Democracy Captured: Bulgaria’s Peevski Predicament

This article was first published by Transitions on April 28, 2025.

In Bulgaria’s increasingly fragile democracy, Delyan Peevski—a politician sanctioned by the United States and the United Kingdom for alleged corruption—has become one of the most influential figures in government without holding any formal executive role. His rise to power, despite widespread condemnation, reflects deeper structural vulnerabilities in Bulgaria’s political and judicial institutions, and raises pressing questions for the European Union.

In 2021, the United States imposed sanctions on Peevski under its Global Magnitsky Act, citing allegations of bribery, media manipulation, and influence over judicial processes. The United Kingdom soon followed with similar measures. Yet, rather than being politically marginalized, Peevski has reemerged as a central actor in Bulgaria’s legislative landscape.

Today, his Movement for Rights and Freedoms–New Beginning (DPS–NN) is not officially part of the governing coalition but it holds a decisive share of votes in the National Assembly. Peevski’s support has proven essential to passing the budget, critical legislation, and appointments to regulatory bodies.

This was most evident following Bulgaria’s October 2024 parliamentary elections—the seventh in three years—which resulted in yet another fragile majority. A coalition was formed by former prime minister Boyko Borisov’s GERB-SDS, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and There Is Such a People (ITN), with external support from the Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (APS).

However, in March 2025, a Constitutional Court-ordered recount awarded seats to the Greatness (Velichie) party and in April, APS decided to quit the coalition over internal disagreements. This reduced the coalition’s majority from 126 to just 102 in the 240-seat chamber, placing Peevski’s party in a kingmaker position, as the coalition now is completely dependent on its 29 parliamentary seats.

In March, thousands participated in protests demanding Peevski’s withdrawal from political life. Echoing the 2020 anti-corruption protests, this showed the public’s enduring frustration with elite impunity and the perceived failure of institutions to deliver meaningful reforms.

Return of the Usual Suspects

Peevski’s reemergence has consolidated the influence of political forces tied to Bulgaria’s old ways of doing things. GERB, the Socialist Party, There Is Such a People, and Peevski’s DPS–NN, while ideologically distinct, are part of the pro-Russian status quo that has hindered efforts to consolidate the country’s democracy and effectively combat Russian influence and corruption.

Although nominally a center-right party, GERB is often lumped in with the pro-Russian actors in Bulgarian politics. The party maintained strong energy ties with Russia during its governments and still does. GERB orchestrated the TurkStream pipeline section through Bulgaria that helped circumvent Ukraine and ultimately helps Russia’s war against Ukraine. GERB has rhetorically been pro-European, but not in deeds, which is an important nuance frequently overlooked in some Western media. It has ignored Russian influence in Bulgarian politics, media, security, and business. GERB also was instrumental in this month’s cancellation of the sale of nuclear reactors to Ukraine, another step in Russia’s favor.

Meanwhile, the reform-oriented opposition alliance We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria (PP–DB) has been pushed to the political margins. It has struggled to advance long-promised reforms, both when in government and now in opposition. This has allowed the status quo parties to deploy their cadres in all institutions and regulatory bodies, as well as to use the prosecution against their opponents, as PP–DB co-leader Kiril Petkov accuses Peevski of doing. This has stalled any judicial and anti-corruption reforms, in another sign of creeping state capture and the reassertion of informal networks.

Once the dominant figure in politics, even after the end of his mandate as prime minister, Borisov now depends completely on Peevski’s support to govern.

Peevski’s rise has also shifted the balance of political power. Long seen as an ally of Borisov, he is now arguably more influential. Once the dominant figure in politics, even after the end of his mandate as prime minister, Borisov now depends completely on Peevski’s support to govern. Their relationship endures but the roles have changed. Peevski’s ambitions, once dismissed, were simply underestimated.

The Georgieva Affair

Concerns about institutional independence deepened in March when Teodora Georgieva, Bulgaria’s representative in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, was suspended amid an internal probe. She had publicly stated that she had recused herself from investigating the 300-million euro Chiren gas storage expansion project—co-funded by the European Union—after facing pressure from Peevski.

Georgieva said she recused herself after feeling personally threatened, including with compromising materials. Soon after,a leaked video allegedly of a conversation between Georgieva and Petyo “the Euro” Petrov, a former investigator linked to a judicial manipulation network, raised further concerns that judicial appointments and investigations may be subject to informal control. Though the identity of the voices of the obscured figures in the recording has not been officially confirmed, the episode fueled the debate on the erosion of prosecutorial independence.

Complicating public perceptions further, Georgieva’s mother died in a fire under suspicious circumstances. No official connection has been drawn between Georgieva’s allegations and her mother’s death, but the sequence of developments has contributed to a climate of unease and suspicion.

Strategic Vulnerabilities and Foreign Influence

Bulgaria’s internal political challenges have external implications. Although the Russian consulate in Varna was officially closed in 2023 amid espionage concerns, multiple reports suggest it continues to operate informally. The vacuum left by weak governance, captured institutions, and a muted Brussels response is a gap Russia knows how to exploit.

In this context, Bulgaria’s geopolitical alignment is being tested—not in overt declarations, but in the hollowing out of democratic resilience. State institutions remain vulnerable to influence—both domestic and foreign—when formal oversight mechanisms are weakened or co-opted.

Peevski’s ability to shape policy without holding formal office reflects a broader crisis of accountability. While democratic procedures continue to function on paper, the reality on the ground suggests the normalization of informal rule and institutional dependency.

In spite of that reality, Bulgaria continues to advance along the EU integration path. The eurozone accession process is coming along, and Brussels largely avoids publicly criticizing the current political trajectory or taking any significant institutional action to address democratic backsliding more broadly.

But how should it respond when a member state is not merely lagging in reform, but actively demonstrating how to subvert it?

Bulgaria is not an isolated case—it is a warning. If left unaddressed, it risks becoming a model for how democratic institutions can be re-engineered to preserve elite control while eluding both public scrutiny and international consequences.

This is a test for the EU’s resolve on the rule of law, democracy, and values, and the exam is far from over. And Peevski, it seems, has already submitted his answer.