Bulgaria’s Corruption Problem Is Washington’s Too

Since the Trump administration lifted the sanctions under the US Global Magnitsky Act against a key government official in Hungary in April, political figures in other countries have been hoping that it will not stop there. In Bulgaria, the leader of the largest party, GERB, has said he expects that Washington will lift sanctions on controversial persons in his country as well. This raises concerns about whether Bulgaria’s problematic political trajectory can be reversed without sustained external pressure. Not letting up in this regard is very much in the United States’ interest.

Bulgaria is a deeply troubled democracy within the EU and NATO—one whose institutions have long suffered from systemic corruption, oligarchic entrenchment, and pro-Russia undercurrents. State capture, cronyism, and the fusion of business and political elites have weakened the rule of law, undermined governance, and opened the door to malign foreign influence. Corruption there is not simply an internal dysfunction; it is a strategic liability for the transatlantic alliance. 

For decades, the United States has supported Bulgaria’s democratic trajectory, largely through diplomatic engagement and development assistance. But it was not until 2021 that it applied one of its most potent instruments: the Global Magnitsky sanctions. By holding officials personally accountable for corruption, these exposed just how deeply the problem is embedded in Bulgaria’s institutions.

The sanctions targeted several high-profile figures, not least Delyan Peevski, a media mogul and key political power broker. Vladislav Goranov, a former finance minister from GERB, has been sanctioned for facilitating corruption schemes that benefited private interests and influenced public policymaking.

These US sanctions marked an important shift. For years, public trust in Bulgaria’s institutions have been eroding due to a perceived lack of accountability for elite corruption, as the old pro-Russia actors—of which Peevski and Boyko Borisov, the GERB leader and former prime minister, are emblematic—maintained their grip. This entrenched elite has played a central role in Bulgaria’s democratic backsliding and persistent failure to counter Russian influence across the political, economic, media, and judicial spheres. 

With its targeted sanctions, the United States effectively stepped in to address a problem Bulgaria’s judiciary has avoided. The message was clear: if local mechanisms fail, international pressure will intervene.

With its targeted sanctions, the United States effectively stepped in to address a problem Bulgaria’s judiciary has avoided.

Yet some targets have not only survived politically—they have regained influence since. Peevski is today the chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms–New Beginning (DPS-NN) party and the most influential individual in the government despite not holding any official executive position.

If the US Global Magnitsky sanctions have had an incomplete effect, it is because their effectiveness depends not only on who is targeted but also on how many. Sanctioning more high-profile figures, such as former ministers or party leaders, can be a stronger deterrent and disrupt the command centers of Bulgaria’s entrenched corrupt networks. These are hard to dismantle, but if the United States were to expand the scope of its sanctions to include business figures, judicial enablers, and political actors, this would increase pressure exponentially on the old elite.

This must include reconsidering the tolerant treatment of Borisov. He is widely linked in public discourse to governance practices seen as enabling oligarchic consolidation and systemic corruption. The Barcelonagate affair in 2020, which raised suspicions of money laundering through luxury properties in Spain, symbolized Bulgaria’s crisis of accountability and corruption. Though not he was not charged in relation to it, Borisov’s record warrants close scrutiny.

Lifting sanctions now would be a mistake. Rather, the United States should expand them, not least to reinforce the message that accountability does not end with the passage of time. Targeting more figures would increase pressure across entrenched corrupt elites, shifting the cost-benefit calculus of those currently banking on impunity.

At stake is not just Bulgaria’s democratic trajectory but also its role in regional security. Persistent vulnerabilities—from opaque networks to disinformation channels—continue to make it susceptible to external influence from Russia at a time when the West needs unity and resilience.

Sanctions are not a cure-all but they send a powerful message. However, there is a troubling imbalance as the EU has done little to match Washington’s efforts. Despite the clear evidence of state capture and systemic abuse in Bulgaria, Brussels has largely avoided taking firm action. The EU should align its policies with US sanctions to prevent loopholes because coordinated pressure is vital. But the United States cannot afford to wait for this alignment by the EU—it must lead.

Bulgaria is at a turning point. The Global Magnitsky Act offers Washington a tool not just for accountability in this one country but for increasing democratic credibility in a key region. Failure to act decisively by increasing its pressure now risks enabling a dangerous precedent in which corruption not only survives sanctions but adapts to outlast them.