A Window of Opportunity in the South Caucasus

The joint declaration signed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the peace agreement initialed by their foreign ministers—both mediated by US President Donald Trump—mark the most significant step in decades toward lasting peace between the two Southern Caucasus countries. Once the peace agreement is ratified, Türkiye is likely to move swiftly to open its border and establish diplomatic relations with neighboring Armenia. The moment presents a rare strategic opportunity to reduce the Kremlin’s influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan, draw the former closer to Europe, catalyze regional cooperation, and make the Middle Corridor trade route between Europe and Central Asia, which bypasses Russia, a reality.

Yet none of these outcomes will materialize automatically or simply because a peace treaty exists. Success will require sustained, coordinated engagement by the EU, Türkiye, and the United States, alongside committed implementation by Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves. The European neighborhood offers cautionary precedents: Countries once oriented toward Europe became disillusioned when the EU failed to provide tangible benefits, prompting political reversals and a retreat from reform.

For Azerbaijan, the gains are clear and largely irreversible. Before the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Baku was prepared to accept far less than it has won since then. It has regained all territories lost three decades earlier and secured a roadmap for unimpeded connectivity to the Azeri exclave of Nakhcivan and, through it, to its ally Türkiye.

Armenia’s position, in contrast, is precarious. Under Pashinyan’s leadership, Yerevan has taken bold, sometimes painful steps in the direction of peace and is expected to do more, including amending its constitution to remove irredentist references. These moves carry political risk. Pashinyan could be remembered as the leader who integrated Armenia into its region and Europe, delivering prosperity to his citizens, or as a “traitor” who made painful concessions without securing concrete benefits. The scenario that prevails depends heavily on what Ankara, Brussels, and Washington choose to do—or fail to do—in the coming months.

Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be seen in those capitals not merely as an end to a conflict but as a strategic opening to advance regional cooperation, development, and the long-envisioned Europe–Central Asia link through the Middle Corridor. A window of opportunity to achieve that is open, but it may not remain for long.