Rough Seas Ahead
When the Washington Post first reported that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had recalled hundreds of the United States’ most senior military commanders to Washington for an in-person briefing—without a public agenda—speculation was rampant about what the meeting could mean. Some foresaw a worst-case scenario of mass firings, a new loyalty oath, or other highly politicizing activity. Others speculated that the secretary would present significant new policies, including the eagerly awaited National Defense Strategy, which would require buy-in and cooperation from the nation’s highest military leaders.
In the end, the meeting was neither. Hegseth’s speech was a slightly updated repetition of a speech he has been giving to commands since the spring, criticizing personnel policies in the Biden administration in highly partisan remarks. US President Donald Trump’s hour-long remarks would have sounded familiar to anyone who has listened to the president speak at length in the last month. The decorum exhibited by the group of senior officers, even during the most politically charged moments, allowed all parties to avoid a major crisis in US civil-military relations. Indeed, the meeting felt, on the whole, somewhat anticlimactic.
Yet, while the meeting itself did not spark an immediate crisis, it was a stark reminder that there are rough seas ahead for both the senior US officer corps and US partners across the Atlantic. In particular, it underscored the administration’s intention to shift its focus away from global priorities toward homeland issues, and also provided the clearest indication yet that US partners and allies abroad will have to contend with a military force increasingly operating outside of international law. Either issue on its own would present significant challenges for global military and political leaders, but in combination suggest that transatlantic leaders will face some difficult choices ahead about when and how to work with the US military.
Enemies Within, Allies Abandoned?
The parts of the meeting that received the most coverage by far in the United States dealt with President Trump’s suggestion that the administration might use US cities as a “training ground” for military forces, and his declaration that it was necessary to combat the “enemy within”—a phrase widely taken to mean political opponents rather than foreign adversaries. The comments, particularly when made in front of the entire senior leadership of the United States military, should alarm defenders of democracy and free speech. Already, the administration has waded into murky legal and ethical territory with the federalization and deployment of hundreds of National Guard and active-duty soldiers to support law enforcement operations in Los Angeles, Washington DC, Portland OR, and other major US cities; using soldiers to detain American citizens for exercising their first-amendment rights would represent a major escalation and almost certainly spark a constitutional crisis in the United States.
Yet, even for those who choose not to take the president’s words at face value, the focus on homeland threats is neither new nor necessarily unexpected for the second Trump administration, given recent reporting about the highly anticipated National Defense Strategy. The administration’s unprecedented and highly controversial focus on using the military to perform traditionally civilian homeland tasks—such as enforcement on immigration, drug trafficking, and local crime—has, according to most reporting, crowded out other, more global defense priorities in the new NDS. Should the reporting turn out to be accurate, it would represent the largest formal shift in US foreign policy priorities since the end of World War II, and could have major implications for security cooperation between the United States and Europe. Research shows that militaries with domestic missions are less effective in war, and US military training will almost certainly adjust to reflect its new mission set. As a result, in addition to high-level concerns about security guarantees, financial commitments, and global leadership, European military leaders may also be interacting with American counterparts who are both less effective and less prepared to help Europe during times of crisis.
Ignoring the Laws of War
Also prevalent during both Hegseth’s and Trump’s remarks was an apparent disregard for the laws that govern the use of force, both at home and abroad. During his speech, Hegseth repeatedly denounced the role of legal counsel in approving military operations, going so far as to insist that it was “liberation day” for the war fighter, and suggested that the Department of Defense would not consider itself bound by the laws of armed conflict that have governed US military action since the end of World War II. President Trump further questioned why the military was subject to the Posse Comitatus Act (though he did not explicitly name it)—the domestic law that forbids federal military forces from performing law enforcement activities inside the United States.
This dismissal of the international and domestic laws that govern the use of force by the highest levels of political leadership in the United States sends an important signal to both US and international military leaders. It is the clearest indication yet that the administration may knowingly issue unlawful orders to US military leaders, and order military campaigns without regard to collateral damage, civilian casualties, and other considerations prevalent in the laws of armed conflict. This obviously presents enormous challenges to American service members, who are obligated to obey all lawful orders but are woefully unprepared to identify what a “patently unlawful” order might look like. As the recent strikes against Venezuelan boats suggest, that line is not always clear and the bias is toward compliance with civilian orders.
Yet it also presents enormous challenges for allied military leaders who may find themselves sharing intelligence and assets with a US military operating without regard for the same international laws by which foreign militaries still consider themselves bound. This will complicate and, in some cases, undermine joint exercises and operations, intelligence sharing, and other cooperative activities as US allies and partners must consider how their cooperation may enable human rights violations across the world.
In the end, the major takeaways from Hegseth’s and Trump’s meeting with the US generals stem not from the advertised subject matter, but rather the perhaps inadvertent revelations of how the administration is thinking about the priorities, resourcing, and operations of the US military. What they said suggests that there are enormous challenges to come in the United States’ international partnerships.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of GMF.