Armenia Chose Continuity Over Ties to Russia

Armenia's parliamentary election on June 7 was about more than parties and personalities. At its core, it was a choice between two geopolitical trajectories: a return to the Russia-centered order that has shaped much of Armenia's post-independence history, or the continuation of incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s course of reducing the country's strategic dependence on Moscow, pursuing peace with its neighbors, and deepening engagement with Europe. Armenian voters chose the latter. In doing so, they delivered a mandate for continuing the reorientation pursued since the 2018 Velvet Revolution.

Pashinyan's Civil Contract secured a renewed mandate with 49.81% of the vote, enough for a clear parliamentary majority. Samvel Karapetyan's Strong Armenia, led by a Russian-Armenian businessman with close ties to Moscow, finished a distant second with 23.29%. 

For Russia, the significance of the result lies not in the defeat of individual parties or politicians, but in the erosion of the bargain that underpinned its influence in Armenia for decades. Moscow's position rested on a simple proposition: Armenia accepted economic dependence and strategic alignment in exchange for security guarantees. The fall of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 undermined that logic. For many Armenians, it was a wake-up call. The country's principal ally and self-proclaimed security guarantor proved either unwilling or unable to uphold the commitments that had long justified Armenia's strategic dependence on Moscow. The election was therefore a verdict on whether Russia could still credibly act as Armenia's security guarantor.

Armenia's election should be read not only as a mandate for continuity in Yerevan, but also as evidence that Russia’s influence in the country is no longer automatic. However, the opening created by the election should not be considered irreversible. Moscow still retains significant economic, political and informational levers in Armenia and is likely to use them to preserve its position and rebuild influence.

To avoid this, the strategic question now shifts from Yerevan to its international partners. Armenian voters have endorsed a course based on peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, reduced dependence on Moscow, and a closer engagement with Europe. The United States, which has invested significant diplomatic capital in regional stability and connectivity, can help support that trajectory, and continued normalization with Türkiye would expand Armenia’s strategic options. But the EU possesses the most comprehensive toolkit for consolidating the opening that the election revealed, from economic integration and mobility to investment and institutional cooperation with Brussels. The EU did not create this opening, but it is now uniquely positioned to act on it.

The instruments already exist: the visa-liberalization dialogue, the €270 million Resilience and Growth Plan, and the Strategic Agenda agreed upon with Armenia. The EU's Global Gateway investment strategy for Armenia is targeting up to €2.5 billion in mobilized investment to bolster digital, energy, and transport connectivity. What is needed is not new policy, but implementation. Progress on mobility, investment, connectivity, and institutional cooperation would provide visible evidence that closer ties with Europe deliver tangible benefits. Just as importantly, Brussels should avoid presenting Armenia with a zero-sum choice between Russia and Europe. The objective should be to strengthen Armenia's resilience, expand its strategic options, and support its sovereignty. But the opportunity the EU now enjoys is not permanent. If closer cooperation fails to produce tangible benefits, the case for the European course weakens, and the next elections may not return the same answer.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.