Like It or Not, Democratic Societies Need Clearly Defined Adversaries

Over the past decade, the “boiling frog” has been a popular metaphor for the democratic decline in Western societies. While this gradual decline has several causes—such as the deleterious effects of economic and cultural globalization, the crisis of democratic representation, and the polarizing impact of dominant social media platforms—analysis has overlooked one critical factor: the absence of a shared understanding and clear conceptualization of external and internal adversaries, or even enemies, of democratic societies.

This can be traced back to the fall of communism, the West’s triumph in the Cold War, and the absence of a competing model to democracy at the peak of the Pax Americana in the 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, Western capital spread intensively in countries that were previously off limits, not least China and Russia. With no credible external threat to democratic values, and with the peaceful nature of societies driven by economic cooperation taken as self-evident, the notion of democratization and peace through globalization was frequently invoked. This was in clear opposition to the idea of considering one’s economic partners as adversaries, let alone enemies.

The lack of clearly defined adversaries in the mainstream democratic political narrative, or of “othering”, in Western—particularly European—societies had two profound negative consequences. First, it left them largely unprepared for the rising threats that began to appear after the 2008 global financial crisis. Second, it created a conceptual void that the illiberal radical right, simultaneously an internal enemy and an enabler of external adversaries, moved to fill by shaping public opinion with what and whom it defined as societal enemies.

As a result, immigrants, vulnerable groups, different minorities, and, more broadly, pluralism and liberal values became perceived as threats by a significant portion of democratic societies. By contrast, violations of pluralism and fundamental freedoms, acts of war and aggression, mass killings, and clear military threats often failed to provoke the same level of alarm. In effect, by forgetting their capacity and need to identify adversaries, pro-democracy elites have in several instances permitted the radical right to contest democracy and pluralism.

Whether believers in democracy like it or not, the human psyche needs a clear understanding of a community with organizing principles within boundaries as well as of its challengers. All democratic societies contain cleavages—ethnic, religious, class-based, or ideological—that are often exploited by populist political actors to increase polarization. Democratic centrists are right to reject “othering” as the main way of promoting their own agency. Consequently, they cannot predominantly base their politics on divisive “us versus them” dichotomies, as this leads to populism, illiberalism and autocracy. But their rejecting “othering” altogether as a structural feature of society is sociologically untenable and politically unwise.

By forgetting their capacity and need to identify adversaries, pro-democracy elites have in several instances permitted the radical right to contest democracy and pluralism.

Societies with a clear concept of their adversaries or enemies show greater resilience and threat awareness. In Europe, the Baltic States and Poland exemplify this. But achieving a societal consensus on adversaries requires a consensus among pro-democracy elites about who or what poses a credible threat and unified, effective communication about it on their part.

The last significant attempt to define a clear enemy for the Western democracies before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the “axis of evil” and “war on terror” framework of President George W. Bush’s administration. This failed because the “axis of evil” did not pose a credible threat, and radical Islamism and the terrorism stemming from it proved to be not enough to unite societies. All this did was to foster Islamophobia and xenophobia.

Since then, the democratic mainstream has avoided narratives involving adversaries, especially in Europe. Pro-democracy elites have struggled to define and to explain relations with rising authoritarian powers such as China and Russia in this way, even after the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. And they stood idle in the face of the deepening entanglement between the Kremlin and the internal illiberal adversaries of democracy in Europe. This has cost the European democracies nearly a decade. Instead of preparing for the inevitable, they have clung to wishful thinking, denial, and appeasement, which still shape elite attitudes to a significant degree, toward external and internal adversaries

Understanding and identifying adversaries in everyday political discourse, rather than just in lofty declarations, does not mean adopting hostility or aggression toward them, particularly external ones. Rather, it requires a constant review of the situation and the threat level, deliberate public reflection on the nature of the relationship with adversaries, including the potential for and drivers of cooperation with them, while preparing citizens to maintain a high level of motivation and ability to defend their own country and democracy.

To counter illiberalism, pro-democracy leaders must abandon “anti-politics” that remains silent about the existential challenges adversaries pose to liberal democracy and cultivate civic responsibility. They need to develop a compelling narrative about the nature of the threat that can galvanize public support and foster a willingness to defend democracy. Such an approach, coupled with effective strategic communications, can be critical for addressing the issue of parts of society placing their trust in democracy’s adversaries and the means they employ as well as to bolstering confidence in democratic elites.

Had pro-democracy elites adopted this approach to defining adversaries and their enablers, including the radical right, over the past decade, the trust structures and resilience of European societies would likely look very different today.

It is not too late for democratic elites and societies to face reality. They must accept that conflict is an inevitable aspect of relations with actors who define democracy based on pluralism and liberal values as their adversary. Increased threat awareness and reduced social trust in democracy’s adversaries can lead to greater resilience and ultimately to greater security for democracies.

Daniel Hegedüs is a regional director at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Goran Buldioski is a senior fellow at the Hertie School.