France’s Shift to Long-Term Engagement in the Black Sea

Historically, France’s policies in the Black Sea region were more of a side effect of its EU enlargement, Russia, or Middle East policies. Its engagement was more ad hoc than calculated. But, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Paris changed its approach drastically. It is now active multilaterally through the EU, NATO, and the UN, and bilaterally with Black Sea countries, backing their energy diversification away from Russia and investing in Moldova and Ukraine, among other things.

France leads NATO’s Cincu-based multinational battle group (Mission Aigle) in Romania, with a contingent that was increased from 1,500 to 4,000 soldiers earlier this year. Paris has also deployed a MAMBA air-defense battery to the country’s Black Sea coast, contributing to the policing of its airspace.

France has committed almost $6 billion’s worth of military aid to Ukraine, including in high-tech equipment and the training of personnel. It has also expanded its defense cooperation with Moldova. In 2024, the two countries signed an accord covering training, intelligence-sharing, logistics support, and better governance of defense spending.

Defense-industrial cooperation with EU members in the region is another element of France’s engagement. Romania’s decision in 2023 to approve the €2 billion purchase of two Scorpene-class submarines from Naval Group is one example. This built on existing links with French giants Thales and Airbus, which have had an established presence in Romania for many years.

However, France’s efforts are limited by restricted naval access to the Black Sea, since Türkiye has imposed wartime restrictions on vessels of non-littoral countries going through the Turkish Straits, as it is allowed to do under the Montreux Convention. Because of this, Paris is attempting to keep its relationship with Ankara pragmatic. It focuses on shared interests such as ensuring free navigation in the Black Sea while avoiding more controversial topics where the two countries have disagreements, such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean.

France sees its support for Ukraine and Moldova as an investment in regional stability.

France sees its support for Ukraine and Moldova as an investment in regional stability. It has provided Ukraine with more than  €2 billion in direct budgetary aid, and it has also offered €1.2 billion in guarantees through export-credit insurance. Earlier this year, the two countries announced a new joint reconstruction fund, and the French Development Agency opened an office in Kyiv to oversee projects. Paris has tried to involve French companies in reconstruction as well. It has also been a key sponsor of the Moldova Support Platform, a diplomatic initiative launched with Germany and Romania to coordinate international aid for Moldova and governance reforms.

Additionally, as the EU’s largest wheat producer and exporter, France is sensitive to global markets changes that affect its farmers. This is why it has supported the Black Sea Grain Initiative brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye as well as the EU’s Solidarity Lanes Initiative to keep Ukrainian grain flowing, viewing them as necessary for stabilizing global food prices.

In parallel, France has robust economic ties with Türkiye, despite the ups-and-downs in their relationship at the political level. Trade between them was worth $22 billion in 2024, making France one of the country’s top European trading partners.

France also supports regional energy connectivity. It backs related projects mainly through the EU, complemented by French development finance and companies. Paris supported the EU’s 2022 memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan to expand the Southern Gas Corridor. It also supports the planned Georgia-Romania undersea power cable by backing the European Commission’s funding framework.

Supporting projects involving Azerbaijan and Türkiye, two countries with which it has had strained relations, illustrates Paris’s pragmatism when it comes to the region.

Put simply, France’s approach is to turn presence into permanence. There are multiple reasons for this shift to a more deliberate role in the Black Sea region and why is Paris willing to invest so many resources in it.

Put simply, France’s approach is to turn presence into permanence.

First, it is about France’s security. During a visit to Romania in  2022, President Emmanuel Macron said that “it is on the eastern front where we can defend Europe as war is being waged once again”. From Paris’s point of view, the advantages of containing the war in Ukraine and preventing its escalation are greater than the costs of regional engagement.

Second, France supports the EU’s efforts to diversify energy supply away from Russia and the Black Sea is considered vital for its natural resources, such as the gas deposits discovered by Romania and Türkiye this year, and for the flow of natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan through the Southern Gas Corridor.

Third, successful engagement in the Black Sea will boost France’s credibility as a security provider and European power. By leading NATO’s battle group in Romania, training and arming Ukraine, and supporting Moldova’s reforms, it shows its commitment. This also improves the credibility of NATO, on which France relies for its defense.

At the same time, France faces several challenges:

It is not a Black Sea littoral state and its naval access is constrained by the Montreux Convention. This forces it to rely on partners’ navies.

The Black Sea region has become a crowded theater. It will be a challenge for France to synchronize all its efforts and to avoid overlapping with those of others, including the EU, NATO, the United Kingdom, the United States, and regional organizations. Additionally, while its preference for a “European approach” helps in this regard, seeking consensus from all EU members can be frustratingly slow.

France does not possess as many resources as China, Russia, or the United States. It also has interests in numerous other hot spots such as the Sahel or the Middle East and North Africa. It must therefore shepherd its resources carefully, with a focus on effectiveness rather than quantity.

It will not be easy to sustain public support for spending in a relatively distant theater. If results are not visible to the French public, there will be growing pressure to redirect resources elsewhere. Much will also depend on the continuing alignment of France’s allies, which is vulnerable to their election cycles.

With all of the above in mind, France should issue a clear Black Sea strategy that explains why the region matters to it; what it will do there in military, energy, and diplomacy terms; what will be the indicators of success over the next two to three years; and how this aligns with NATO’s regional defense plans and the EU’s Black Sea agenda.

At the bilateral level, France must follow through on the commitments in the 2024 accord with Moldova on military training and logistics, and governance support. It should deepen joint planning for air and maritime surveillance and coordinate defense procurement. At the multilateral level, it should help to build a coalition of Black Sea states to deter Russian aggression, based on steady and long-term cooperation among them. It should also back more regional connectivity projects that cut dependence on Russia, such as the ones of the Three Seas Initiative.