Europe’s Taiwan Imperative

As global attention swings between crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, trade policy, and shifting dynamics in Washington, Taiwan risks falling off Europe’s policy radar. But the message from Berlin this June, where GMF convened the eighth Taiwan Trilateral Forum, was unambiguous: Europe’s stakes in Taiwan are growing, and the time for a more deliberate, coordinated strategy is now.

The two-day Track 1.5 forum brought together government officials from across Europe, the United States, and Taiwan, along with think-tank experts and business leaders. Conversations underscored both the urgency and opportunity for Europe to clarify its Taiwan policy—not as an extension of China strategy, but as a strategic agenda in its own right.

Taiwan’s Value to Europe Is Structural and Symbolic

Taiwan is a democratic partner in the Indo-Pacific, where its political system, open information environment, and vibrant civil society stand in stark contrast to the coercive governance model advanced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). At the same time, Taiwan plays a critical role in the global economy. It is a cornerstone of advanced semiconductor manufacturing and a key transit point for maritime trade. More than 90% of the world’s advanced semiconductors are produced on the island. Nearly half of global container traffic passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022. Disruptions in the Strait would have immediate consequences for Europe’s economic security.

Yet participants at the forum noted that European policymaking remains cautious. While the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy gestures toward Taiwan, it stops short of articulating a stand-alone vision. Without clearer policy guardrails, Europe remains mostly reactive to events in the Strait, limiting  its ability to engage constructively or deter destabilizing behavior.

Responding to Gray Zone Pressure

Experts at the forum detailed the intensification of gray-zone pressure from the PRC, including a sharp increase in cyber intrusions, coercive maritime patrols, and undersea cable disruptions—all tactics designed to undermine Taiwan’s stability while avoiding overt conflict. These activities are not confined to the Taiwan Strait; they echo the hybrid threats Europe faces from Russia in its own maritime and digital spaces.

Forum participants agreed that while Europe lacks traditional deterrence tools in the Indo-Pacific, it can still shape the risk calculus. This includes signaling clear opposition to coercion, actively contributing to Taiwan’s resilience, and expanding Track 1.5 and parliamentary engagement with Taiwan. Officials also discussed developing EU contingency planning and crisis simulations, steps that can both prepare decision-makers and send important signals to external actors.

Reframing the Relationship through Democratic Integration and Innovation

A central takeaway from the forum was the need to frame Europe-Taiwan engagement on its own terms. Taiwanese officials and European counterparts alike emphasized the importance of developing a distinct approach and one that recognizes Taiwan’s intrinsic value and strategic relevance beyond the context of EU-China relations.

European officials made clear that likely PRC economic retaliation remains the primary obstacle to a more assertive Taiwan policy. But many participants argued that failing to prepare for this pressure regardless is itself a vulnerability. A more proactive, coordinated approach through economic diversification, resilience-building, and expanded partnerships can help absorb the risks and reduce the leverage Beijing currently holds.

Democratic integration means focusing on areas where democratic cooperation can drive resilience. This includes structured engagement on semiconductor supply-chain security, maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity, AI governance, and disaster preparedness. Officials pointed to tangible opportunities to expand technical collaboration, streamline regulatory approvals for joint ventures, and integrate Taiwan into Europe’s evolving chip strategy. Such a strategy could also include an EU-Taiwan technology dialogue, joint investment frameworks, civil society exchanges, or coordinated parliamentary visit programs.

These are areas where Europe’s strengths align with Taiwan’s needs and where collaboration can help both sides withstand coercion. Integrating Taiwan more fully into Europe’s economic and civil-society networks will not eliminate the threat of coercion. But it will make that coercion harder, more costly, and less likely to succeed.

Paving the Way to the Future

Taiwan also offers valuable lessons for Europe as it navigates its own digital and democratic resilience challenges. From countering disinformation to setting global norms on emerging technologies, Taiwan is not just a partner to be protected; it is a contributor to shared democratic innovation.

Taiwan’s future will shape the trajectory of the rules-based international order, the resilience of democratic governance, and the credibility of Europe’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. A more defined, structured approach to Taiwan—rooted in Europe’s strategic interests and implemented in coordination with democratic partners—can help reinforce deterrence, build resilience, and ensure Europe is prepared for future challenges.