Easier Said Than Done
Repairing democratic institutions that were weakened by a previous government has become a major theme of Poland’s upcoming presidential election. In 2023, after eight years of increasingly autocratic Law and Justice (PiS) party rule in Poland, opposition leader Donald Tusk and his Civic Coalition (KO) secured a majority alongside The Left and Third Way in the parliamentary elections. Tusk formed a government in December 2023, and nearly two years later, KO hopes to secure a unified presidency and parliament with a mandate to restore such institutions. The first election round is set to be held on May 18, with a near-certain second round to be held on June 1.
The current frontrunners include centrist governing KO candidate Rafał Trzaskowski, with 32% support in a late April poll conducted by Opinia24 for TVN, right-wing PiS-backed candidate Karol Nawrocki with 26% support, and far-right Confederation candidate Sławomir Mentzen with 15% support. Based on preliminary polling for a second-round face-off between Trzaskowski and Nawrocki, Trzaskowski has 51% support compared to Nawrocki’s 45%. While Trzaskowski leads, the gap between the top two candidates is narrowing. Support for Trzaskowski in the first round is down by 1% while support for Nawrocki in the first round is up by 4% since the previous poll was conducted.
Background
After returning to power in 2015 following eight years in opposition, PiS and its chairman, Jarosław Kaczyński, wasted no time in dismantling Poland’s democratic institutions to cement their own power. A notable example is the immediate purge of management within Poland’s public media and the transformation of Poland’s national broadcaster, TVP, into a propaganda machine for PiS.
PiS also immediately began an overhaul of the judiciary. In 2015, the party refused to recognize Constitutional Tribunal judges appointed by the outgoing Sejm, packed the court with loyalists, and introduced the “Repair Act”, which inhibited the court’s proper functioning. Then in 2017, the PiS-led Sejm (lower house of parliament) passed legislation that would end the terms of the members of the National Council of the Judiciary—the body that nominates all judges—and give the Sejm the power to appoint their replacements. PiS also lowered the retirement age for Supreme Court judges, enabling it to replace forced retirees with their hand-picked judges. With these actions, the party was able to assume significant power over the appointment of judges.
The overhaul of democratic institutions did not stop at the judiciary and media and included packing the prosecution services with loyalists, allowing PiS to go after its critics and avoid accountability. A major step in undermining prosecutorial independence was the 2016 merger of the offices of the Justice Minister and the Prosecutor General, which allowed then-Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro to interfere in prosecutors’ investigations.
KO ran in 2023 largely on a platform of reversing these and other illiberal reforms, framing the election as Poland’s “last chance” to save its democracy. Many in civil society hailed Tusk’s KO/The Left/Third Way coalition as a second chance for Poland to rejoin the camp of liberal democracies. Nevertheless, Poland’s case has served as a sobering example of the challenges to legally rebuilding democratic institutions that have been dismantled extralegally.
Restoring Democracy in Poland: Easier Said Than Done
In Poland, the president has the power to veto legislation or redirect it to the Constitutional Tribunal for review. While the government has been eager to introduce reforms, PiS-supported President Andrzej Duda has made it clear that such attempts would be thrown out or sent to the Tribunal, which is still packed with PiS loyalists. The Sejm may override a veto by a three-fifths majority vote, but the governing coalition does not have enough votes to do so.
Given these challenges, the government has chosen to adopt extra-legislative measures to begin rolling back some of the anti-democratic changes carried out by PiS. Almost immediately after taking power, the Tusk government replaced management within the public media by sidestepping the traditional appointment process for such roles. Duda attempted to thwart these efforts by vetoing the budget, but the government found a loophole that allowed them to retain the staff and continue with their reforms. The legality of these measures has been debated, and some have argued that bias simply shifted in favor of the new government. The liquidation period is to be completed at the end of 2025, and further reform will require new legislation.
Regarding the Constitutional Tribunal, whose primary responsibility is to review the constitutionality of legislation, the Tusk government has begun to ignore its decisions. It claims that the decisions have no legal basis because the tribunal’s judges were unlawfully appointed under the PiS government. The recognition of the Supreme Court’s rulings, by contrast, has been inconsistent since not every chamber has been packed with PiS loyalists. A major legal barrier to reforming the judiciary has also been the question of whether all judges installed under PiS should be terminated, or a vetting process should be established. That a judicial vetting process could be necessary emphasizes the severity of state capture of the judiciary in Poland, since such processes have historically been reserved for the aftermath of atrocities and deeply autocratic regimes.
Justice Minister Adam Bodnar has been successful in replacing personnel at multiple levels of the prosecution service. A new national prosecutor was appointed in a competitive process, and Bodnar issued a directive restoring his office’s supervision of the national prosecutor and his deputies. Bodnar also relocated his three Ziobro-appointed deputies away from Warsaw, prompting them to sue him, claiming that the action violated a 2023 law requiring their dismissal to be approved by the president. These initial moves have allowed for investigation into politically motivated prosecutions and abuses of power under PiS; however, structural reforms such as unlinking the offices of the prosecutor general and the justice minister will require new legislation.
Despite the dearth of options for the government to implement reform, the legality of the government’s actions remains in question, and inconsistent application of the courts’ rulings has created divisions among the public and within the legal system. On top of this, effective governance has been hampered by disagreements between more conservative and more progressive members within the governing coalition. For example, a major mobilizing issue for voters in 2023 was a promise to soften the Constitutional Tribunal’s near-total ban on abortion—a move that members of Third Way have voted down.
What Is at Stake in the Long Term
Nearly two years into the Tusk-led government, this election will act as a referendum on the future of the coalition’s leadership, progress towards rehabilitating the country’s democratic institutions, and Poland’s relationship with NATO and the EU. While a victory for Trzaskowski appears to be within reach, it is important to consider recent party polls that have created major concerns for the government. Some suggest that if the 2027 parliamentary elections were to happen today, Third Way—a current coalition partner—would not pass the electoral threshold. In such a scenario, Tusk would likely not win enough seats to govern alone or in a coalition with The Left, and a coalition of PiS and Confederation could overtake them. Support for PiS is also up by 6% since the last party poll was conducted in early April and is now equal to KO’s 32%.
The road to democratic recovery and resilience for Poland will be a long and difficult one, with this election being a key point along the way. A Trzaskowski victory would allow the coalition to legally implement reforms and make good on the promises KO made to their voters in 2023. While two years will likely not be enough time for the government to completely reverse the severe state capture that has taken place in Poland, it could be enough to convince the public in 2027 that another backslide to the illiberal right is not in their best interests. However, this is only some of the work that needs to be done. Effective governance will also require greater compromise among the diverse parties within the coalition, especially on major mobilizing issues for voters such as abortion.