The Case for Ukraine’s Progressive EU Accession

The EU is set to take a big step forward on Ukraine’s accession. In Luxembourg on June 15, it will open negotiations with Kyiv on the Fundamentals cluster, which encompasses Chapters 23 and 24 on the judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom, and security. This cluster is the central pillar of the entire accession framework, and it opens first and closes last. Fulfilling its interim benchmarks is a prerequisite for the provisional closure of any other negotiating chapter. This long-awaited breakthrough had been blocked for months by Hungary’s veto before the change of Budapest’s political leadership finally cleared the path. Ukraine and the European Commission are also pushing for the opening of the remaining five clusters before the end of summer, if member states can reach a political consensus. This in itself is a significant ambition, as opening all six clusters within one calendar year is exceptional in EU practice.

The formal opening of the accession talks has brought back to the EU-Ukraine agenda a question that Brussels and European capitals have been grappling with for years: What, precisely, should Ukraine's accession look like, given the country’s unprecedented situation? The standard enlargement methodology, developed for peaceful times, is clearly no longer fit for purpose. There is a growing consensus among member states and within the European Commission that the geopolitical urgency of integrating Ukraine demands a fundamentally different approach. Ukraine and the EU simply cannot afford to move at the usual pace. 

A tentative answer is now emerging in Brussels, both for Moldova and now also for Ukraine. With the concept of reverse accession—membership granted upfront, with reforms to follow—rejected by member states, and the “associated membership” proposed by Chancellor Merz declined by Ukraine, Commissioner Marta Kos arrived in Kyiv in early June with what seems like a more balanced alternative. It would entail an “accelerated gradual integration”, as the Commission currently refers to it, under which Ukraine would progressively—sector by sector—access EU policies, funds, institutions, and markets in advance of full membership. This process has in many respects already begun and should now be formally anchored and expanded. “Progressive accession” may, in fact, be a stronger framing of what the Commission is putting forward, both in terms of the destination and the process. Each progressive step in accession would be contingent on Ukraine’s concrete reform outcomes. The final membership architecture, Kos implied, will be agreed upon once peace is achieved, but the need for a gradual, reform-contingent modality is no longer in question.

For Ukraine, this progressive accession model would create a measurable incentive structure to accelerate reforms and effectively determine the pace of the country’s EU integration process. For member states, including the skeptics, it would offer the ability to oversee Ukraine's integration in real time, with each new stage of access reflecting demonstrated progress. The alternative is a high-stakes, upfront political decision that many capitals are not yet ready to make. This matters all the more as the rise of far-right forces, particularly in France and Germany, and the volatility of European politics more broadly, threaten to close Ukraine’s accession window. At the same time, “accelerated gradual integration” would progressively unlock what Ukraine already brings to the table in security, military technology, defense preparedness, economic resilience, and other critical areas. 

Progressive accession would turn a binary decision into a process that builds facts on the ground, mobilizes stakeholders for Ukraine's integration across capitals, and with each step forward becomes increasingly harder to reverse. Member states that remain cautious can view it as a risk management tool, as it allows them to move at a pace calibrated to Ukraine’s performance.

But, as Commissioner Kos reiterated in Kyiv, none of this will be possible unless Ukraine delivers critical reforms without further delay. In December 2025, months before the Hungarian veto was lifted, the Danish presidency and the European Commission devised a creative workaround: a “frontloading” strategy that allowed substantive negotiations to proceed informally, handing Kyiv its negotiating positions on three clusters without formally opening them. This meant that, once the political blockade lifted, opening and closing could swiftly follow. Central to this effort was a concrete reform agenda formalized in the Kachka-Kos memorandum, which specified the rule of law, anti-corruption, and law enforcement reforms Ukraine was expected to deliver. The subsequent Cypriot presidency continued this framework, keeping the process alive. Little reform progress, unfortunately, has been achieved since then, despite relentless advocacy by Ukraine’s vibrant civil society.

Paralyzed by an internal political crisis that can hardly be justified given the stakes, the Ukrainian parliament has failed for months to pass many of the critical EU accession laws, including during the week of Kos' Kyiv visit. In particular, the Ukrainian parliament must adopt the rule of law legislation without further delay. Every failed vote hands ammunition to membership skeptics and risks undermining the Commission's efforts to bring member states into agreement behind an accelerated accession scenario. Beyond the political damage, the consequences are also financial. Tranches of EU macro-financial assistance are directly conditional on legislative delivery, and deadlines expire.

There is strong demand in Ukrainian society for European integration and justice reforms. Corruption has, for the first time, been named by Ukrainians as the number one national concern, ahead of the war itself. This is a powerful signal that Ukrainian society is ahead of its political leadership in demanding the kind of state transformation that EU accession requires. Political leaders must respond to this demand and under no circumstances allow a failure of reform delivery to erode Ukrainians' confidence in the promise of EU membership. According to polls, support for EU accession, while still high, has dropped to 67%, down from 92% in 2022 and 85% in 2025, creating the perfect breeding ground for the emergence of Euro-skeptical and other populist forces. The longer Ukraine remains in a limbo of accession uncertainty and stalled reforms, the more significant that decline is likely to become. That risk is already materializing and will likely accelerate if reform paralysis and lack of action on Europe’s part continue.

Ukraine's progressive EU accession is not charity. It is a strategic bet that rewards consistent reform and forecloses the scenarios that Russia’s and Europe's own far right are counting on. Ukraine’s leaders are well aware of what is required of them. So are European capitals whose political courage to formalize a path worthy of what Ukraine has already sacrificed is being put to a test. The question is whether both will act fast—before the window closes.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.