Skilled But Displaced: Belarusian and Ukrainian Migrants in the EU Labor Market

Summary

Belarus’s political crisis in 2020 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered unprecedented waves of involuntary migration from both countries to the EU. Over 300,000 Belarusians have fled, primarily to Poland and Lithuania. Over 17 million Ukrainians fled their country during the first months of the invasion, and more than 5 million still reside in the EU, notably in Germany and Poland. Unlike previous migration from the two countries, this latest wave involves large numbers of skilled professionals. This creates challenges and opportunities for EU labor markets. Successful integration of these migrants could mitigate Europe’s demographic decline, fill critical skill shortages, and strengthen economic and democratic ties between migrants’ home and host countries. Conversely, their poor integration risks underemployment, wasted potential, and disillusionment with the EU and its norms and values among migrants and in their home countries.

A new survey of these recent Belarusian and Ukrainian migrants shows commonalities but also important differences among them. They tend to have high levels of education and work experience. Ninety percent of Belarusian respondents and 60% of Ukrainian ones hold a higher-education degree, and most had extensive professional backgrounds before migration. Yet nearly half of Belarusians and two-thirds of Ukrainians have had to change their profession entirely in their host country. Cross-border convertibility of human capital varies significantly among respondents, affecting their ability to continue in their profession. Those in the IT, healthcare, and certain technical professions enjoy high convertibility, while those in fields like education, finance, and consulting face steep barriers. The gender balance among Belarusians is almost even, while there are more women among the Ukrainians due to Ukraine’s mobilization law. Women experienced greater losses in professional standing, reflecting structural barriers and family obligations.

These migrants also differ in terms of return intentions. Among Ukrainians, 38% said they intend to return and 19% that they do not, while among Belarusians the respective figures are 35% and 38%. For Ukrainians, the decision to return will hinge primarily on geopolitical factors: 70% said they would return if Russia’s government and foreign policy changed, and 46% if active warfare ended. Seventy percent of Belarusians said they would consider returning if political repression ended, and 82% if there were a change in the country’s leadership. Attitudes toward a possible return shape migrants’ career strategies: those hoping to return in the near future weigh temporary adaptation, while those who do not often commit more deeply to integrating into the host-country labor market.

The EU faces a critical choice in how to manage this influx of involuntary migrants. For member states experiencing shrinking populations and labor shortages in healthcare, IT, education, and construction, Belarusian and Ukrainian migrants offer a valuable pool of human capital. Effective policies could align humanitarian needs with economic benefits. These include gender-responsive integration programs with childcare support, entrepreneurship initiatives with access to finance and fast-track business registration, public-private partnerships for skilled recruitment, and streamlined recognition of foreign qualifications. Through such policies, the EU and its member states can transform these instances of involuntary migration into an engine of growth, resilience, and democratic exchange, benefiting the migrants as well as their host and home countries.

Lev Lvovskiy is a ReThink.CEE Fellow 2024 of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.