The Long Global Shadow of October 7

Dust in the Wind: A Shattered Illusion of a New Middle East

By Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı

On October 6, 2023, the Middle East seemed to be moving toward a more integrated order. Normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia were advancing under the framework of the Abraham Accords. Israel and Türkiye had recently restored diplomatic relations. Washington was promoting the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a flagship connectivity project. The Hamas-led attacks of the next day and Israel’s response, however, quickly overturned progress on all these fronts.

The Abraham Accords were the first to see a setback. The violence reminded Arab governments that normalization with Israel could not bypass the Palestinian issue without high domestic political costs. The promise of a “new Middle East” based on economic and security partnerships subsequently lost momentum.

A doctrinal shift in Israel also upended the region. Containment of Hamas and Hezbollah gave way to a strategy of broad military dominance aimed at any perceived threat, particularly Iran and its allies. The “axis of resistance”, as well as Iran itself, saw significant setbacks. Israel assassinated senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard officials, devastated Hamas, and hit Hezbollah and the Houthis. The Assad regime in Syria became collateral damage, and the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities.

While tactically successful, Israel’s new posture has reframed its regional image. Its strategy of overwhelming military dominance and cross-border strikes has led other regional actors to view it as a potential security threat and, therefore, a source of instability.

As a result, the Gulf states have advanced their hedging strategies, diversifying their security relations while maintaining ties with Washington. Saudi Arabia deepened its relationship with Pakistan through a new security and investment pact. Israeli strikes that extended into Qatar, crossing another perceived red line, have raised doubts about the credibility of US security assurances and will almost certainly reinforce recent trends to pursue other means to safeguard security.

These developments have had a significant economic dimension. Houthi assaults on Red Sea shipping disrupted global trade, forced costly rerouting, and deprived Egypt of critical Suez Canal revenues. The turmoil also set back IMEC, intended as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The last two years have returned the Palestinian question to the center of regional politics. It remains the unresolved core of Middle Eastern geopolitics, and attempts to sideline it now clearly come at considerable risk. Progress on all other regional issues will be limited at best as long as this is the case.

The Necessity and Limits of US Power

By Dr. Ian O. Lesser

Experience since Hamas’ October 2023 attack on Israel underscores the myth of US disengagement from the Middle East. It also points to the limits of Washington’s power and influence in the face of multiple crises across the Levant, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

Political leaders and observers around the Middle East had anticipated in recent decades a steady decrease in American diplomatic engagement and security presence in the region. Bipartisan disenchantment with US activism there fuelled this perception. Many in Washington had been preoccupied with more pressing challenges elsewhere and see the Middle East as a source of “forever wars”. But the Hamas attack and its aftermath drew the United States back, and in dramatic fashion. American-led diplomacy in pursuit of a ceasefire and post-conflict governance in Gaza is a key example. But it is only the latest in a two-year stream of initiatives and interventions, from the bizarre proposal for a Riviera-like reconstruction of the Palestinian territory to more conventional overtures to Syria, Türkiye (on a mix of Middle Eastern and European security questions), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, American naval and air presence has been greatly reinforced, and the United States has struck targets across the “axis of resistance” from Yemen to Iran.

This activism has come against a backdrop of continued support for Israel. To be sure, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces growing criticism over the terrible human costs of an unbridled war in Gaza. Polls point to a sharp decrease in support among Americans for Israel’s operations there, if not for Israel per se. Many see parallels with the United States’ own struggle against terrorism, with the events of October 7 serving as a disturbing reminder of September 11. The American Jewish community is itself sharply divided on the conduct of the war and the desirability of a two-state solution. But overall US support for Israel remains strong with this and other constituencies, including evangelicals.

Yet developments since the Hamas attack also point to the limitations of US power. Attacks on the Houthis in Yemen have not brought back shipping to the Red Sea, and sophisticated attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have yielded uncertain results.

Washington’s active, unconventional diplomacy may yet yield a “deal” in Gaza. If so, it will open a new chapter in a long history of US engagement in the Middle East marked by some notable triumphs and many disasters.

People and Potentates: A Divide Between Arab Leaders and the Street

By Dr. Dalia Ghanem

Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza did more than shift public opinion; they ripped open a dangerous chasm between Arab societies and their leaders. The Palestinian cause is again central to regional discourse, but the real story is the now-glaring disconnect on the Israel-Palestine conflict between sentiment on the Arab street and official state policy. A crisis of legitimacy is emerging, one fueled by a widespread perception of elite inaction. This is fostering a political environment volatile enough to raise the specter of a third Arab Spring.

At the heart of this dynamic is an almost complete collapse of trust. The conflict unleashed a wave of pro-Palestinian protests across the Arab world and solidarity with Palestinians that took many forms including a boycott of Israeli goods and services. This mass mobilization collided with official responses that were widely seen as contradictory and immoral.

Arab publics now see policies of normalization and the Abraham Accords as betrayal. This dissonance is not happening in a vacuum. Traditional and social media act as a constant amplifier, broadcasting Gaza’s humanitarian crisis while exposing the perceived indifference of Arab regimes. The result is a corrosive distrust, with leadership seen as an obstacle to popular will, clinging to policies that have lost all moral legitimacy.

All this makes for a combustible moment. The grievances behind the Arab Spring of 2011 were primarily socioeconomic. Israel's actions in Gaza, which have been labelled genocide by a UN independent international inquiry commission, add a layer of complexity to an already explosive situation, where raw political frustration meets a wounded collective identity.

In this context, the perceived failure to support Palestine has become the unifying banner under which all other domestic frustrations—from the economy to political repression—can gather. Another series of region-wide uprisings is by no means certain, but the political calculus has undeniably changed. The war in Gaza has supplied a powerful, resonant cause that could galvanize populations in a way that challenges the very foundations of the regional order.

Dalia Ghanem is a senior fellow and the director of the Conflict and Security Program at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha.

Israel: Caught Between October 7 and Its Aftermath

By Gabriel Mitchell

Two years after Hamas’ attack on Israel, the country remains caught between military strength and political weakness. That raises questions about its ability to translate battlefield victories into lasting strategic gains. Israel has shown remarkable resilience, crippling Hezbollah and the Iranian regime while securing near-total dominance of the region’s skies. Yet in Gaza, heavy-handed tactics have drawn global condemnation. Even allies such as the United States are distancing themselves.

Israel’s domestic situation is equally unsettled. Most Israelis want the war to end and the remaining hostages freed. They hold Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for prolonging the conflict, resent his refusal to accept responsibility for the failures of October 7, 2023, and fear he has used the war to further erode the country’s democratic institutions. Fatigue runs deep, fueled not only by the war itself but also by years of political polarization. Even if Hamas were to accept the Trump administration’s proposed plan to end the fighting, allowing Netanyahu to declare “total victory”, his political future would remain uncertain.

Still, mainstream Israeli views increasingly align with Netanyahu’s. A majority rejects the idea of a Palestinian state and sees recognition by liberal democracies, particularly those in Europe, as hypocritical and counterproductive. Many support improved ties with the Arab world but not at the cost of cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. This reflects Israel’s well-documented shift to the political right, but also reveals an unwillingness, or inability, to engage in long-term strategic thinking.

Some of this is understandable. Like a family in mourning, Israelis struggle to confront the larger questions while hostages remain in Hamas’ tunnels. Genuine reflection and healing will begin only once they are freed. Yet international sympathy for this bereavement period has waned, and there is no guarantee that the war’s end will deliver political renewal. The deep divisions that plagued Israeli society before the Hamas attack remain firmly in place.

If Israeli society’s reflection process does not include dialogue with Palestinians—whose suffering has largely been ignored, downplayed, or denied—why should anyone expect the “Day After” to be any better than what came before?

And yet, there are grounds for hope. Israeli civil society has demonstrated extraordinary resilience, particularly in its unwavering commitment to rescuing the hostages. That same spirit suggests a political community still exists that desires a safer, inclusive, and more integrated future. While it may not surface in the next election, the generation of leaders forged in the wake of the Hamas attack could reshape Israel’s political map and offer alternative solutions to the country’s deeply rooted challenges. For that to happen, the seeds planted in the scorched earth of October 7 need sufficient time and resources to grow.

Trade and Connectivity: Rethinking the Geographic Concentration of Risk

By Kristina Kausch

The vulnerability of critical chokepoints in the Middle East has raised concerns for many years. The cascading regional insecurity in the aftermath of October 7, however, showcased to a global audience the potential knock-on effect on global trade and connectivity. Houthi missile attacks on Red Sea shipping led to a temporary rewiring of Europe-Asia logistics away from Suez and around the Cape of Good Hope. This brought skyrocketing rates for freight, insurance, crew, storage, and aviation, raising liquefied natural gas prices and congesting ports along the way. Suez trade fell 50% in the first half of 2024. The structural vulnerability remains even if there has been some recovery in traffic. In addition, security-related regional airspace closures further disrupted aviation. Damage to Red Sea cables slowed internet traffic among Asia, Africa, and Europe, making the interlinked vulnerabilities of shipping and data routes concentrated in Middle Eastern security hotspots evident.

Global stakeholders’ awareness and resolve for diversification of trade, energy, and data routes and value chains have consequently grown. The 2023 initiative led by the United States and India to create an India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was simultaneously an effort to de-risk from trade routes transiting China and to reduce reliance on traditional Middle Eastern chokepoints. The choice of the Israeli port in Haifa as the main Mediterranean IMEC entry point, however, proved problematic after October 7. The ensuing regional conflict effectively froze IMEC’s core overland leg, which had relied heavily on the vision of the Abraham Accords to integrate Israel into the Middle East through normalization of diplomatic relations and economic cooperation.

The heightened awareness of the geographic concentration of risk has revived post-pandemic debates on diversification and nearshoring, and shifted money and attention toward lower-hanging fruit such as port upgrades, digital corridors, and alternative land links. At the same time, a volatile United States has led to a bloom in Europe-India relations, including a forceful joint French-Indian push to revive IMEC. The Gaza war and broader regional security conditions, combined with the limitations imposed by the Ukraine war, however, continue to present tough challenges to such projects.

Calls for Change: Reframed North-South Relations

By Hermine Sam

The shock waves of Israel’s response to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, have gone far beyond the region, weakening the credibility of the rules-based order that Western countries champion. Their response to the war in Gaza has reinforced, for many governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, perceptions of selective application of international law and human rights, and re-exposed long-standing fractures through the lens of bias and postcolonial criticism.

The mobilization to this by “Global South” actors is striking. Multiple initiatives stemming from these countries showcase a turn toward Southern agency in international relations. South Africa’s proceedings against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and the creation of the Hague Group of states committed to upholding international law, underline a global shift. Countries historically excluded from decision-making are now championing the very legal and diplomatic tools that Western powers invoke but often fail to apply consistently. This aligns with growing calls for institutional reform at the UN and with renewed demands for expanded representation in and veto-power limits on the Security Council.

Still, the Gaza crisis has not produced two North and South camps. Southern positions are not uniform. States such as South Sudan, driven by security ties, regional rivalries, or pragmatic partnerships, have avoided direct criticism of Israel. Meanwhile, in the “Global North”, cracks were visible early on. As the United States and Germany remain staunch supporters of Israel, Spain and Ireland continue to lead European voices calling for accountability and humanitarian restraint. The official recognition of a Palestinian state by France, a permanent member of the Security Council, marked a symbolic evolution in the West’s approach to the conflict.

The recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) highlighted the divides and the shifting currents. A strong majority of 142 states voted for the New York Declaration, which outlines steps toward a two-state solution. Only 10 opposed it, including the United States, Israel, and Argentina. The lopsided vote highlights the breadth of support for Palestinian statehood and the persistence of sharp political divergences.

Two years on, the echoes of the October 7 attack also resonated in UNGA speeches by leaders of Senegal, Rwanda, Barbados, Finland, and others, all calling for a rebalancing of the international order from different perspectives. For most African, Asian, and Latin American countries, and some Western states, the war in Gaza has accelerated demands for a more inclusive and consistent multilateral system. For the West, it has become harder to claim moral authority without confronting charges of bias. And for North-South relations, the war in Gaza has crystallized the importance of trust for implementing an impartial rules-based order.