The Trump-Xi-Putin Trilateral
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The Shenzhen summit of presidents Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin was not another Yalta. The three leaders did not carve spheres of influence or settle the fate of third countries. Their four-point “Heads of State Declaration toward Peace” is short on specifics and sets no timetable, no targets, and no delegations. It would still be a mistake to dismiss the event as irrelevant. The first-ever leaders’ meeting of the United States, China, and Russia is significant in its signaling and in the processes it could set in motion.
The most consequential item is the pledge to hold a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing proliferation. Nuclear arms reductions remain unlikely. Beijing has long resisted any negotiations that would constrain its arsenal, which, while expanding, remains a small fraction of the massive stockpiles held by Washington and Moscow. A risk reduction dialogue is a different and more achievable proposition. The three could discuss crisis communication, doctrine, and the dangers posed by new technologies. They could also take up the concerns each has voiced about the others’ possible return to nuclear testing, an issue that could erode confidence quickly if left unaddressed. Whether this dialogue convenes, and whether it produces anything concrete, will be the real test.
The declaration’s other provisions are harder to assess. The language on energy commits the trio to boost refined petroleum production and stable energy flows, but it contains no numbers. It reads less as a framework for cooperation than as an expression of shared interest, shaped by Trump’s separate talks with Xi on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. Its practical significance will depend on whether it translates into any easing of sanctions, which the text does not spell out. The clause on the International Criminal Court (ICC), which says that “state consent” and the immunities of state officials are of paramount importance, is more pointed. It lines up with Washington’s recent sanctions on the court and with Putin’s obvious interest, given the warrant outstanding against him. It signals that the three share a preference for shielding leaders from international legal accountability, a position many U.S. allies, most of them ICC members, will not welcome.
What the declaration omits is as telling as what it includes. It says nothing about ending the Iran war. And despite Trump’s pre-summit promise to take up Ukraine, his “favorite subject”, the declaration does not mention it. At their May summit in Beijing, the White House said, Trump and Xi agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to support the free flow of energy, that no one should be allowed to charge tolls for passage, and that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. China’s own readout did not mention tolls or Iranian nuclear weapons. Trump says he raised Ukraine with Putin, but there is no sign of agreement among the three leaders on how to proceed.
Even so, each leader gained something. Xi was the host and convener, and he will be credited with a diplomatic achievement no one had managed before: bringing the leaders of the three largest nuclear powers to the same table. The meeting also reinforces the narrative Beijing has long promoted, namely that the United States, China, and Russia are the principal actors responsible for managing international security, with everyone else on the sidelines.
Putin gained legitimacy and visibility. Despite Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, he was treated as the leader of a major power with a legitimate role in addressing global issues, seated at the same circular table as the American president. For a leader facing international isolation and an ICC arrest warrant, the optics matter a great deal.
Trump gets to claim a “historic” first and a seat at the center of great-power diplomacy, which he prizes. He has also signed onto a joint statement that calls for reforming the UN and limiting the ICC, institutions many of America’s closest partners support.
For US allies, particularly in Europe and Japan, the summit will prompt some unease, if only because of the optics of Trump seated alongside Xi and Putin and the extent to which Washington may have consulted beforehand with its partners. But the idea that the meeting in Shenzhen points toward a great-power arrangement made over their heads looks far-fetched. The declaration’s thinness shows how little the three leaders agree on. Ukraine and Iran, where the trio’s interests clearly diverge, appear to have been discussed but left out of the text, most likely because no common language could be found. On nuclear weapons, they limited their commitment to a dialogue with no stated goals. These are leaders pursuing different and often conflicting objectives who found a few points of common ground. If anything, the summit exposed the limits of their alignment more than its depth. That is cold comfort for allies, but it should temper fears that a new Yalta is in the making.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.