A Holdup of US Arms for Taiwan

In January, the US Congress informally cleared an arms package for Taiwan worth roughly $14 billion. No formal notification by the White House to the legislature has followed, however, indicating that Taipei remains a long way from receiving the weaponry. The Trump administration says it must prioritize US military requirements elsewhere, but there are costs to the delay.

China reads the hold as proof that it has a say in the timing of US arms sales, if not a veto over them. But the longer the hold lasts, the angrier Beijing will become when it is lifted. For Taiwan, the delay slows its defense buildout and deepens a domestic political fight over the spending. For US allies in the Indo-Pacific, it raises doubts about Washington’s commitments in the region and erodes American credibility globally. 

To prevent these challenges from festering, the administration should proceed quickly with congressional notifications, beginning with one that sets the stage for informing Congress of a small tranche of arms.

Background

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 directs Washington to make available to Taipei the defense articles and services “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” as determined by the president and the Congress. Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan in 1982 affirmed that the United States had agreed not to consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. The assurances were never codified but are often cited as a basis for continuing to refuse to consult with China.

The current hold is the fourth major disruption in arms sales to Taiwan in 21 years, following pauses in 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2011-2015. US concerns that support for Taiwan would undermine cooperation with Beijing were often responsible for the delays. The administration justifies the current hold by noting US munitions needs for the Iran war, but many observers believe that Trump seeks to accommodate Chinese leader Xi Jinping or uses arms sales to Taiwan as bargaining leverage.

Trump has said as much. He has called arms sales a “very good negotiating chip”, said he had discussed them with Xi “in great detail”, and described the package as held “in abeyance”. That position is at odds with the spirit of the Six Assurances. The president has also edged away from the long-standing US position of not supporting Taiwan independence toward Beijing’s preferred formulation of opposing it, saying in May “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent.” At his September White House summit with Trump, Xi tried to lock in that language, urging the president to “maintain the correct position of opposing Taiwan independence”. Trump did not take the bait. Administration officials insist US policy is unchanged, but rhetoric reinforces the quiet hold on the arms package.

Defending the Delay

White House officials and their supporters defend the pause with three arguments. They note that:

• Trump has approved more arms sales to Taiwan by value than any prior president. In the first year of his second term alone, the value of approved arms sales ($11.4 billion) exceeded that approved during Joe Biden’s presidency ($8.4 billion) by approximately 36%.
• American production capacity is limited and other demands, including those related to the wars in Iran and Ukraine, take priority over further arms for Taiwan and other US partners. Taipei already faces a backlog of roughly $30 billion in undelivered arms, so postponing new congressional notifications for a few more months does no harm.
• withholding the package preserves the trade truce with Beijing and buys the US time to reduce its dependence on China for rare earths and magnets. Additional arms sales could spark greater fallout than in the past.

None of these arguments is baseless. Trump’s approval of more arms for Taiwan than any of his predecessors weighs heavily on Beijing’s view of its relationship with Washington. US production is meaningfully constrained by the rate at which weapons are being expended worldwide and by preexisting limits on manufacturing. Regarding the backlog, it will neither grow nor shrink significantly due to a delay of a few more months. But the risk that resuming weapons sales would provoke retaliation and unravel the fragile Sino-American truce is real. Xi has tied Taiwan directly to the “constructive strategic stability” framework that the two leaders agreed on in May. He could plausibly respond to a lifting of the hold with a renewed rare-earth export squeeze.

But the record suggests Beijing’s reaction is likely to be limited. After the December 2025 notification of a separate $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan (deliveries of some items have subsequently been made), China held “Justice Mission 2025” military drills and sanctioned 20 US firms and 10 individuals. The truce, however, remained intact and was later extended through January 10, 2027.

Beijing has an interest in maintaining the status quo. A small, first tranche of arms under the current package would therefore likely draw only a familiar response: rhetorical condemnation, suspension of select dialogues and exchanges, military exercises around Taiwan, and sanctions on specified US firms. The greater danger is further delay, which reinforces Beijing’s belief that it can influence US arms sales.

The Costs of Foot-Dragging

The hold on arms sales has costs that must be considered in US decision-making. Washington should take into account four factors.

First, delays in congressional notification compound delays in weapons delivery. The latest package reportedly includes nine National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) batteries, hundreds of PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors, and the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), all central to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s layered air-defense network, or “T-Dome”. NASAMS enhance defense against cruise missiles, drones, and aircraft at low and medium altitude; PAC-3 MSE interceptors strengthen defense against ballistic and cruise missiles; IBCS links all three systems. Delivery delays slow the buildout of this network and weaken Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

Delays in congressional notification do not equal delays in delivery. Production slots are limited, and the US government can generally place orders only after sales, funding, and contracting are complete. While notification is held up, manufacturers may allocate capacity to other customers, pushing Taiwan to a later slot. A six-month delay in notification could therefore become a delivery delay of a year or more. 

The queue for these systems is already long. PAC-3 MSE lead times run about 24 months for the missile and 30 months for its rocket motor. Lockheed Martin delivered 620 MSEs in 2025 and aims for 2,000 annually by 2030, but the company is working through a $52.5 billion multiyear award from the US government and purchases by other customers, including an approved sale of 730 MSEs to Saudi Arabia.

Taiwan’s own record shows how long the wait can be. Delivery of its first batch of 11 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) took four years once Congress was notified in 2020. Thirteen months passed between the October 2024 notification for three NASAMS and the November 2025 contract for the systems, scheduled for completion in February 2031. A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) sale about which Congress was notified in 2017 faces a possible nine-year delivery timeframe. One exception confirms the rule: Taiwan received Altius drones a little over a year after Congress was notified of that sale. It reflects the possibility of expedited delivery of items in production.

Second, the hold stokes the battle over Taiwan’s defense budget. Washington has urged Taipei to spend 10% of GDP on defense. Lai has pledged 3.3% this year and 5% by 2030. But the opposition Kuomintang, chaired by Cheng Li-wun who met Xi in April, and its partner, the Taiwan People’s Party, control the legislature. It approved in May a special defense budget of $24.8 billion, nearly 40% less than the amount Lai requested for 2026-2033. Of the funds earmarked, $14.65 billion is for the stalled arms package and more than $9 billion is for weapons Congress was notified about in December 2025. Money committed to the former, however, cannot (yet) be spent, which gives skeptics in Taipei a ready argument that the United States is an unreliable supplier and that the spending is wasted.

Third, Beijing is learning that delay works. The earlier pauses lasted about a year or more. Each one has taught China that pressure and summitry can alter the timing of weapons sales. Trump's description of Taiwan arms as a "negotiating chip" invites Beijing to expect something in return for each future approval. The more successful that bargaining appears, the more Beijing will press it, and the more it will treat the next notification as a concession from Washington rather than a routine measure under the Taiwan Relations Act. Beijing operates most effectively in a gray zone. By taking incremental steps that avoid a strong response, it establishes a new normal. A pause that is never formally announced and never formally ended is such a step, taken at no cost to China.

Fourth, allies are watching. Partners such as Japan and South Korea base their own planning on US willingness to follow through on commitments in the Indo-Pacific, and the hold gives them reason to doubt Washington. The stakes extend to the economy as well. Taiwan accounts for roughly two-thirds of the world's advanced-node chip production and about 80% of processes that use extreme ultraviolet lithography. That compares to about 11% for South Korea, 10% for the United States, and 9% for China, according to TrendForce. If Washington appears willing to trade away Taiwan’s defense for smoother relations with Beijing, every government that relies on the island’s supply chain, and on US credibility to protect it, will be unsettled. 

Recommendations

• Notify Congress of a small, first tranche of arms to Taiwan now. The administration should lead with the items that most urgently require a place in the production queue. This includes PAC-3 MSE interceptors, IBCS components, and counter-drone systems. Notification will not make delivery quick, but it would start the sale-funding-contracting process and secure Taiwan's production slot. The cost of the initial order can be a portion of the total $14 billion package, reducing the pretext for a major Chinese response.
   
• Return to regular, case-by-case reviews. Washington should process Taiwan’s requests individually as they are submitted, rather than bundling them into large, periodic packages. This approach began in Trump’s first term and continued under the Biden administration. Remaining components of the January package and future requests should follow this procedure.
   
• Use Congress to restore regularity and transparency. Lawmakers can press for formal notification through oversight and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and can require public tracking of the arms backlog so that delayed deliveries are treated as a cost. Pending proposals offer a case in point. The PORCUPINE Act would give Taiwan "NATO Plus" treatment and halve the notification period from 30 to 15 days while the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act would codify the US commitment not to consult Beijing on arms sales. The NDAA for fiscal year 2026 already authorizes up to $1 billion for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative.

Quick Steps

The Trump administration should resist Beijing’s attempts to use the recently agreed “constructive strategic stability” framework to influence the timing of US arms sales to Taiwan, let alone vetoing them. Resuming sales could provoke Chinese retaliation, but Beijing’s own interest in preserving the trade truce, and its response to the December 2025 package, suggest that a reaction would be limited and temporary. Continuing the pause, however, undermines the strategic interests of the United States and its partners. Washington should rapidly resume arms-sales notifications and restore a regular congressional notification process.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.