The Return of Classical Strategy
As Washington continues to weigh military pressure, diplomatic outreach, and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, it may be overlooking a more important strategic approach to the Iran war.
US President Donald Trump recently described renewed diplomacy as Iran's "last chance", warning of severe consequences if talks fail. Tehran responded by denying that such talks were even taking place.
Meanwhile, a familiar debate continues: Is deterrence working?
That is an important question, but not the right place to begin. Instead, policymakers should first ask a more fundamental question: How does Tehran perceive the strategic environment, and have recent events fundamentally changed that perception?
More than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu offered an insight that remains remarkably relevant: "Place your army on death ground, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety." His point was not that cornered armies become stronger. It was that leaders who believe they have no acceptable avenue of retreat begin making decisions through an entirely different strategic lens. Risks once considered unacceptable become preferable to what they perceive as the alternative.
Modern deterrence theory rests on a straightforward premise: Increase the costs of aggression until they outweigh the benefits. Military superiority, economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and credible threats are designed to change an adversary's behavior. Usually, they succeed. But deterrence depends as much on psychology as on capability. Costs matter only insofar as they change an adversary's perception of what is at stake.
If leaders such as those in Iran conclude that defeat threatens the survival of the regime, or perhaps the state itself, their calculus changes. Actions that appear irrational to outside observers may become entirely rational to those who believe they have no acceptable path backward.
Sun Tzu called this "death ground". Whether Iran has reached that point remains an open question, but it is one policymakers should answer before taking the next step on the escalation ladder. An adversary that believes it has entered Sun Tzu's strategic straits will often employ the full range of capabilities at its disposal, seeking to impose costs wherever it retains leverage rather than limiting its response to the immediate battlefield. The strategic challenge is no longer merely imposing costs. It is ensuring that those costs do not convince the adversary that escalation is its least bad option.
The current crisis in the Middle East also illustrates another lesson from the classical strategists: Diplomacy and military force are rarely opposing choices. Tehran has alternated between negotiations, denials, proxy attacks, and renewed confrontation. Many observers interpret these developments as inconsistency on the part of Iran. The classical strategists would have recognized them simply as statecraft.
Sun Tzu called for shaping an opponent's perceptions rather than merely destroying his forces. In classical strategy, deception was not dishonorable; it was often indispensable. Kautilya viewed diplomacy, intelligence, alliances, economic pressure, and military force as complementary instruments of statecraft, while negotiations themselves could become tools for buying time, shaping perceptions, or improving strategic position. Machiavelli similarly argued that states confronting what they perceive as existential threats act according to necessity rather than idealized expectations.
The irony is difficult to miss. Washington is focused on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. It should devote equal attention to avoiding the strategic straits, mentioned by Sun Tzu, that convince an adversary it has nothing left to lose. The first is a geographic chokepoint. The second is a psychological one. The former can be secured by military power. The latter may determine whether deterrence succeeds or fails.
The question now is not whether US military power remains overwhelming or whether sanctions impose meaningful costs. They plainly do. The more consequential question is whether American policymakers have correctly judged how Iranian leaders interpret US actions and how they are responding as a result. If Tehran concludes that regime survival is at stake, pressure designed to strengthen deterrence may instead reinforce the very resolve it seeks to weaken.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.