Shifting Ground
US Vice President J.D. Vance recently delivered an unusually harsh and public rebuke to Israel, historically one of Washington’s closest allies. He claimed his boss, President Donald Trump, was the world’s only political leader sympathetic to the nation, and he reminded Israelis of their ongoing dependence on American weapons and protection. Vance's remarks—aimed at tempering Israeli criticism of the US-Iran memorandum signed a day earlier and at securing compliance with it—stood in stark contrast to the tenor during the opening salvo of the US–Israeli war that was meant to force regime change on Tehran.
Vance's remarks were also directed at a domestic audience in the United States, where the conflict has accelerated a shift in views of Israel that has been building for years. The Pew Research Center found in April that 60% of Americans have an unfavorable view of the country, up seven percentage points in a single year and almost 20 since 2022. A July AP-NORC poll found that 40% of Americans believe that the United States is “too supportive” of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians, eight percentage points higher than in December 2023. Crucially, while the shift in US public opinion of Israel is particularly pronounced among Democrats, the erosion in support is bipartisan, albeit generationally skewed. A majority (57%) of Republicans under the age of 50 now view Israel unfavorably, up from 50% last year. Among younger Democrats, 84% hold unfavorable views of the country.
The recalibration underway in the United States, which has coincided with increased criticism of ongoing American military aid to Israel, is not happening in isolation. In many respects, shifting perspectives in America echo those already prevalent across Europe, where a majority of governments now recognize Palestinian statehood and others have moved to curb arms sales, suspend trade provisions, or back legal scrutiny of Israel's military conduct in Gaza. Cooler US-Israeli relations could further broaden the European realignment, emboldening capitals hesitant to break with a Washington-led consensus.
No clear change in US policy toward Israel has yet emerged, but one is inevitable in the longer term. Foreign policy debates in the Democratic party have focused on diagnosing the failings of the Biden administration and identifying an alternative path that reckons with this legacy. These conversations have unfolded as US midterm elections approach. Israel and its military campaigns across the Middle East have already emerged as a defining issue in several Democratic primaries, highlighting divisions between the party’s left-wing progressives and moderates. In New York’s 10th congressional district, City Comptroller Brad Lander, who had pledged to vote against US funding for Israel’s military and refused funding from AIPAC, the staunchly pro-Israel advocacy organization, ousted incumbent Dan Goldman to become the party’s candidate for the House of Representatives. In Colorado’s first congressional district, first-time candidate Melat Kiros, campaigning on a platform to ending aid to Israel, did the same to Diana DeGette, who has served 15 terms in the House.
On the right, isolationists and anti-war Republicans are testing the party’s more traditional neoconservative approach to foreign policy. Vance, after awkwardly backing the administration’s military actions for months, has used his new role as mediator to reemphasize his more isolationist rhetoric on Israel––and pander to some of his party’s more conspiratorialleanings. Some Republicans on Capitol Hill have been willing to put Israel's funding to a vote. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene unsuccessfully sought in July 2025 to strike $500 million in defense funding for the country. Republican Congressman Thomas Massie recently introduced an amendment that would slash nearly $3.3 billion in funds allocated for Israel in the 2027 defense funding package. It garnered the support of one Republican (Massie) and 103 Democrats. Although the amendment failed, the roll call demonstrated the skepticism of once-automatic military support to Israel.
Despite the widespread shift in thinking, American foreign policy toward Israel has changed little. The second Trump administration, in its first two months, approved nearly $12 billion in foreign military sales to the country, and the president’s promise to end the war in the Gaza Strip has not fared well. The nominal ceasefire he announced last October has been violated at least 3,795 times, while Israel has contravened the deal by enlarging its area of control in Gaza. Israel has also continued to expand illegal settlements in the West Bank with only limited rhetorical pushback from Washington. And in spite of ongoing US efforts to promote territorial and political sovereignty in Syria and Lebanon, Israel has vowed to maintain its military forces in both countries. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently proclaimed that his country’s wars “never end”.
Two key factors explain the dueling realities. First, Trump’s political base remains loyal to and supportive of the president’s performance and his overall handling of foreign policy. Second, the president's foreign policy has centered on quick deal-making and transactional leverage, an approach that thus far has left the unequal power dynamics that characterize Israel’s relationship with its neighbors intact.
The status quo is unlikely to last. The Trump administration and the Israeli government have reportedly started negotiations on the successor to a 10-year memorandum of understanding signed in 2016, which commits $3.8 billion in annual US aid to Israel and expires in September 2028. Netanyahu, arguing that his country aims to move from aid to partnership, has publicly called for a phaseout of American military assistance and a focus on bilateral collaboration on joint cyber and defense projects. Critics note, however, that such a reorganization would create a defense relationship that is deeper and less transparent. The issue of dependence cuts across broader Israeli politics as well. Ahead of fall elections, several of Netanyahu's opponents have attacked his government for making Israel reliant on Washington for freedom to act militarily.
As Democratic and Republican hopefuls turn their gaze beyond the midterms to the 2028 presidential election, they will need to contend with shaping a bilateral relationship that is being redefined in both countries. How the contours of that relationship are renegotiated––and who will oversee setting its parameters––will prove critical across the Middle East.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.