“America Is Back”… But for How Long?

Eighteen months ago, President Joe Biden proclaimed to the United States’ European allies that “America was back” after four difficult years during which his predecessor suggested that Europe was a “foe” and contemplated an American withdrawal from NATO. My organization’s flagship polling project on European public opinion, the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends, can quantify that the United States is back—and its engagement is strongly welcomed by Europeans. 

After significant polling across fourteen countries, this year’s results show that those European countries polled perceive the United States as the most influential world actor and overwhelmingly support its involvement in Europe’s security. Both measures increased since the last time we published our findings in 2021. Likewise, overwhelming majorities on both sides of the Atlantic see NATO as important for national security—a leap by 11 points from 2021.

After significant polling across fourteen countries, this year’s results show that those European countries polled perceive the United States as the most influential world actor and overwhelmingly support its involvement in Europe’s security.

That is the good news. But countries on both sides of the Atlantic predict the United States’ global influence will drop significantly even as they expect relations between Europe and the United States to grow stronger. While 62% of Europeans and 68% of Canadians see the United States as the most influential power, only 36% and 35% of them respectively say the same will be the case in 2027. More troubling, the next generation generally has a less positive view of US influence in the world: respondents aged 18–24 in the United Kingdom (41%) and the Netherlands (50%) are significantly less likely to describe US influence as positive than their oldest compatriots (67% in the United Kingdom, 77% in the Netherlands). America is back, Europeans agree, but perhaps not for long.

Why are European allies hedging their bets against the United States even as it provides essential military assistance and security guarantees? Active allied hedging is not positive for US interests as strategic competition with China heats up and Russia looms large as a security risk for our transatlantic partners. Respondents in Europe also expressed a clear preference to tackle these threats through the European Union rather than NATO or with the United States. The appetite for bilateral cooperation with the United States only garners support from 9% of European respondents in managing relations with Russia and 11% when it comes to managing relations with China. Ultimately, respondents in the European Union believe they will confront a bipolar world order where the United States shares leadership with China, with the latter gaining influence over the next five years. 

European responses seem particularly counterintuitive as Russia threatens nuclear strikes against Europe. Why wouldn’t most Europeans want to work through NATO to combat Russia, particularly when their security is at its greatest risk in a generation? For many Europeans, the United States’ foreign policy over the last two decades has appeared to have been one of constant policy upheaval and military adventurism. In stark juxtaposition, the European Union was designed as a peace project to make war materially impossible. Additionally, turbulent US domestic politics may also fuel hedging. While it is very positive that 71% of American respondents see NATO as important (up from 64% in 2021), 86% of Democrat-supporting respondents valued the alliance, and 70% of Republicans and 65% of independents felt the same, will US policy shift when a new administration assumes power?

More worrisome, as the potential for conflict with China over Taiwan increases, our surveys find very little European appetite for allied responses beyond diplomatic measures and sanctions. The share of respondents who want their country to send arms or troops to Taiwan nearly vanishes inside Europe, with multiple countries hovering between 1% and 2% respectively. Will European allies support the United States as President Biden has committed to defend Taiwan with US forces? Today, it does not appear so.

Having been significantly damaged in prior years, transatlantic trust could never be rebuilt by one president. Thankfully, tomorrow’s transatlanticism rests on the historical legacy of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, and the founding of NATO and the EU. Europe and the United States presented a united policy stance against Russian aggression. Transatlanticism’s future will be tested on whether a united policy stance toward China can be developed, continuing to address a highly unstable Russia, rebuilding Ukraine, and meeting the challenges of digital, networked world. These daunting tasks require sustained US diplomatic investment and consistent policy rather than episodic and transactional approaches.

“America is back” in the sense that we have an opening to craft stronger policies with our European allies vis-à-vis Russia and China now, but the task will not be easy.