Russia Has Lost Moldova

The results of Moldova’s parliamentary elections demonstrate a decisive political shift. Pro-Russian narratives, propaganda networks, and entrenched corruption can no longer dominate the national debate in the country. For Europe and its international partners, the 50.2% victory for the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), especially when compared to the 24.18% secured by the Moscow-leaning Patriotic Bloc, confirms that Moldova is capable of resisting external pressure and that its European orientation is not a passing electoral mood. Rather, it is indicative of a strategic and conscious choice by its citizens, one that strengthens the case for accelerated EU accession.

For Russia, a sequence of consecutive interference failures—from the 2021 parliamentary elections, to the 2024 EU referendum and presidential elections, to this legislative contest—highlights the limits of its influence and the failure of its tactics to erode the resilience of Moldovan society and institutions. Despite heavy spending on disinformation, vote-buying, and orchestrated provocations ranging from bomb threats to fraudulent “observers”, the message from voters is consistent: Moldovans have expressed their pro-European will with clarity and resolve.

This success is not merely a domestic achievement; it constitutes a geopolitical milestone for Eastern Europe. It shows that a small state in a volatile region, often described as the poorest state in Europe, can cultivate mechanisms of democratic resilience capable of protecting the ballot, preserving political stability, and sustaining a European trajectory. International investment in critical state institutions, such as the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation and the National Agency for Cybersecurity has borne fruit. These organizations have demonstrated that robust institutional design can withstand hybrid threats, secure electoral integrity, and ensure long-term political stability.

Brussels and EU member states should capitalize on Moldova’s European momentum. The decisiveness of the pro-European mandate offers a rare window of opportunity to deepen engagement, accelerate reforms, and strengthen Moldova’s institutional resilience. Prompt and visible EU action on judicial and administrative reform, anti-corruption measures, and economic and social modernization will be essential to translate electoral legitimacy into tangible progress. Of equal importance is ensuring that Moldovans experience concrete benefits from their choice through targeted pre-accession funding, infrastructure projects, and programs that improve public services and economic opportunities. Delay risks eroding confidence in both the government and the European project, undermining the momentum this mandate has generated.

Few electoral contexts so clearly display the range of hybrid tactics Russia attempted in Moldova, and the extent to which they failed. Organized transport of voters from Transnistria produced negligible results. Attempts to mobilize diaspora communities, including chartered transport to Belarus, fell flat. Bomb threats at polling stations in Europe caused disruption but no systemic breakdown. Preparations for violent street protests by Pro-Russian groups contesting the results of the elections were preempted and thwarted by the security services and three people from Transnistria were arrested. In Russia itself, only 4,109 Moldovans voted, despite inflated pre-registrations and manufactured queues, evidence of both the weakness of pro-Russian mobilization networks and the lack of genuine interest among Moldovans abroad. Claims by the Kremlin that Moldova prevented hundreds of thousands from voting are unfounded. The sole exception remains Gagauzia, where pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor continues to buy support. Yet even here, his associated political projects—Victoria Furtună’s Moldova Mare and Irina Vlah’s Inima Moldovei—were stopped in time for the elections, delivering an effective blow to the wider political corruption scheme.

Journalistic investigations suggest that electoral corruption and online promotion campaigns likely contributed to the success of the Democracy at Home Party, which exemplified the “surprise party” phenomenon built through digital mobilization. Yet Russia-backed observers from the diaspora failed to document any instances of genuine fraud, demonstrating that the significant resources deployed by pro-Russian actors to manipulate the process ultimately proved ineffective.

Pro-Russian parties also failed to mobilize in traditional strongholds. In northern districts such as Drochia, Soroca, and Fălești, voters shifted toward PAS and other pro-European parties at the expense of the Patriotic Bloc. Leaders such as Igor Dodon drew criticism for alliances with discredited figures from the old system, including Vladimir Voronin and Vasile Tarlev. This reflects a structural transformation: The electorate is increasingly receptive to the European project and progressively less responsive to pro-Russian messaging.

Our Party, which once commanded significant support in the north, has now lost ground and performed poorly in the diaspora. This suggests that the pro-Russian voter base is neither cohesive nor sufficiently motivated to shape outcomes. Meanwhile, results in Chișinău marked a clear repudiation of Mayor Ion Ceban, one of the Alternative Bloc’s leaders. Voters rejected his divisive rhetoric and his alliances with controversial figures.

Two trends stand out: the evident inability of Russia and its allies to mobilize the pro-Russian electorate and the consolidation of a pro-European base that asserts its preference for stability, reform, and integration even in historically contested districts.

PAS’s victory is resounding and carries significant political dimensions. In Chișinău, its vote share of over 52% confirmed the consolidation of a pro-European urban electorate and demonstrated the party’s ability to mobilize the capital consistently. Gains in northern districts point to deeper penetration into areas once inclined toward pro-Russian parties. This nationwide expansion grants PAS legitimacy to present itself not only as a party of government but as a representative force for Moldovan society at large. The unprecedented turnout of more than 1.57 million voters underscores the representativeness of these elections.

The diaspora was again decisive. In Western Europe, more than 216,000 votes bolstered the pro-European majority and reaffirmed the diaspora as a crucial political actor. Strong turnout saw queues form across European capitals despite the doubling of polling stations. Diaspora voters accounted for 17% of all ballots, translating into proportional representation in Parliament. By contrast, turnout in Russia was minimal, signaling both low interest and the collapse of mobilization networks.

However, significant risks remain. The pro-Russian Patriotic Bloc and structures linked to Shor are likely to continue to challenge the legitimacy of the vote, leaning on isolated incidents and fraud narratives. Opposition leaders immediately called for protests the morning after the election. The demonstrations materialized, but they were modest, tightly policed, and dispersed peacefully. Their failure to generate real momentum underscored both the weakness of pro-Russian mobilization and the capacity of Moldovan institutions to manage dissent without sliding into instability.

PAS now has a strong mandate, but with it comes heightened responsibility. The party would be wrong to treat this result as a blank check. Many votes reflect not unqualified support for PAS’s program, but rejection of compromised, corrupt, or populist alternatives. Fear of instability and a desire to safeguard peace and the European trajectory championed by Maia Sandu were decisive motivations. This places an obligation on PAS to govern pragmatically and deliver tangible reforms. Without visible progress, the party risks squandering its electoral capital.

For Europe, the lesson is clear. Moldova, despite its size and economy, has shown that even under intense pressure, democratic institutions can hold. Citizens can reject disinformation, and society can defend its right to choose a European future. This election should be read not only as a mandate for PAS but as a case study in democratic resilience, one that deserves urgent recognition and sustained support from the EU and its partners.

Will Kingston-Cox is Founder and Managing Director of Europinion.uk