Bulgaria’s Ties to Moldova’s Ethnic Minorities: A Channel for Pro-EU Engagement

The outcome of the September 28 parliamentary elections could determine whether Moldova will consolidate its democratic gains of recent years and secure its place in the EU or fall back into instability and systemic corruption fueled by Russian manipulation. 

For decades, Russia has worked to obstruct Moldova’s democratic trajectory and EU integration. Its influence operates through an ecosystem of hybrid tools including propaganda, elite capture through oligarchs, illicit financing, cyber interdiction, and energy coercion. For example, ahead of the 2024 presidential election and constitutional referendum, the authorities uncovered a scheme funneling at least $15 million through bank accounts tied to pro‑Kremlin networks to over 130,000 voters, aimed at reducing support for EU integration. In 2022, the government suspended the licenses of Russian-affiliated television channels in an attempt to counter disinformation. However, Moscow continues to push anti-government, anti-EU, and anti-Romania narratives through social media and the internet. These include claims that EU accession would drag Moldova into war, flood the country with illegal migrants, force the adoption of LGBTQ+ ideologies, and even lead to annexation by Romania. The last weeks of the campaign saw the intensification of Russian-funded operations aimed at disrupting the elections through covert payments, illegal polling activities, and coordinated disinformation campaigns against the pro-EU incumbent Party of Action and Solidarity and President Maia Sandu.

Ethnic Minorities as a Vulnerability

Persistent internal vulnerabilities shape how external influence is received in Moldova, and they are exploited by Russia. In particular, institutional fragility, political volatility, and deep societal cleavages create a fertile environment for its hybrid threats to thrive. Corruption and elite capture remain entrenched, eroding trust in public institutions and weakening the rule of law. High-profile scandals—such as the 2014 “billion-dollar bank fraud”—have left scars on the public’s perceptions and revealed systemic deficiencies in accountability. There has been some uneven progress in anti-corruption reforms, but inconsistent enforcement continues to undermine governance.

Ethnic and linguistic divisions that map over competing historical narratives and national identities compound the institutional fragility. Tensions over language use, contested symbols, and regional autonomy frequently shape public discourse and electoral behavior. Events such as Victory Day on May 9 illustrate how historical memory can become a field of political contestation—it is perceived by some as a commemoration of liberation and by others as a reminder of Soviet domination.

These divisions are sharpest in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and Taraclia, where pro-Russia views regarding Moldova’s geopolitical direction—including skepticism toward NATO and EU integration and support for neutrality policies—are particularly widespread among their ethnic-minority communities. In these places, the state is sometimes seen as distant or unresponsive, which creates opportunities for Russia to deploy its narratives, resources, and soft-power instruments. These ethnic minorities are Russian-speaking, consume media from Russia, and maintain social and cultural ties to it. Moscow repeatedly uses the rhetoric of defending minority rights in Moldova, but its objectives include the Russification of the population by entrenching the Russian language, media, and identity markers.

This is particularly the case in Transnistria in the eastern part of Moldova, where ethnic Russians are the largest group with 30% of the population (compared to 3% of the country’s population). Russian is the dominant language, the ruble is used as currency, and Russian soldiers have been stationed since the 1990s. The ability of the central authorities to foster an inclusive national identity is severely constrained by their de facto lack of jurisdiction over Transnistria, which reinforces the Russian identity there.

Gagauzia in southern Moldova is home to a Turkic-speaking, Christian Orthodox, predominantly Russian-oriented population that historically originated in the territory of modern-day Bulgaria. It makes up 4% of the population. With a specific constitutional status as the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit, it has periodically asserted its distinctiveness through referenda and political declarations. In a non-binding referendum in 2014, over 98% of voters there expressed support for joining the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union rather than the EU—a stark divergence from national public opinion. In August, Gagauzia’s pro-Russia governor, Evghenia Guțul, received a jail sentence for channeling undeclared Russian funds to the banned pro-Russia Șor Party.

Pro-Russia sentiment in Gagauzia is driven by concerns over language policy—specifically, fears that Romanian will be imposed, threatening the region’s linguistic and cultural identity—as well as socioeconomic grievances and historical ties to Russia. Russian is the main language in public life, while education in Gagauz or Romanian is limited. Many locals feel excluded by Chișinău’s EU-oriented reforms, especially those viewed as undermining local identity or autonomy. Russian institutions and media reinforce these perceptions by depicting the central authorities as indifferent to local needs. This alienation has grown following the government’s suspension of the licenses of Russian-affiliated television channels and the sentencing of Guțul. Russian media have used these two developments to claim that EU integration will erode Gagauzia’s distinct identity. 

The Bulgarian minority in Moldova, which makes up around 2% of the population, is concentrated in the southern district of Taraclia and it is one of the country’s most distinct and cohesive ethnic communities. Historically, Taraclia has maintained strong cultural, educational, and religious ties not only with Bulgaria but also with Russia. While many residents speak Bulgarian at home, Russian is the dominant language in the public sphere, particularly in media consumption and official settings. By contrast, proficiency in Romanian is limited, which isolates Taraclia from broader national discourse and increases its exposure to Russian-language media and narratives.

Bulgaria’s Engagement With Moldova’s Ethnic Minorities 

Despite its vulnerability to Russian influence, Taraclia’s ethnic Bulgarian community also offers an opportunity for building up Moldova’s resilience. This comes from a little-noticed regional dynamic in the shape of Bulgaria’s diaspora assistance, outreach, and cultural policies. 

Sofia provides assistance to the community for school renovations and facilities as well in the form of educational materials and equipment. It funds cultural institutions and scholarships, and it will launch an annual exchange program for 300–400 children to visit Bulgaria. Many families in Taraclia send their children to study in Bulgaria. The local university has become a branch of the country’s Ruse University and is a hub for Bulgarian-language higher education and cultural preservation. Sofia also provides development aid to the community in Taraclia, including for water-supply infrastructure and reforestation.

Crucially, members of the community can and do apply for Bulgarian citizenship, which gives them free movement in the EU and thus greater exposure to EU democratic norms. 

The institutional and people-to-people connections between Taraclia and Bulgaria are a tangible link for this part of Moldova to the EU. They offer a channel for constructive engagement in a traditionally pro-Russia region. Taraclia’s Bulgarian minority can thus contribute to Moldova’s EU integration rather than be an obstacle to it given Russia’s influence there. 

In addition, Bulgaria has extended its outreach and cultural policies to parts of Gagauzia (where ethnic Bulgarians make up around 5% of the population), showing its extended soft power in southern Moldova. The Advisory Board of the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad has acknowledged the Gagauz as being of Bulgarian origin, and recommended that their applications for citizenship be treated as equal to those of other Bulgarians. Some of the region’s residents have thus successfully claimed Bulgarian origin and received citizenship.

Bulgaria is thus an EU and NATO member that is in a particular position to counterbalance Russian influence in Moldova through its cultural programs and soft-power initiatives, as well as development aid, in minority regions. These can not only support Moldova’s EU aspirations but also help counter the narratives advanced by pro-Russia politicians like Guțul. At the same time, however, Sofia’s actions are primarily motivated by national interests rather than broader considerations of EU ones.

Furthermore, Bulgaria’s approach could shift depending on which political actors are in power in Sofia, since recent history shows that this can result in policies that are more or less aligned with the EU and opposed to Russian influence. Thus, the engagement in Moldova could be more or less supportive of its EU accession path as a result of Bulgaria’s political fluctuations. It cannot be ruled out also that pro-Russia Bulgarian actors would work in concert with their ethnic counterparts in Moldova, such as Guțul, who is rumored to have acquired Bulgarian citizenship.

Conclusion

Moldova’s fight for its democratic sovereignty is emblematic of broader geopolitical and ideological contests unfolding across Eastern Europe. Poised between competing authoritarian and democratic influence systems, it faces daunting challenges from domestic fragmentation, institutional fragility, and Russia’s hybrid tactics. The country’s future depends on more than political declarations or having EU candidate status; it requires sustained action, structural reform, and a national vision capable of uniting its people and institutions. Significant progress will require systemic strategies, stakeholder involvement, and practical reforms. Moldova has showed resilience to and pushback against Russia’s malign influence; the next step is to expand these efforts into a comprehensive democratic defense.

Bulgaria’s engagement in Taraclia and Gagauzia indicates that, as part of such an effort, Moldova’s government, civil society, and media as well as the EU should do more to support education, media pluralism, and community actors in the country’s minority regions in ways that reinforces shared values and reduces Russian influence while respecting local identities. This should be part of the central government engaging more with local minorities through targeted development and inclusive reform. 

Recommendations

For Moldova’s government
 

• Develop bilingual and localized strategic communications targeting the ethnic Bulgarian, Gagauz, and Russian communities, including counter-narrative campaigns in the three languages to combat Russian propaganda.
• Expand Romanian-language education in Gagauzia and Taraclia, while preserving the cultural and linguistic rights of both minorities.
• Develop an identity-consolidation roadmap—on the basis of democratic consultations on the gradual changing of Soviet-era street names, the relocation of Soviet monuments, and the phasing out of Cyrillic script in official communication—that is framed as part of a unifying democratic narrative that respects ethnic minorities and does not seek forced assimilation.

For Moldova’s civil society and media

• Launch bilingual content platforms (Romanian-Russian, Romanian-Gagauz) to reclaim the information space from sources of hostile narratives.
   

For the EU

• Invest directly in infrastructure for minority areas, especially those of the Bulgarian and Gagauz communities, via earmarked EU funds.
   

These policies would not aim to erase minority identities or force their integration into a dominant national culture but to defend Moldova’s sovereignty and democratic future by closing vulnerabilities in these communities. The coming decade will determine whether Moldova completes the progress along its EU accession path or slips into indefinite geopolitical limbo. The stakes are existential—not only for Moldova, but for the resilience of democracy in a region under siege.