterrence in the war against the USSR, is more ambiguous today. Nuclear deterrence cannot carry the same importance in the contemporary security environment as it is difficult to make credible nuclear threats to deter non-state actors or unconventional warfare. The use of nuclear force is generally not discussed nowadays due to its obvious sensitivity in public opinion, but transatlantic powers cannot overlook this dimension of deterrence, especially given that the threat from Russia has dramatically increased in recent years and given some Russian leaders' growing dangerous and irresponsible proclivity toward nuclear saber-rattling. The United States and European powers must include this issue in discussions on transatlantic deterrence and address the possibilities and limits of nuclear power today.

The transatlantic deterrence principles, based on NATO's Article 5, are also a legacy of the Cold War that remains relevant in today's security context. Transatlantic powers should not reinvent a new framework for their deterrence strategy, but rather reaffirm the norms and actions that they have already agreed upon. Although Russia is testing the credibility and limits of Article 5, as well as trying to weaken transatlantic strategic unity, the Alliance should not overreact to the current crisis by questioning its key principles and instruments. For instance, NATO's strategic concept, despite its limits, remains a useful instrument — though will continue to evolve in the face of new threats. Designing new toolkits, including notably concrete ways to minimize the risk of unconventional or hybrid warfare and, at the least, counter its effects, would be more pertinent than challenging the concepts and abstract principles of transatlantic deterrence, which are still relevant to conventional and nuclear deterrence. Similarly, the multiplication of redlines have a counter-productive effect and

alter the credibility of the clear limits established by Article 5. European allies, especially in the east, have blamed the United States for being too publically outspoken about what it did and did not intend to do to deter Russia and that by doing so, it undermined the deterrent effect of the transatlantic strategy.

Beyond capabilities and strategic principles, transatlantic deterrence relies on a strong political engagement by both the United States and European powers for transatlantic security. First, deterrence aims to affect perceptions and thus depends in part on strategic and political messaging. Demonstrating strong leadership and cohesion at the political level is the most efficient way to deter an enemy from acting against partners. Second, non-conventional deterrence, including the use of economic warfare, counter-propaganda, and diplomatic sanctions, must operate at the political level and not at the defense level. The use of non-military means to punish or deny an adversary has become increasingly relevant in recent years, and transatlantic powers should work to maintain strategic superiority in this domain as well. Indeed, the future of the security environment will require a capacity to exploit the weaknesses of state and non-state adversaries, and this requires a more comprehensive and coordinated approach of deterrence.

The political aspect of deterrence requires an even deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU. NATO, despite being more than a military alliance and having political means, can greatly benefit from the political assets of the EU. For instance, the building of resilient societies is considered a strong deterrent against potential aggressors, especially when it comes to unconventional war. The EU plays a major role in developing political resilience among EU-members, but can also help non-EU members increase their resilience by fighting against corruption and strengthening their

political culture and stability. Similarly, fostering economic development and exchanges in the transatlantic area participates in the emergence of resilient societies. The unique set of tools and experience of the EU in all these domains constitute the greatest asset of Brussels in the transatlantic security realm.

Re-Thinking Transatlantic Deterrence Toward Russia in Light of the Crisis in Ukraine

The current conflict in Ukraine has tested transatlantic deterrence strategy. Russia's revanchist foreign policy and the threats it poses for the Eastern European region, have directly challenged the transatlantic partnership as a credible security and stability provider in Europe. The Ukrainian case and the renewed tensions with Moscow could therefore bring constructive lessons for the improvement of the transatlantic deterrence as a whole.

The Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the difficulty to articulate common goals at the transatlantic level. Various perspectives, often different and sometimes divergent, on the use of deterrence toward Russia have hampered the quality of the NATO and EU response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. It remains unclear whether the United States and the European countries want to deter Russia from further destabilization in Ukraine (which would suppose that a status-quo would be an acceptable base for peace) and from destabilizing NATO partners and non-NATO partners, or rather wish to reverse Crimea's integration into the Russian Federation. These different objectives have very different strategic implications, which need to be clarified in order to strengthen the credibility of transatlantic deterrence.

Defining a common strategy requires anticipating all its needs, both in terms of political consensus-building and capabilities, which proves particularly problematic in the Ukrainian case. Indeed, Russia purposely operates below

the threshold of Article 5 and uses grey zone tactics to bypass the deterrence principles of the transatlantic security partnership. Facing Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, the United States and the European powers have to redefine the level of political and military engagement necessary to effectively achieve their deterrence objectives. Similarly, transatlantic partners are yet to agree on the sufficient measures to reassure frontline states, despite the Readiness Action Plan being adopted, and providing a baseline for the expression of transatlantic solidarity. The U.K.-led initiative of joint expeditionary forces and the new U.S. forces exercises in the region, such as the recent Operation Atlantic Resolve exercises and the "Dragoon Ride" convoy, are all steps in the right direction, but they might not be enough to reduce, in the long run, feelings of insecurity and provide a credible deterrent in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the current efforts will have to be normalized in the future, and the question of a permanent military presence in frontline states must openly be addressed at the transatlantic level. The United States and its European allies are still divided on whether such a presence could be a sustainable solution, and whether it is the only solution to prevent Russia from implementing its revisionist agenda.

The Ukrainian conflict also raises questions about the U.S. and European strategic priorities in the region. Moscow is testing the level of transatlantic commitment to Ukraine's stability and security. From a Russian perspective, the future of Ukraine has immense political, economic, and geostrategic consequences, and is therefore seen as an absolute priority. On the other hand, many observers in Western Europe and the United States do not consider Ukraine's stability and security an existential matter.

Transatlantic powers need to find a way to overcome this priority gap in order to appear as a credible security provider and deterrence force when facing Russia. Changing the transatlantic

perspective requires understanding the full scope of the issue and its potential implications for vital transatlantic interests. Indeed, the strategic implications of the Ukrainian conflict go largely beyond the question of the Ukrainian sovereignty. Russia's revanchist foreign policy does not simply threaten frontline states, but also challenges the European order as a whole and therefore the global credibility of the transatlantic partnership. The ability of transatlantic powers to provide security in its nearest neighborhood cannot but affect their capacity to deter revisionist powers elsewhere in the world. For instance, the handling of the annexation of Crimea could create a precedent for other territorial ambitions and further destabilize other regions in the world. The Chinese leadership could use the Russian experience in Ukraine to justify its foreign policy in the South China Sea. Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategy consists of challenging transatlantic non-vital interests, and thus operates under the threshold of a transatlantic reaction. However, the aggregated implications of his actions constitute a real threat to the global security order that require a transatlantic response.

Finally, the Ukrainian conflict may reveal a deeper structural problem in transatlantic engagement with Russia. Focusing on Putin's foreign policy to explain the current tensions in Eastern Europe could actually lead transatlantic powers to misread the real security threat to the European order. Russia's identity is based on a world of spheres of influence, and Moscow will inevitably pressure neighbors to secure and extend its power of influence in these regions, with military force if necessary. The relative decline of Russia's geopolitical, defense, and economic power since the end of the Cold War has only increased the revisionist ambitions of Russia's foreign policy, and led it to use non-conventional tactics in order to avoid conventional military confrontation, a

type of threat that transatlantic partners have not developed adequate tools to address. The United States and its European partners also need a better understanding of Russia's strategic priorities and political identity to define the terms of their diplomatic engagement with the Russian leadership. Transatlantic expertise on Russia, which has diminished in recent years, should be fostered in order to design the pertinent diplomatic tools and to be able to anticipate the consequences of political changes in Russia, even if the ability to truly understand Russia today means having access to a small group of decision-makers around Putin, a very hermetic circle.

Understanding Russia's foreign policy mindset is nevertheless crucial, since transatlantic partners are already preparing to re-engage with Russia after the conflict; it is also crucial to understand how the future of decision-making among Russia's political and military leaders will affect the nature of the relationship and transatlantic engagement. The Ukrainian crisis has created momentum for closer transatlantic cooperation and new deterrence mechanisms toward Russia, but it should not stop all forms of cooperation with Moscow on other global issues, nor should it prevent diplomatic exchanges with the Russian leadership on the broader European project. The transatlantic partnership cannot afford to leave Russia off the table, and would instead benefit from a better understanding of Russia's long-term interests and objectives at the global level. Although cooperating with Putin may be impossible in the coming years, Russia also cannot be sealed off from the West and will continue to be an essential actor when it comes to Europe's security. Transatlantic strategy should therefore seek to create a framework for future strategic dialogue.

5

SESSION III: FACING THE MULTIPLICITY OF THREATS: THE NEED FOR NEW NATO STRUCTURES AND INSTRUMENTS?

What are the main challenges that the simultaneous major crises in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East pose for the structure of the Alliance? Can leading NATO countries manage the proper balancing act to meet these challenges? What capabilities will they require to do so? To what extent is NATO able and willing to develop the right tools to address multiple threats? What are the instruments that should be in the toolkit in order to meet the identified challenges? Will the Framework Nations Concept provide a useful blueprint for this? What are the key security issues that the transatlantic Alliance fails to address in a coordinated manner? How can this be harmful in the long term, and what will need to be addressed before the Warsaw Summit in 2016 to ensure that all NATO allies are concerned and committed? Do the United States and European countries share the same dichotomy between urgent and important security issues? Can transatlantic powers agree on strategic priorities in the short and long-term, and on the means used to address these?

Scene-Setting Papers

“Fulfilling NATO’s Missions: The Need for New Structures and Instruments,” John R. Deni, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

“NATO’s Moving Goalposts between Wales and Warsaw,” Martin Michelot, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Key Insights: NATO will focus on collective defense and the definition of a common approach to security threats both in the east and in the south in order to prevent transatlantic strategic priorities from diverging.

Articulating Security Priorities According to Transatlantic Threat Perceptions

Transatlantic partners face a large swath of security threats in the European neighborhood.

The key issues can be divided into an Eastern front, with growing tensions with Russia and violent events in Ukraine, and a Southern front, which includes primarily non-state threats from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Each transatlantic power is affected differently by each security front, which creates significant divergence between the strategic priorities of transatlantic partners. In the context of the Ukrainian conflict, and despite initial difficulties, the United States and its European partners have been surprisingly successful in creating unity and designing common military and economic responses. Indeed, the defense of Allied territory remains an absolute priority to the Alliance, and Russian military revisionism has been an important factor in fostering this transatlantic strategic unity. Threat perception stems from geographical proximity and strategic interests, with frontline countries such as Poland and the Baltic countries defining the invasion of Crimea and the war in Ukraine as an existential threat while the growing strength of terrorist groups in Libya and North Africa in general holds a greater significance for Italy, France, the U.K., and Southern Europe. In a context of multiple threats surrounding Europe, competing threat perception is a major risk for transatlantic solidarity, and eventually for the future of the transatlantic partnership. NATO and the EU have an important role to play, along with U.S. leadership, in fostering dialogue between transatlantic partners, and especially between European powers, in order to define common priorities and build frameworks of cooperation. These two institutions have the political legitimacy and the institutional means to build up and coordinate the actions of smaller coalitions or clusters of countries that share closer priorities and can, or at least want to, operate together.

The Southern front appears more problematic than the Eastern one to the transatlantic partnership. Firstly, while the threats of Russia’s

aggressive foreign policy in Eastern Europe jeopardize the European territory, NATO partners, and potential NATO members, the conflicts in the MENA region to date have more indirect implications on transatlantic security. Besides, in times of resource constraints, the United States and its European partners tend to prioritize urgent security issues over more long-term, important issues, and the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the European order is seen as the most urgent matter today. Third, transatlantic security tools have not been successful at addressing Southern front issues such as terrorism, failed states, and the security implications of massive migration waves. The lackluster results of recent interventions and the difficulty to deter, or even anticipate, these questions have made transatlantic powers reluctant to engage in new costly operations. The cases of Iraq, Libya, and Syria, where different forms of intervention or non-intervention were adopted and were not successful, have also fostered a feeling of hopelessness. Finally, transatlantic powers, due to the variety of their security interests in the Southern neighborhood, support different — and sometimes opposing — proxies in the region. This prevents the United States and the European powers from building a united approach to regional security providers, and therefore delays the definition of a common transatlantic strategy in the MENA.

Nonetheless, the transatlantic partnership will have to articulate a common approach to both Eastern and Southern fronts because growing perception gaps could easily create opposing priorities and strategic incoherence. Security threats that are coming directly to the Alliance's borders cannot be sidestepped; the transatlantic powers will not be facing wars of choice. The evolution of U.S. foreign policy, which has reassessed its priorities and "pivoted back" to the Middle East and Eastern Europe in light of the

recent crises, illustrates the seriousness of the threats in the European neighborhoods.

Improving the Alliance's Force Structure and Focusing on Core Missions to Address Multiple Security Issues

The principles and structures of the Alliance are constantly evolving in order to adapt to the changes of the transatlantic security environment. Russia's recent policies on the international stage have led to a reconfiguration of NATO, both in its strategic objectives and in the means to achieve them.

In the context of NATO operations in Afghanistan, the Alliance has focused for more than a decade on crisis management issues. The Russian annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have forced transatlantic leadership to rebalance the three core missions of NATO in favor of collective defense. The aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy has led the Alliance to come back to its historical *raison d'être*, and entailed a new momentum for transatlantic security cooperation. At an operational level, the Alliance will continue to train for external crisis management operations, but budget and bureaucratic efforts will be focused on deterrence and collective defense issues in order to respond to the new threats. The emphasis on collective defense also frames transatlantic public diplomacy. While the purpose and relevance of NATO has been questioned since the end of the Cold War, it is now perceived as the necessary tool to do what countries cannot do alone for the security of the European territory.

In addition to reinforcing the prominence of collective defense, the Alliance has sought to increase its flexibility and readiness in order to face the multiplicity of threats on the Eastern and Southern fronts. The future of NATO will be rooted in the projects and ideas that were approved and strengthened at the 2014 Newport Summit. The Framework Nation Concept and

the Readiness Action Plan have designed efficient and practical tools to respond to the Alliance's current needs. The effective implementation of these principles will determine NATO's capacity to transform itself and become more able to foster constructive cooperation among transatlantic partners. Similarly, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) established at the Newport Summit provides concrete instruments to speedily deploy necessary capabilities in response to an Article 5 crisis. These actions need to be in full force by the 2016 Warsaw Summit and efficiently applied in the near future to serve NATO's collective defense purpose. In the meantime, NATO's objective will be to devise responses for the new threats that have arisen in its Southern neighborhood.

The need for more flexibility constitutes an argument against the establishment of new permanent bases in Europe, especially in times of financial constraints and the need for cost-efficient solutions. Defense budget cuts will continue to frame transatlantic security economics despite the Russian threat and the need for the reassurance of Eastern European partners, and improving the flexibility and readiness of the Alliance seems a particularly sensible compromise to fulfill the security commitments without creating static forces.

In parallel to refocusing on its core principles, adaptation of NATO members to the contemporary security environment also necessitates a transformation of its institutional and capability structure. First, transatlantic partners can no longer afford losing more deployable forces for fear of becoming militarily irrelevant, the so-called "bonsai armies." This caveat concerns more specifically the major European powers, and cannot be compensated by the growth of defense spending among smaller Central and Eastern European countries. The political debate on defense spending should be guided by a sharp understanding of the need for

capabilities, and the strategic community has a role to play by informing the public and the political leadership of the security implications of capability cuts and reductions of deployable forces. Second, the issue of the scarcity of resources requires prioritizing security imperatives over political ones in the allocation of defense spending. Transatlantic military have dramatically increased the number of non-deployable staff while decreasing the number of actual forces on the ground. Thus, the reduction of capabilities stems from the new distribution of the defense personnel as well as from the budget cuts. Besides, the social function of transatlantic military, which provides employment to the populations and resources to the private market, has often taken on more importance than the strategic and security rationales, and creates new political constraints when taking hard decisions on budget cuts and restructuring of transatlantic defense.

NATO's transformation also requires fixing a certain number of institutional blockages. The strategic culture of the institution is particularly process- and input-oriented, which prevents more pragmatic and creative thinking from emerging. The growing number of entities within NATO has also led to the multiplication of ideas, interests, and perceptions, thereby affecting its general cohesion. The lack of centralization of the Alliance, embodied by the very limited staff actually working at NATO's headquarters, has paradoxically increased the number of bureaucratic issues. In addition, the Alliance lacks knowledge and expertise on important regions of the world, which has created blind spots and made the design of a comprehensive transatlantic strategy more difficult. The aggregation of these structural liabilities affects the general efficiency of the Alliance. Improving the internal functioning of NATO therefore constitutes an essential task for the general transformation of the transatlantic security partnership in the 21st century.

6

PROSPECTIVE ANALYSES AND CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION

The conflict in Ukraine raises serious implications for the European security order as a whole, and for transatlantic credibility at the global level. Transatlantic partners cannot, and should not, limit the scope of Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine to a regional issue, and need to unite against a real threat of military revisionism directed against transatlantic norms and values, not to mention the entire project of European integration. European solidarity is clearly at stake, as frontline nations keep calling for more actions of reassurance, beyond the ones announced at the NATO Summit in Wales, and the risk of the political destabilization of Eastern European NATO partners and certain NATO members cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the way the Ukrainian crisis is being handled by Washington and its European partners may create a precedent for future revisionist ambitions in other regions of the world. For instance, the U.S. commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty will influence its credibility both in the Middle East and in the South China Sea. The future relationship with Moscow will also be determined by the transatlantic partnership's ability to remain a credible security provider in the European neighborhood, both East and South.

Russia's use of hybrid warfare, in an unprecedented scope, has also challenged transatlantic security cooperation, and should lead transatlantic partners to devise new responses to non-conventional threats. Due to U.S. and European absolute military conventional superiority, revisionist powers will engage in other forms of confrontation to promote their interests. Hybrid warfare includes a mix of instruments such as cyber technologies, low-level political agitation, state corruption, strategic communication, and economic pressure. The non-conventional nature of these activities enables revisionist powers to operate under the threshold of Article 5, and to likely avoid any

transatlantic military reaction. In order not to be in a situation of strategic disadvantage, transatlantic powers need to find the right tools and design a comprehensive response to hybrid warfare tactics. Institutional dialogue between NATO and the EU is crucial in all domains of hybrid warfare, particularly to improve public diplomacy to shape transatlantic public opinions and help develop resilient societies.

Transatlantic solidarity requires constant efforts and support at the political level. First, the perception gap among partners constitutes a risk to transatlantic strategic unity. While the USSR was the sole existential threat during the Cold War, the United States and the European powers now face a multiplicity of smaller threats both in the East and the South, which has fostered a certain divergence of priorities. A strong transatlantic leadership is instrumental in defining common security priorities and improving the sharing of strategic responsibilities. Second, transatlantic division of labor should not give way to a division of purposes and interests. Transatlantic leadership must promote cooperation at the strategic level in order to avoid the disintegration of the transatlantic identity, while the burden of operations is rationally distributed among partners, based on respective willingness and capabilities. A pragmatic approach to transatlantic security cooperation should encourage an informal and organic division of labor rather than institutionalize the specialization of transatlantic powers. This requires improving communication between partners, especially between the United States and the European powers as well as between the EU and NATO, in order to reach a consensus on strategy and define a case-by-case distribution of security tasks.

Transatlantic powers have unique assets and capacities to rapidly achieve strategic objectives, but often struggle to sustain a constant level of engagement in the long term. The lack of

staying power stems from the strategic culture of transatlantic democracies, which can provide quick answers to security issues but also requires quick results to preserve the support of the populations. Financial constraints also limit the duration of military operations and the transatlantic ability to implement long-term post-conflict strategies. Moreover, as the contemporary security environment on the transatlantic Eastern and Southern fronts evolves, the United States and the European powers will have to show extreme patience and wait for the outcomes of the current dynamics. The transatlantic strategic community has a role to play in convincing the public of the need for a patient approach to security issues.

The issues brought forth by the decomposition and recomposition of political structures, especially in the Middle East, are at least a decade away from being resolved, so transatlantic partners must keep a long-term perspective on the security challenges of the region. The U.S.-supported Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) intervention in Yemen might become a model for future military engagement in the region, with a “no boots on the ground” United States providing intelligence sharing, targeting assistance, advisory, and logistical support to a regionally led military intervention. This “leading from behind the scenes” strategy entails risks with potentially long-term destabilizing consequences, as regional powers will pursue their own strategic interests, which might not always overlap with those of the United States. The challenge for the transatlantic partners is to find a middle ground that meets both the complexity of the region and transatlantic strategic interests. The question remains: How do you support and build regional capacities without taking sides? Relying on regional partners will obviously compel Western powers to choose sides in conflicts and frustrate a few allies.

The demand for U.S. leadership has increased all around the world: in Europe, the Middle East, and in Asia, Washington is being asked to be more present in regional security affairs. The U.S. “rebalancing” strategy toward Asia and the financial constraints on U.S. defense budget had caused significant security concerns among European partners. Although the recent crises in Eastern Europe and the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State group in the Middle East have forced the United States to re-engage more openly in these regions, the strategic and economic rationale has not fundamentally changed in Washington. Indeed, Europe still represents the third-ranked priority of U.S. strategy; as such, European powers should enhance U.S. interests in European security and preserve their strategic relevance. First, intra-European defense cooperation and continued European political integration should be reinforced in order for Europe to enhance its position as a credible and united partner. Second, as most of the key international security crises are taking place in the Eastern and Southern European neighborhoods, European powers have a unique opportunity to become essential stakeholders in the peace-making processes. The negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program could serve as a model of efficient European foreign policy coordination. Third, if the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and European partners is ratified, it could create a new momentum for the transatlantic relationship, and thereby dramatically increase U.S. interests in Europe’s long-term stability and development. Fourth, there is a need to strengthen the U.S.-European security dialogue and clarify cross-expectations when it comes to defining policies and capabilities. Finally, the United States and its European allies will have to potentially include third parties who are devoting more attention to the region, like India or China, to manage crises in the MENA region.

For more than a decade, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) constituted a remarkable engine for partnerships and expertise for the Alliance. The end of the mission in Afghanistan also means the closure of a unique period of operation coordination within NATO as well as with non-NATO members. The need for external partnerships will remain constant despite the renewed focus on collective defense over crisis management issues and collective security. NATO does not seek to be a global security actor, but can have a strategic relevance when dealing with various international security issues beyond the transatlantic realm. Recently, controlling nuclear proliferation, the security of

Japan, and the monitoring of relationships with North Korea have illustrated the way NATO can serve transatlantic interests on the global stage. All these missions suppose strong partnerships with third-party countries, and NATO will have to reinvent a model for cooperation in order to keep its power of projection and its unique role in capacity-building missions around the world. The preservation and use of ISAF's lessons-learned in terms of partnerships and interoperability with non-NATO members should therefore constitute one of Alliance's objectives in the future. The Alliance's capacity to continue to project power and manage crises will still determine its capacity to deter potential adversaries.

7

TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION OF LABOR: A WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE

Derek Chollet

Over six years ago, U.S. President Barack Obama came into office with a firm conviction that the United States needed to revitalize its alliances and renew its core security relationships around the world. That is why one of the most important tenets of his foreign policy has been to build strong partners. The Obama administration's 2015 National Security Strategy makes clear that while the United States needs to continue to lead, it must do so with "capable partners" and that "no global problem can be solved without the United States and few can be solved by United States alone."

The National Security Strategy goes on to state that when it comes to addressing the world's most pressing security challenges, "a strong Europe is an indispensable partner." The United States views a Europe more capable of tackling security challenges — and therefore sharing the burden — as essential to ensuring maintenance of a strong transatlantic alliance. That is why a meaningful division of labor between the United States and Europe is vital to having a strong partnership.

Of course, countries will have competing priorities, influenced by differences in geography, economics, or history. One cannot expect that all countries will prioritize everything equally; what matters are the big issues. The United States and Europe must have a common outlook and be willing to share sacrifices. From a U.S. perspective, a division of labor means that the United States is not expected to do everything alone, and that Europe is prepared and willing to put substantial resources into meeting security challenges.

This is what Obama has set out to do. He has tried to ensure that where the United States is contributing to common efforts, it does not necessarily own the effort outright. Obama has focused on the U.S. contribution being defined through what he calls "unique capabilities." The

United States must lead, but do so in a way that enables other partners to contribute as well.

For example, in the 2011 Libya campaign, the president was determined that the United States resist the temptation to dominate the intervention, and instead, sought to "cabin" the U.S. role to providing unique capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; airlift and refueling; and precision strike. Obama was also determined to make it a NATO effort, drawing the capabilities of others into the campaign. In the end, 18 countries were involved and U.S. forces flew just over 10 percent of the strike missions. The campaign's success would not have been possible without NATO's command and control capabilities. As then-U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon observed at the time, "This approach succeeded in meeting our objectives and led to a division of labor that enabled others to contribute based on their distinctive capabilities and interests."

There is a similar dynamic in addressing other common challenges. Take Afghanistan, where the United States and Europe have worked together in what has been the longest NATO operation in history. And in West Africa, the United States is using its unique capabilities to support the French in its military operations through intelligence, airlift, and refueling support.

There has also been a division of labor in the transatlantic community's response to the Ukraine crisis. Both the United States and Europe have stepped up on sanctions, despite the fact that many predicted the Europeans would never be able to muster the will to do so. European leaders have been at the forefront of the diplomatic effort to try to solve the crisis, with the United States in support. Yet the United States is putting more emphasis and resources toward working with the Ukrainian military to ensure that it becomes more capable, less corrupt, and that it can play a positive and stabilizing role in

its country (of course, this is an area where the United States would like to see more European involvement). So far, the United States has committed to providing the Ukrainian military with over \$200 million in assistance. Beyond Ukraine itself, the United States and Europe have been sharing the burden in reassuring NATO partners in the East through such initiatives as the Readiness Action Plan and by bolstering NATO's rapid response capacity.

In the Middle East, the United States and Europe are sharing the burden in the campaign against the self-proclaimed Islamic State group (ISIS). While the United States is doing the most by far, it is not alone. France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark are taking part in direct airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. Germany sent 40 paratroopers to conduct weapons training in Iraq last fall, and Kurdish fighters are also being trained in southern Germany. The U.K., Spain, Portugal, and Italy have also sent or committed troops for the training effort. France, Germany, the U.K., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Albania have provided direct military assistance, while many others have provided monetary support. That is all good, but the campaign against ISIS will not end anytime soon. The real test will be in sustaining European capabilities, resources, and public support throughout the campaign.

These examples illustrate why the debate about defense investment and capabilities matters so much. In a way, a division of labor is inherent for Europeans, since U.S. capabilities are so dominant. From Washington's perspective, the perception is that transatlantic labor has not been divided enough. To be simplistic, the United States does not want the desire for a division of labor to become an excuse for Europeans to shoulder the burden on the "easy" security problems and for the United States to take on the "tough" ones. U.S. national security leaders are no longer worried about Europe duplicating

capabilities or diluting NATO; they are concerned about Europe evolving into strategic irrelevance — therefore making it impossible to divide the labor.

This points to the core challenge: Inherent in the concept of dividing the labor is the idea that the United States and Europe have the same perspective on security threats, and that there is a common cause that transatlantic partners must bring their different capabilities to help address. When it comes to issues that threaten the NATO Alliance, and the broader transatlantic homeland, cooperation between the United States and Europe is paramount.

Over the years, Americans and Europeans have shown that they do have that shared perspective, despite the popular argument that they come from different planets. The United States and Europe have worked and sacrificed together in places like Afghanistan, where there are still thousands of U.S. and European troops trying to help bring peace to that country. Similarly, against ISIS, the United States and Europe have a shared perspective of the urgency and magnitude of the threat. And finally, on Russia, the United States and Europe increasingly see eye-to-eye on the great danger that President Vladimir Putin's Russia poses.

To address such issues, the United States wants and needs strong and capable partners. "A core principle of all of our alliances is shared responsibility," then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said a few years ago. "Each nation must step up to do its part. And American leadership does not mean we do everything ourselves. We contribute our share — often the largest share — but we also have high expectations of the governments and peoples we work with." That is why Washington wants a Europe that is willing to invest with the United States in common security efforts. That is why it wants more capable European militaries. And that is why, when it

concerns to common security efforts, the United States believes it must share the burden, and yes, divide the labor. In a world experiencing such dramatic and historic changes, which present so many security challenges to the transatlantic community, we cannot afford to do anything less.

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8

RESTORING ORDER: DETERRENCE IN EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Barry Pavel and Magnus Nordenman

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has focused primarily on its crisis management and cooperative security tasks, with operations and efforts in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Mediterranean. This expeditionary era for NATO was enabled by a relatively permissive security environment, with an absence of great power competition not only in the Euroatlantic arena, but across the world. Furthermore, the United States was viewed as virtually unassailable, and NATO could operate essentially unimpeded at long distances on the back of its superpower member. Today, however, global competition between great powers is back, not only in the transatlantic region due to a newly assertive Russia, but also globally with a more extensive Chinese presence in the South China Sea, as well as across the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and even the Mediterranean. At the same time, new arenas of competition are opening up, including the Arctic and the African continent. NATO is not a global alliance, but it is a powerful regional alliance that finds itself in, and must relate to, a very dynamic global context. And in a world of great power competition, with Russian aggression in Europe's neighborhood, once again NATO must bring collective defense in general, and deterrence in particular, to the top of the Alliance agenda. Much suggests that this will, once again, become NATO's *raison d'être* over the next decade or more.

Hybrid Warfare and Deterrence

Russian military and hybrid warfare operations against Georgia and Ukraine, along with other assertive and coercive activities directed against some NATO members (e.g., cyber attacks against Estonia) suggest that non-NATO European countries may fall victim to Russian aggression in coming years, while NATO members and the

Alliance may be tested through Russian shows of force and provocations as well. Indeed, while all-out war in Europe remains a remote possibility, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis it no longer can be ruled out entirely. Russia will continue to test NATO's collective defense and deterrence reactions over the coming years, in order to detect weaknesses and gaps that can be used for opportunistic advances of the Russian sphere of influence and to shake Allied confidence in the sanctity of NATO's Article 5. In order to stand up to these tests, as well as credibly demonstrate continued Alliance cohesion, NATO must review and update its conventional, nuclear, cyber, and other deterrence policies, postures, and tool sets.

NATO's deterrence challenge in a 21st-century context is quite different from that faced during the Cold War. Among other things, hybrid warfare as recently practiced relies on the full spectrum of national power, including information, finance, organized crime, energy, cyber, military, para-military, intelligence, and cultural elements, to coerce a target country and to spread uncertainty about security commitments and defense arrangements. Military power is only really introduced toward the end of a hybrid warfare effort. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described it recently, hybrid warfare is "the dark side of a comprehensive approach."

Conventional Deterrence

At the grand strategic level, NATO and its members still far outweigh the power of Russia, regardless whether one considers aggregate GDP, population, soft power, defense budgets, and military capabilities. However, at a more operational level of analysis, in regions such as the Baltic or the Black Sea, Russian power is significant and could be brought to bear to intimidate and coerce NATO members relatively swiftly. Therefore, conventional deterrence across NATO's eastern and southeastern frontiers

is of immediate importance and needs to be buttressed and then sustained for years to come. The rotations of U.S. forces through the Baltics and Poland are welcome developments, as are the deployment of European forces for exercises in eastern Europe. Furthermore, the commitments made at the NATO Summit in Wales in terms of defense spending and rapid reaction forces show notable promise. However, such measures are far from enough. In order to credibly shore up the conventional elements of deterrence, NATO as an alliance needs to permanently base forces in the Baltic States and Poland. As part of this effort, NATO also must expand its planning for how to rapidly surge forces into Europe's east and further reinforce those regions in a crisis.

The effectiveness of deterrence rests on having the needed capabilities and the political will to mount an effective defense and to inflict punishment viewed as unacceptable by a potential adversary. For this reason, it is of great importance that NATO members do not backtrack from the commitments made at the Wales Summit in terms of defense spending (inputs) and capability development (outputs). Unfortunately, some Allies already are departing from those commitments, in some cases seeking to paper over relative inaction through creative budget maneuvers. Furthermore, the transatlantic community should seriously consider the idea of providing defensive lethal aid to the Ukrainian government. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, providing it with arms would raise the cost of continued Russian aggression in Ukraine, and would contribute to restoring deterrence in Europe in a broader sense.

NATO also should consider its enlargement agenda in the context of "political deterrence." One of Russian President Vladimir Putin's goals in operations against both Georgia and Ukraine has been to fend off continued Euroatlantic enlargement, be it through NATO or the EU. The transatlantic community can impose a real

cost on Moscow if enlargement were allowed to continue in the near future with countries such as Montenegro. Further down the road, Sweden and Finland also could be nudged along for membership in the Alliance. This would send an unmistakable signal that Russian aggression will not lead to a halt in Euroatlantic integration, but instead further catalyze the growth of the transatlantic space.

Nuclear Deterrence

NATO also must reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in restoring European security. Russia is, after all, a major nuclear power, and the risk of an armed confrontation with Russia no longer can be discounted. Russia also has adopted a doctrine for the possible use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict or crisis; indeed, recent Russian exercises have included simulated nuclear strikes against targets in NATO countries, and Russian official statements have rattled the nuclear saber in an unmistakable and deliberate fashion. Russia's nuclear forces also are undergoing rapid modernization that will enhance all legs of its nuclear capabilities. A clear and convincing NATO nuclear policy is therefore needed in order to remove any potential doubt in Moscow that a nuclear attack on a NATO member would be met with a terrible response. NATO's policy and posture may have to address the middle rungs of the nuclear escalation ladder, where Russia has recently been active with intermediate-range nuclear forces while NATO's capabilities are limited to aircraft-delivered bombs.¹ Finally, while NATO's missile defense posture is designed to protect against an Iranian ballistic missile threat, NATO should undertake a review of its missile defense policy and capabilities in light of the new Russian actions. Alliance leaders know

¹ Ashish Kumar Sen, "Kroenig: NATO Should Develop Credible Response to Russian Nuclear Strike," <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/kroenig-nato-should-develop-credible-response-to-russian-nuclear-strike>, March 3, 2015.

from decades of experience that Western missile defenses and technologies are a major concern for Russia, a point that should be leveraged by the Alliance as part of its overall approach to countering Russia's recent coercive activities.

Economic Roles in Deterrence

The European Union also could play an important non-military role in helping to deter future aggression in Europe. The Russian economy is intimately intertwined with the EU's, and further European sanctions on Russian banks, trade, and energy sectors would generate significant costs for Putin, who already must be worried about the viability of the Russian economy under the current sanction regime and significantly reduced energy prices. This will, of course, come at a cost for Europe, and this may be a price that is hard to bear as the eurozone continues to struggle to recover economically. Nevertheless, not bearing this cost now would incur greater costs down the road, as an uncertain European security environment under constant pressure is hardly the recipe for long-term economic growth and foreign investment. Similarly, the conclusion of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership could also contribute to presenting a united transatlantic front to Russia and strengthening the geopolitical influence of the United States and Europe.

EU-NATO Collaboration

Credible deterrence and defense in a hybrid warfare context also will require more effective coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU. Many of the challenges associated with hybrid threats are first and foremost civilian in nature, and can be best met through, for example, law enforcement, institutional reform, and government resilience. Many of these aspects are primarily national or EU concerns, but need to be applied and thought through in a strategic context that also considers how these efforts fit

with NATO's more military-oriented deterrence efforts. Furthermore, European energy policy, and how to reduce European dependence on Russian energy sources, is also primarily driven by the EU and national governments, but has direct implications for the security of the broader transatlantic community. And while NATO is increasingly serious about the cyber component of defense, cyber security also greatly concerns the EU and European national governments.

Conclusion

Russian actions in Ukraine and Georgia, along with a wide range of coercive probes of NATO allies and partners in Europe's north, east, and southeast, have shaken the European security order that the United States and its European friends and allies worked so hard to establish after the Cold War. Europe once again is an insecure theater. In order to rebuild and safeguard the European security order that enabled the spread of peace, prosperity, and cooperation across the continent, NATO needs to refashion a deterrent that is relevant to the very different set of challenges posed by Russia than those that were prominent in the Cold War. By basing forces in Europe's east, enhancing planning for surging forces, supporting Ukraine with defensive arms, and revamping NATO's nuclear and missile defense policies, the transatlantic community can significantly raise the costs for Russia's current activities and deter future potential aggression against other European nations. Economic instruments also have an important place in efforts to help raise the cost of Russian aggression to forbidding levels. Integrating all these tools into a coherent toolkit to support an effective deterrence strategy is a task that must be taken up by transatlantic leaders with great alacrity.

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9

DETERRENCE AND GREAT POWER REVISIONISM

Tom Wright

Background: The Return of Spheres of Influence

Growing tensions between the West and Russia and between the United States and China go well beyond competing interests in a rustbelt in eastern Ukraine or over uninhabited rocks in the South China Sea. Fundamentally, they are about whether Russia and China will acquire spheres of influence in their neighborhood.

For almost a quarter-century, the United States has said it opposes a return to a spheres of influence order of the kind that existed in the Cold War or prior to World War II. In fact, in 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry even formally repudiated the Monroe Doctrine. Successive presidents have endorsed a Europe “whole and free” and the principle that states should get to decide their own foreign relations. This policy had real consequences, in Europe especially. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has expanded from 16 countries to 28 and the European Union from 11 to 28.

However, it was relatively easy to oppose a return to spheres of influence when no other major power was actively trying to reconstitute it. Now Russia is using hybrid warfare to seize territory in Europe and China is using land reclamation tactics to enforce its “nine-dash line.”¹ While Russia and China are very different actors, these strategies of territorial expansion present the United States with a particularly thorny problem. U.S. rhetoric is consistent — it opposes a return to a spheres of influence order — but it is unclear what it means. So far in Europe, it involves imposing costs on Russia for seizing territory in Ukraine but not stopping it from doing so or reversing it after the fact. In Asia, it means diplomatic efforts on maritime security

but nothing to punish or stop China’s facts on the ground policy in the South China Sea.

Revisionists’ Strategic Advantage

To understand how to deter Russian and Chinese efforts, it is necessary to grasp one key feature of a revisionist strategy of territorial expansion: revisionist states traditionally go after the non-vital interests of their great power rivals. When a rival power threatens your vital interests, it is clear that you should push back. But what is the responsible course of action when the dispute is over something that hardly anyone has ever thought about or sometimes even heard of?

Of course, the term non-vital interest is somewhat misleading and only holds true when viewed narrowly and in isolation. The way in which a state increases its influence matters profoundly. For example, annexation and unprovoked invasion constitute a major breach of the peace and threaten vital U.S. interests. Moreover, while small rocks or strips of territory may be of limited strategic importance individually, they can acquire a much greater value in the aggregate.

Nevertheless, the fact that no treaty has been breached and the territory itself seems to be of limited importance is highly significant to the dynamics and psychology of any given crisis. The small strategic value of the territory in dispute with a revisionist state usually appears to the dominant power to be vastly and inversely proportionate to the extraordinary cost that would be incurred by going to war over it. This is the great advantage that a revisionist power has and one that it can ruthlessly exploit as long as it does not overstep its mark. After all, what U.S. president wants to risk nuclear war for the Donbas? To put it another way, how many vital interests is a state willing to jeopardize for a non-vital one? Therefore, if the revisionist power is smart, and it usually is, it will pick territories

¹ The “nine-dash line” is a boundary line used by China to mark its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

precisely because they lack significant strategic value to rival great powers, even if they are viewed very differently by the smaller country upon which it preys.

The revisionist state can also reduce the risk of a military response by Western powers with another tactic. The aggression must not take the form of an outright invasion but instead it must involve something else, such as coercive diplomacy to address the “plight” of its nationals stuck outside its borders or using civilian assets to establish facts on the ground. Done in this way, the situation will appear complicated. And a “complicated” situation in a place that is “not vital” immediately undercuts domestic and international support for a robust response.

Revisiting and Rejecting Accommodation

This is not a new problem. It is textbook revisionism. Its purpose is to make deterrence extremely hard and to encourage rival great powers to accommodate them diplomatically or to limit their response so that it is ineffective. It was for this reason that the British Empire used accommodation as a pillar of its grand strategy for half a century prior to its catastrophic failure in the late 1930s. Indeed, until 1938, accommodation or appeasement was viewed very positively in Britain. As the historian Paul Kennedy described it, it was “a policy predicated on the assumption that, provided national interests were not too deleteriously affected, the peaceful settlement of disputes was much more to Britain’s advantage than recourse to war.”²

The complexity of the revisionist challenge is such that accommodation is likely to make a comeback, at least in some quarters. It will be framed, as it usually is, as part of a diplomatic effort that facilitates additional influence for the revisionist state in exchange for some restraint or

² Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945*, Fontana Press: London, 1983, chapter 1.

cooperation on its part. Although this challenge is in its very early stages, there are multiple examples of Western strategic thinkers making this case for Europe (e.g. Jeremy Shapiro and Stephen Walt) and East Asia (Hugh White). These thinkers point out that most revisionist states are not the second coming of Nazi Germany so a negotiated settlement stands a better prospect of success.

Accommodation remains a bad idea however, both for old and new reasons. The only case in which accommodation has ever truly “worked” was in the case of Britain’s appeasement of the United States in the late 19th century. But it worked for a very particular reason. British appeasement of the United States certainly did not satiate Americans. The United States pocketed the concessions and kicked Britain out of Western Hemisphere. The story had a happy ending only because the United States acted in a way commensurate with Britain’s long-term interests. Specifically, the United States intervened on Britain’s behalf in two world wars. U.S. hegemony worked out pretty well for Britain, if not for the British Empire.

For the U.S. precedent to be a good one for Russia or China, one would have to believe that these countries would be equally well disposed to protecting long-term U.S. interests as the United States was with Britain. To pose the question is to know the answer. For whatever hope there is of thinking that a democratic Russia or a democratic China would uphold the rules of the international order, there is no reason to think that Russia’s dictatorship or China’s authoritarian regime would do so. Instead, they would likely build on their gains, albeit gradually, and challenge the regional order in Europe and Asia.

The second reason accommodation will not work is that we live in a post-colonial world. Britain pursued appeasement because it was an empire and existed in an age of empires. It had

possessions it could give away, regardless of what the locals felt. And, it felt little compunction about selling out small states in central and eastern Europe, since the very existence of these states struck them as odd — more the result of an idealist U.S. president than clear-headed balance of power thinking. We, by contrast, live in a post-imperial age. The United States leads an order in which it enjoys a privileged position but it does so only because the vast majority of states want it to be that way. In an order dominated by democracies, the United States cannot just sit down with its competitors and rewrite the futures of independent countries. The very spectacle would be stomach turning and hugely damaging to the legitimacy of the order. Moreover, the states affected would take matters into their own hands. We would see a return to regional rivalries in short order.

The Future of Deterrence

This brings us back to the question of deterrence. If accommodation remains undesirable, how should the United States and its allies deter modern revisionism? As long as revisionist states carefully choose their targets and means, there is no easy answer to the problem we face. It is simply not realistic to threaten war over each and every revisionist act for the aforementioned reasons. However, there are steps we can take.

1. *Describe revisionist acts for what they are.* We should not downplay or seek to move on from territorial aggression. We must explain why it is an egregious violation of the international

order, even where “non-vital” interests are concerned.

2. *Strengthen deterrence by denial.* The United States should build defense capacity in vulnerable states and limit the offensive capabilities of revisionists, including training and equipping other countries to deal with unconventional warfare.
3. *Strengthen the regional and global order.* Make opposition to territorial expansion a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and seek to strengthen legal and diplomatic paths to counter it. In a practical sense, this means pressuring European nations to back the Philippines’ right to take a case against China over the South China Sea dispute and pressuring the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to condemn Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
4. *Show that territorial expansion has long-term costs.* The United States should clearly communicate to its competitors that a foreign policy of territorial expansion will cause it to move toward a strategy of containment.

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10 FULFILLING NATO'S MISSIONS: THE NEED FOR NEW STRUCTURES AND INSTRUMENTS

John R. Deni

During the 2014 Wales summit, NATO heads of state and government recommitted themselves to the three-fold purpose of the alliance — collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. This was a particularly important act in the face of relative exhaustion following major combat operations in Afghanistan and the return of an aggressive, seemingly dynamic Russian threat in the East. It would appear obvious and necessary that the alliance, now returning “home” from Afghanistan, should refocus itself mostly on Article 5-style territorial defense. In fact, the alliance declared in Wales that it would establish an enhanced exercise program with “an increased focus on exercising collective defense including practicing comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios.”

This might seem to be evidence that the alliance now favors collective defense capabilities and readiness at the expense of NATO's other two broad strategic purposes. However, a more accurate assessment is that the alliance has decided to correct a major imbalance. For the last decade, alliance military capabilities and readiness efforts have strongly favored counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and reconciliation and reconstruction — precisely what allied troops needed for their mission in Afghanistan. With that mission now ending, more attention can, and must, be paid to collective defense capabilities and readiness. Additionally, it is also clear that several NATO members — especially the United States — still want an alliance that can contribute to collective defense and security not simply in Europe but beyond it as well, despite Russia's recent aggression and the threat it presents on the continent.

The question now facing the allies is whether they have the necessary structures and tools to effectively and efficiently implement their vision, fulfill the three-fold mission set, and return to a

relatively more balanced approach among those missions. There are many obstacles facing the allies in doing this, but three stand out as the most compelling.

First, with regard to collective defense, the alliance faces a widening credibility gap, which manifests in two ways. The first of these is the difficulty NATO faces in projecting enough force quickly within Europe. In order to more effectively respond to contingencies within Europe, the alliance needs to give the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) greater authority, particularly when it comes to using the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the NATO Response Force (NRF). Unless these forces can be made more responsive in some way, the resources devoted to maintaining their high levels of readiness ought to be applied to other requirements. In order to do this, what is really needed is institutional or organizational creativity to come up with modalities to increase SACEUR's authority without unduly undermining member state sovereignty as exercised through the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The second element of the credibility gap is difficulty in conducting maneuver warfare. While the alliance spent the last decade or more focusing on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations, its ability to conduct large scale corps- and division-level maneuver warfare has largely atrophied. The alliance's plan to conduct a so-called “high-visibility exercise” should help here, but holding such an exercise once every three years is probably insufficient to raise the proficiency of alliance forces to the necessary level. Additionally, the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) should provide some benefit, but NATO needs to ensure this is more than just a bumper sticker or a label pasted onto everything it does. The challenge facing all the allies is that readiness is not as prestigious as buying a new fighter jet, it does not produce many jobs back home, and it is among the

easiest defense budget line items to cut because it is typically funded out of annual operating budgets. Nonetheless, readiness is critical for the alliance to overcome its credibility gap — the political attention devoted to this rather esoteric military issue at Wales was significant, but implementation remains a challenge.

Second, with regard to the crisis management mission, European allies can and must maintain a security horizon beyond the continent. At the strategic level, this means acknowledging through periodic defense white papers, national security strategies, and other prominent policy documents that Europeans' vital national interests hinge on events far from Europe's shores. This seems patently obvious to most, but remains sometimes difficult, if not risky, for some European politicians to admit.

At an operational level, maintaining a security horizon beyond the continent means continuing to prepare and train for operations far from Europe's shores against hybrid foes. Specifically, training for complex expeditionary operations, including stability operations, must continue to be part of what NATO does year-in, year-out. Judging from U.S. national military strategies, national security strategies, and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reports dating back to the post-Cold War period, Washington will continue to look to NATO and European allies to collectively defend common interests wherever they are threatened. Europeans need to maintain their part of the transatlantic bargain.

Finally, with regard to the cooperative security mission, NATO risks spreading itself too thinly. At Wales, the alliance launched no less than six new initiatives; some of these are repeats or modifications of similar, past efforts, but in any case, NATO is certainly not resting on its laurels. On top of this, alliance efforts with regard to worldwide partnerships, energy security, environmental security, and cyber security all

continue to move forward. Meanwhile, as the alliance is doing more than ever and in fact expanding its repertoire, NATO's staffing and budgetary resources are not increasing. The alliance organization continues to operate in a zero-growth budgetary environment, and both military and civilian authorizations are either shrinking or flat-lining.

The clear risk here is that NATO may over-commit and over-extend itself. To mitigate this risk, it would behoove alliance leaders to have a better sense of where and when the application of cooperative security tools like partnerships and engagement makes sense and will be most effective. If NATO's goals and those of the target country do not align, partnership is unlikely to promote the alliance's interests. For example, there is plenty of evidence indicating that Russia remains uninterested in a strategic partnership with the West and a positive-sum approach to European security. Instead, Moscow continues to pursue a zero-sum approach, eschewing the logic of security and peace through interdependence that has animated Western policy toward Russia for a quarter century. To some degree, geography is destiny. Russia has been and will remain a sparsely populated land power with few natural borders, regardless of its president or prime minister. In this environment, domestic political incentives largely favor zero-sum approaches to international affairs. Interdependence and interconnectedness represent, at best, short-term expediences in the pursuit of relative, zero-sum gains over perceived enemies. NATO's efforts at partnership with Russia — including through the NATO-Russia Council and various practical cooperation initiatives — are therefore unlikely to yield results that protect and promote Western interests at reasonable cost.

The Russian-induced security crisis that Europe now finds itself navigating has in many ways breathed new life into NATO. The crisis presents both an opportunity and a challenge to address

some fundamental problems in where and how NATO provides security for its member states. The Wales summit was a resounding success in terms of identifying some of the ways in which NATO will seek to overcome these challenges and subsequently protect and promote the security interests of its members. What needs attention now is the means, including the tools and structures, through which the alliance fulfills its missions.

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11 NATO'S MOVING GOALPOSTS BETWEEN WALES AND WARSAW

Martin Michelot

Much like a football club making its way to the top flight of its league, the NATO Wales Summit's first priority was to ensure that everyone stays happy. First place, the key members of the promotion run (the newer member states), followed by the historical members who have been at the club longer and represent the glue that holds the organization together (the older member states). The deliverables of the NATO Summit, which are being implemented now, represent the first part of this process, throughout which the historicals have been happy to provide support. The second part of the process may well be the trickiest one yet for NATO as it already gears up for the Warsaw Summit in the summer of 2016: taking into account different interests from its older players, in a situation where a lot of money has been spent on ensuring that the first part goes smoothly, where the leadership of the coach (the United States) is being contested, and where competition is fiercer and less predictable (both in the Alliance's South and East).

With such a situation, the tasks of NATO rest on two overarching complementary principles: firstly, managing its messaging inside the Alliance to keep all 28 member states in line with the renewed core missions of territorial defense and collective security, and secondly, helping these member states find a balance in their various multilateral commitments on security issues. The combination of addressing the existing threats at the Alliance's borders and ensuring that it remains a structuring force of Euroatlantic security, all under the watchful eye of a Russia that perceives it as weak, represents a true challenge for NATO, one that requires renewed leadership in Brussels and in the national capitals, and that also calls for a careful process of rethinking the flexibility of the Alliance. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has strongly insisted that "NATO decision-

making reconcile oversight with speed"¹ in order to accompany the institution's necessary transformation and adaptation to meet the new challenges coming from its neighborhoods.

In order to go through with such a transformation, NATO and its member states need to ask themselves a set of questions that the Wales Summit could not address, starting with the issue of leadership. This debate takes on varying levels of complexity, with two main factors: the evolving role of the United States and the lack of a European nation taking over leadership of Alliance-wide debates in a decisive fashion.

Despite intense debates about the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, the country provides much-needed capabilities and a guiding line (especially on defense spending), even if the ways it exercises political leadership within the Alliance seem to have taken a different shape, and it remains the default leader of the Alliance. On the other hand, the debate about European leadership in NATO sees its scope limited by the fact that the major European military players — Germany, France, Poland, and the United Kingdom — do not share the same level of ambition for their security policies, nor do the respective political dialogues and processes facilitate the creation of synergies. This has cast real doubt on the unity of an Alliance that had been laboring under the aegis of the International Security Assistance Force for 13 years, and highlighted how varying threat perceptions could easily put NATO at risk of fragmentation in the absence of leadership coming not only from Brussels, but from both sides of the Atlantic.

How NATO's new leadership will be able to facilitate the creation of synergies between countries and tie their interests together in the NATO framework therefore represents a

¹ Opening speech at the Allied Command Transformation Seminar, Washington DC, March 25, 2015.

key endeavor on the road to Warsaw. While countries such as France and Italy have pulled their weight in carrying out the immediate reassurances measures decided in Wales, and prove constructive partners (or at minimum, do not oppose) in devising the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, these countries do not perceive the Russian threat the same way as the frontline states and yet hold a crucial role in devising a new balance for the Alliance. Regional instability in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the spillover effects of the Libya intervention, counter-terrorism measures against the creeping rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State group and Boko Haram, are also considered Alliance-wide challenges, at the same level as the threat coming from an unpredictable Russia that has decided to redraw borders. Balancing these two momentous challenges and their implications in terms of political leadership and capabilities provide NATO with a clear roadmap for the Warsaw Summit, but also with the necessity to think how – or whether – the Alliance is ready to adapt its structures and keep all its members strongly involved in the future of NATO.

The idea of a NATO “transformation” reflects the idea of increased Alliance structure flexibility, while at the same time it points to certain aspects of decision-making that need to be improved. The increase of operations taking place outside of a NATO framework, for example the French-led operations in Mali or the Central African Republic that were structured around a “coalition of the willing,” represent a cautionary tale of a NATO that is left aside when it comes to operationalizing certain countries’ security and defense interests. Alliance leaders and their partners in national capitals therefore need to think about how to increase the flexibility of the organization.

The foremost example would be to facilitate the process by which NATO can provide plug-and-play capabilities, especially in terms of command

and control facilities, which the EU lacks, to allies (and partners) who undertake an operation that furthers the interests of the Alliance as a whole. While this idea reshuffles the Alliance’s consensus decision-making, it also provides a path to keep NATO as the primary transatlantic military tool of choice for willing and able nations, and would force an important discussion on how NATO can foster speedy decision-making in situations that require it, such as devolving authority to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to engage the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in well-defined situations. Creating the conditions for higher levels of political autonomy within a defined Alliance framework would send a strong message to all member states that they have a role to play in NATO and that NATO has a role to play in defending their interests, and would at the same time send a strong message regarding NATO’s ability to respond to crisis in a unitary and speedy fashion.

Transforming NATO goes hand-in-hand with the articulation of a clear policy in terms of capabilities, especially on the European side. If the Alliance can clearly lay out its strategic objectives and maintains ambitions for territorial defense and collective security, it cannot succeed without matching these up with the relevant hardware. The well-documented European capability shortfalls during Operation Unified Protector in Libya have served as a much-needed reminder that Europe cannot claim influence within the organization if it cannot substantiate its ambitions.

There is therefore a clear need to think how Europe can provide for the Alliance and fulfill the Wales commitment of 2 percent spending — at least showing signs of progress. The Framework Nations Concept (FNC), which Germany introduced to NATO in 2013 and which should allow willing countries to plug certain capabilities into a larger grouping led by a so-called “framework” nation, represents an

ambitious first step in this process, one that also goes in the direction of increasing the Alliance's flexibility by creating small groupings within the framework of NATO itself. The FNC, while ambitious on the surface, remains limited in its immediate scope, as it primarily focuses on protecting existing capabilities without putting in place the conditions for member states to pursue coordinated procurement policies for much-needed strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and strategic airlifting capabilities that are in short supply in European armies. However, despite this, in the interest of limiting new concepts, the FNC could serve as a stepping stone for this process, which NATO has the ability to lead from above, provided that useful feedback is exchanged within the FNC clusters that are currently being set up. Such a process could reinforce the already existing regional clusters that have proven useful discussion tools, but less productive in delivering joint capabilities and procurement plans.

The FNC provides the conditions for countries to take over political and military leadership within the Alliance, without overriding existing political processes, and creating a much-needed gravitational pull effect to match ambitions with capabilities. The fact that Germany leads the process is far from an insignificant fact, as it represents a tool of its new security and defense policy ambitions. It is clear that Germany should not and will not sustain all the necessary efforts on its own, and that the full and unbridled participation of the other major European military powers is a *sine qua non* condition of the success of the FNC. Whether the implementation of the program is a success will represent an interesting indicator of the risks that countries, larger and smaller, are willing to take to advance the Alliance's interests. These risks are both political and economic in nature, as they directly affect the country's force structure and therefore

its ability to act alone. They may also have an impact on any given country's defense industry, especially if a process of specialization emanates from carrying out the FNC program. This would require, for example, the small group of countries that compose each FNC project to take stock of how their industrial capabilities can eventually be pooled and restructured in order to better fit both their missions and the overall balance of the European industrial field. Going through such a process will undoubtedly require hard decisions being made in certain countries whose defense industries would face certain downsizing, while at the same time would mean engaging a dialogue with the EU about the existing *juste retour* policy that structures procurement processes. Taking such risks will require strong political leadership and the existence of a shared vision for the future of NATO.

The ability to take risks and to show that Europe can move forward in a unitary fashion despite existing differences and threat perceptions within the framework of a collective security arrangement will enhance the Alliance's capability to devise adequate responses to crises, and will go a long way in strengthening the perception of European deterrence, which is under attack because of Russian hybrid warfare tactics. It is critical for the vitality and future of NATO that its deterrence capabilities are taken seriously. Developing a cooperative approach based on information exchange and subsequent joint tools, to answer the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, will reinforce the value of Article 5 guarantees and put an emphasis on the role of individual member states as stakeholders in this process of "demystifying" hybrid warfare, as General Philip Breedlove put it at the 10th Brussels Forum in March 2015.²

² <http://brussels.gmfus.org/videos/brussels-forum-2015-future-conflict>

In this context, where a premium is put on cooperation, the relationship between NATO and the EU takes on a renewed importance. It is widely understood that the combination of economic sanctions on Russia and military measures to provide reassurances to frontline states has been unprecedented in scale political-military cooperation. This cannot be a one-off operation: the institutions' interests are so deeply intertwined that their cooperation should expand to devise collective counter-strategies to hybrid warfare and also to work together on issues related to the challenges existing in Europe's southern neighborhood that have direct implications on European security and prosperity. While both institutions should not limit themselves either to a purely military or to a purely economic role, a smart combination of their strengths folded into a common planning process on joint challenges would represent a fundamental change in inter-institutional relations. This would send a strong message outside of the borders of the EU and NATO, but could also help overcome the increasingly prevalent narrative of the EU's inefficiency, which has led to the rise of populist parties throughout Europe.

This roadmap for Warsaw provides NATO with a host of varied challenges that will structure the way it works in the future, and that will also have deep implications on how member states will calibrate their engagement with NATO. The Warsaw Summit may well be the most difficult in the past 25 years; its success will depend on how the Alliance's transformation will tap into the strategic interests of the member states that drive security and defense policy in Europe, while at the same time taking stock of the position of the United States and its desire to continue to shape the Alliance's future.

The countries that do not feel under threat from Russia have a great responsibility in devising a concrete strategy for NATO's southern border, and should do so keeping in mind the constant and real necessity to express solidarity with both frontline states and the states that are between NATO Article 5 borders and Russia. This momentous challenge shows that NATO is at a crossroads. Finding this balance will determine whether NATO can evolve in a context that is neither one of full-on war or full-on peace. The Alliance does not need a new vision: it needs to be able to showcase its credibility as a security provider, and it will not be able to do so without ensuring that all its member states share the goals that NATO has set for itself, and that these countries can participate in reaching these goals.

It is only armed with these tools that NATO can enhance its role and ensure its unity. Absent these guarantees, the alliance runs the real risk on being split up between players who do not share the same goal. Showing weaknesses toward Russia and terrorist threats could have long-term precedents that NATO will have a hard time straying from. Keeping your position in the top flight requires new efforts from both the management and the players, with increased expectations and visibility. The Alliance can count on its solid fundamentals to build up a team that can set its sights on more than a respectable position on the global stage. The Warsaw Summit represents the ideal opportunity to take stock of these ambitions.

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