Competitiveness Check—January 16 Edition

The Quick Take

• The United States completed its first sale of Venezuelan crude oil following a special operation on January 3 to exfiltrate Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Caracas.
• EU member states approved the signing of the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and the Interim Trade Agreement (ITA), ending negotiations that have stretched over 25 years. Both agreements must still obtain the consent of the European Parliament before the Council of the EU can formally conclude them.
• Greenland has moved to the center of US–European strategic attention after repeated threats by US President Donald Trump to “acquire” Greenland. His vice president, JD Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted the foreign ministers of Denmark and Greenland on January 14. The Danish minister said the two sides "have a fundamental disagreement, but we also agree to disagree, and therefore we will, however, continue to talk”. Check out GMF experts’ take here, and a recording of GMF’s event on recent developments here.

Top Transatlantic Trade-Related Developments

January 1: Bulgaria joined the euro area, becoming its 21st member and completing a key milestone in its EU economic integration.

That same day, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase. Imports of carbon‑intensive goods are now subject to a financial obligation based on embedded emissions, to be settled through the purchase or surrender of CBAM certificates starting in 2027.

January 5: The OECD announced that the Inclusive Framework had reached agreement on a Pillar Two “side‑by‑side” package, deeming the US tax system compliant with that pillar and exempting US-headquartered multinationals from certain top-up taxes.

GMF will be hosting a virtual event on January 27 to discuss the package. Details forthcoming.

January 12: Trump said that the United States would impose a 25% tariff on goods from countries “doing business” with Iran, framing the move as a response to Tehran’s crackdown on protests. No formal executive order or implementation guidance was released.

That same day, the European Commission issued guidance on the conditions under which China-based electric-vehicle (EV) manufacturers can replace EU tariffs on their products with commitments to sell at minimum prices. The EU and China agreed on the guidelines following multiple rounds of negotiations.

January 14: The European Central Bank published research on the untapped potential of the EU single market, concluding that internal trade frictions—stemming from regulatory and administrative barriers—are more onerous than the highest tariffs that Trump threatened to impose on the EU last year.

The US president issued two proclamations that invoke, for national security reasons, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The proclamations concern semiconductors and processed critical minerals, and announce a 25% tariff on a narrow range of semiconductor imports that came into effect on January 15.

EU and UK financial regulators signed a memorandum of understanding to coordinate oversight of critical third‑party technology providers under Brussels’ Digital Operational Resilience Act and Britain’s critical third‑party regime.

January 15: Washington announced a trade and investment agreement with Taiwan that lowers US tariffs on Taiwanese goods to 15%. The deal includes commitments by Taiwanese semiconductor and technology companies to invest at least $250 billion in US manufacturing and supply‑chain capacity.

Figure of the Fortnight

1,075: The number of gross orders (after cancellations and conversions) for Boeing aircraft in 2025. Airbus disclosed on January 12 that it had secured 1,000 such orders last year. The US manufacturer also said it delivered 600 commercial jets last year, its strongest annual total since 2018. Airbus delivered 793 aircraft in 2025, slightly exceeding a revised delivery target set in December. The results mark the first time this decade that Boeing has surpassed its European rival in annual orders. Boeing was helped by buyers hurrying to purchase US-built aircraft to maintain goodwill with the Trump administration.

Quote Unquote

“The United States needs Greenland for the purpose of National Security. It is vital for the Golden Dome that we are building. NATO should be leading the way for us to get it. IF WE DON’T, RUSSIA OR CHINA WILL, AND THAT IS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN! Militarily, without the vast power of the United States, much of which I built during my first term, and am now bringing to a new and even higher level, NATO would not be an effective force or deterrent - Not even close! They know that, and so do I. NATO becomes far more formidable and effective with Greenland in the hands of the UNITED STATES. Anything less than that is unacceptable.”

US President Donald Trump, in a January 14 Truth Social post.

“There would never be a chance that Greenland would, for example, not stand within the Western alliance, and not have some kind of a relationship with NATO and also with the US. People [in Greenland] are very cognizant of the basic fundamental strings that Greenland has in terms of security and defense with the US. It’s recognized widely that the 1951 agreement is exactly as it was laid out, that the US has quite a free hand to act in [Greenland] by consultation with the people of Greenland through the government, as it was also agreed upon in 2004. So, there’s not really any questioning about where Greenland stands in terms of the alliance.”

Dr. Sara Olsvig, chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council and former member of the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments, at a January 15 GMF virtual event.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.