Lessons in Resilience: Moldova’s Response to Russia’s Hybrid Interference

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Summary

Following the pro-EU outcome of the 2024 presidential election and constitutional referendum, Russia intensified its hybrid campaign against Moldova for the 2025 parliamentary elections. The aim was clear: destabilize the government, weaken public trust in democratic processes, derail Moldova’s EU accession path, and bring to power pro-Moscow actors. Russia deployed a broad set of tactics, including political proxies, oligarchic networks, disinformation, illicit financing, cyberattacks, and attempts at street-level disruption. Despite the sophistication of these measures and the outsourcing to third-country actors, Moldova’s institutions, civil society, and media responded decisively through rapid exposure, dismantling of interference networks, and transparent public communication. The country’s international partners played an important role in bolstering its resilience. The success of the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity, which won another parliamentary majority, if reduced, dealt a heavy blow to Moscow and its allied oligarchs.

Russia’s interference was part of a long-term multi-layered destabilization campaign abusing democratic freedoms. At its core, it sought to normalize the perception that Moldova could not conduct a fair, sovereign vote while empowering pro-Russia or anti-establishment forces. Ultimately, the strategy relied on mercenaries, corrupt networks, and short-term political technologies that lacked broad appeal. Moldova’s legislative and institutional reforms curbing illicit financing and safeguarding electoral integrity blunted these tactics, although uneven judicial interventions related to the exclusion of certain parties also risked casting a shadow over the process.

There are now three main priorities for Moldova’s democracy. First, Moldova must consolidate institutional readiness against hybrid threats and restore public trust, especially in the judiciary. The swift interagency response around the elections should be developed into a permanent, institutionalized framework. Clearly defined roles for the Supreme Security Council, the Strategic Communication Centre, and the Crisis Management Centre are essential. Second, the fight against polarization and erosion of public trust must be intensified. Strengthening communication capacities, working with civil society experts, promoting digital literacy, and cooperating with independent watchdogs and platforms are all needed to counter disinformation and coordinated inauthentic behavior. There is a risk of civic pluralism shrinking under the pressure of malicious lawsuits, polarization, and economic constraints. Platforms could be established that provide civic actors with timely access to legal aid, cyber defense, and more sustainable funding. Third, international engagement with Moldova must be sustained and predictable. Following the successful completion of its EU accession screening in September, negotiations need to be fasttracked. With US assistance cut, the EU and other donors need to step in more consistently, focusing on long-term core funding for civil society organizations and media. Moldova’s experience should also inform EU-wide resilience mechanisms, including developing new bilateral and cross-border cooperation targeting mainly inauthentic online behavior and illegal political financing.

Moldova’s elections have showed that determined institutions, an active civil society, and international solidarity can resist Russia’s hybrid campaigns. Yet resilience remains fragile. Sustained reforms, economic development, societal cohesion, and long-term donor commitment are indispensable for consolidating Moldova’s democratic path and for ensuring stability in a region that remains a target of Moscow’s disruptive strategies