A Conservative Spain, Neither Maverick Nor Anchor

A Popular Party-led Spain would rejoin the transatlantic consensus, but a coalition with Vox could lead to disruption on certain issues.
November 18, 2026

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This piece is part of GMF's Election Supercycle Hub 2026-2028 series.

When eighty-seven-year-old Maricarmen Abascal was carried out of the Madrid flat she had lived in for seven decades on September 23, 2026, she could not have imagined that her eviction and later death would turn Spain's housing crisis into a referendum on Pedro Sánchez's government. Together with the Ceuta migration crisis two months earlier, corruption allegations, and deadly rail accidents, it led Sánchez to call a snap election. That election, to take place on November 29, is being fought on domestic grievances, but its likeliest outcome could bring the biggest shift in Spanish foreign policy in a decade.

Aggregate polls put the center-right Popular Party (PP) at around 32% and the far-right Vox at 17% of the vote, equivalent to a combined total of 195 parliamentary seats, comfortably above the 176 seats needed for a majority. Similar forecasts overestimated the right in 2023, but the margin is wider now. Even if Sánchez's Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), which is polling around 29%, were to come in first, it would lack partners. Models give the right a 91% chance of achieving a majority.

Vox would be the first party widely classified as far-right in national government since Franco, raising questions abroad about Spain’s foreign policy. A Vox-dependent PP government would likely be more conventional where the PP owns the dossier, but less predictable where Vox's priorities and networks matter.

What Kind of Government to Expect

PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo would likely replace the maverick profile Spain has acquired under Sánchez with a more measured foreign policy aligned with the European center-right. Vox’s foreign policy vision under Santiago Abascal is rhetorically disruptive, but the party’s main priorities lie at home. 

How much room Vox gets would depend on the formula for collaboration. Feijóo prefers Vox's parliamentary support but has not ruled out a coalition. PP sources say the party aims to keep the economy, interior, foreign affairs, defense, and justice portfolios. Past PP-Vox coalitions in five Spanish regions suggest Vox would instead eye a vice-presidency, agriculture, infrastructure, employment, family, social services, or deregulation. Interior, which controls borders, is less likely but might come within Vox’s reach with a strong electoral result.

Divergence does not necessarily mean conflict. Vox will likely spend its capital where its core agenda is at stake. The party’s red lines are domestic: "national priority" in access to public benefits, deregulation, "remigration", and a smaller state. Its July 2024 walkout from all regional PP coalitions over the regional placement of migrant minors was a clear warning. The PP’s new program already nods to most of Vox’s key themes, but in most cases, the degree of practical convergence between the two remains unclear.

A More Conventional Spain

Over the past eight years, Spain has gradually positioned itself internationally as a progressive standard-bearer. Madrid recognized Palestine, spoke out on Gaza, and stood up to US President Donald Trump while most European leaders stood frozen. A PP-Vox government would end this approach and return to a more measured style and broad alignment with Europe’s centrist mainstream on most transatlantic dossiers.

To repair Madrid’s strained ties with the US administration, Feijóo offers a fundamental  Atlanticist reset guided by alignment with EU partners rather than by personal affinity with Trump. Since the US midterms, Feijóo has become more reserved in tone, while stressing that no prime minister can afford to disrespect a US president. He would seek to “avoid a mutually harmful trade war” and likely restore the US use of the Rota and Morón bases that Sánchez rejected during the 2026 US-Israeli strikes on Iran. 

Realignment would also be highly visible on Israel. A PP-led government would mend relations and could seek to repeal Sánchez's arms embargo, which both PP and Vox opposed. The PP is noncommittal on withdrawing Spain’s recognition of Palestine. Vox wants a 180-degree turn and a stronger pro-Israel line than the PP would choose, but the PP would likely lead.

On China, Sánchez has faced criticism from the United States and the European Commission for courting Beijing on Chinese investments in Europe. Feijóo would move Spain closer to the Commission’s more cautious de-risking line. Yet PP (and PSOE) regional leaders' support for a Chinese car plant next to Ferrol's naval base suggests the PP would limit Chinese investment rather than ban it. Vox is more hawkish, but China is not its priority.

On defense, the PP seeks to shed Spain’s reputation as NATO’s outlier. In 2025 Sánchez secured the only carve-out from the alliance’s 5% spending target, while broadly meeting other obligations. Feijóo promises a strong Spain in NATO and pledges that “Spain will be a reliable partner again”, but he will not set a spending target before auditing Spain’s public finances. Vox wants to raise defense spending, too, but with a nationalist rather than a European framing. Citing “sovereignty”, it voted against the European Parliament's resolution on deeper EU defense integration that the PP backed.

On Ukraine, expect continued support. Sánchez has committed nearly €4 billion in military aid to Kyiv since 2022. The PP pledges to maintain support and sanctions as long as Russia's aggression lasts. Vox’s members of the European Parliament have repeatedly abstained on Ukraine resolutions, suggesting it could delay or dilute new aid when in government, but probably not block it. 

On Latin America, the PP and Vox converge. Both prioritize the region and back political transitions in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua—in line with current US preferences. A PP-led Spain could become a more credible interlocutor for the region's new right-wing governments. 

A Less Predictable Spain

The potential for predictable mainstream policies is reduced when foreign affairs touch Vox's core agenda. 

Abascal presides over Patriots for Europe, the Euroskeptic far-right alliance of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Matteo Salvini’s League, among others. Vox would become the Patriots' third foothold in an  EU government, alongside Italy’s League and the Czech Republic’s ANO. It would also form a bridge between Europe's far right, Latin America, and the MAGA movement, with its systematic outreach to European far-right parties. In terms of concrete influence on EU policy, a Vox agriculture minister could carry the party's opposition to Mercosur, the Green Deal, and Moroccan imports into the Council of the EU.

Vox’s partisan influence in Latin America could both solidify and taint Spain’s traditional role as a European bridge to the region. Since 2020, Vox’s Disenso (dissent) foundation has built a network linking Vox to Latin America's new right, affording it influence well beyond its electoral weight. 

Most importantly, Vox wants to reverse a migration policy widely seen as the liberal outlier in an EU increasingly hostile to migration, especially after Sánchez regularized up to 500,000 undocumented migrants by decree in January 2026. Vox wants “national priority” for Spanish citizens in public benefits. The PP’s November program stresses the need to review benefit criteria but rejects the nationals-only argument with reference to EU law, although the Commission had warned previously that some PP-Vox pacts at the regional level may amount to discrimination. Vox's “national priority” and "remigration" ideas would raise the risk of clashes within the coalition and with Brussels. 

Vox's core priorities converge in Morocco, which blends issues of migration, sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, and agricultural competition. Vox wants Rabat to recognize Spain’s sovereignty over these territories or face suspension of the 1991 Friendship Treaty, which for the PP goes too far. Feijóo has not committed to maintaining Sánchez's 2022 pro-Moroccan shift on Western Sahara and seeks more balance between Morocco and Algeria. Vox's hard line on Morocco also sits awkwardly with Washington, Rabat's main ally. The PP also pledges a harder line on immigration and border security and qualifies the “weaponization of irregular migration” as a “hybrid attack” against which it expects greater support from the EU. However, Vox is even more hawkish in a policy area Abascal needs to visibly deliver on. A new migrant surge in Ceuta could be  a plausible trigger for a coalition crisis.

Catalonia is a domestic fault line with potential external consequences. Analysts expect a harder line from a PP-Vox government to inject new life into a fragmented independence movement. The PP has already pledged to abolish Sanchez’ amnesty law shielding Catalonian independence leaders from prosecution. A revived territorial dispute would absorb the government's attention and could return the issue to European agendas.

What to Watch

Under a PP-led coalition with Vox, Spain would likely become a more classical transatlantic partner on many dossiers, including the United States, Israel, and China. Vox’s participation, however, could erode that trend on a few priority issues with international impact. The coalition (or investiture) agreement’s clauses and Vox’s ministerial portfolio assignments are therefore the first signs to look for. Social ministries would keep coalition quarrels domestic, while cross-border portfolios such as Agriculture or Interior would create a volatile brew on migration and Morocco that could break the coalition. Other early markers include Spain's NATO spending targets, its vote on the EU’s cybersecurity rules, Feijóo's first visit to Rabat, and his first encounter with Trump.

Vox’s potential first entry into national government would also come at a sensitive moment for the EU. The 2026–28 European electoral cycle could further consolidate the weight of far-right parties in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, potentially increasing these parties’ ability to block or delay decisions in key areas such as migration, climate, trade deals, or Ukraine.

A shift to the right would make Madrid’s foreign policy more conventional on most issues, and potentially disruptive on a few. Spain may well stop being Europe’s maverick, but a PP in uneasy tandem with Vox could hardly become one of its anchors.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.