The End of History–Act Two
This text was originally published in German in Die Zeit on January 29, 2026.
It has been considered good form for around 30 years to mock the naivety of those who, like the American author Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s, diagnosed the "end of history". For many, this metaphor still serves as the epitome of Western hubris following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the system's adversary. Anyone who today expresses the opinion that history has come to an end because an epoch-making event has swept away all previous certainties would be ridiculed as a hopeless dilettante.
When it comes to transatlantic relations, however, we are witnessing the comeback of the "end of history". Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic now seem to agree that the transatlantic community has reached the end of its long journey. The analysis is that President Donald Trump's deliberate destruction of the international order makes it impossible to continue the traditional transatlantic relationship. Only a Europe that frees itself from political and military dependence on the United States has a chance of survival in this new, inhospitable world.
No one disputes that Trump is straining transatlantic relations like no American president before him. NATO has also been significantly damaged by Trump's policy of threats. But that does not mean the end of transatlantic history. The current crisis in transatlantic relations is worrying, but there are several reasons to believe that a final break between America and Europe is neither inevitable nor likely.
One factor that is often overlooked is the US political landscape. It is far more pluralistic than Trump's media dominance would suggest. Although Democrats have so far been unable to present themselves as a powerful alternative to Trump since their election defeat over a year ago, the recent electoral successes of Democratic candidates show that political competition with Trump still exists. What's more, as criticism of Trump's Greenland antics from the Republican camp and the MAGA movement shows, the president is not all-powerful. If he governs too autocratically, he will lose part of his political base. The deployment of masked ICE agents against illegal immigrants is still tolerated by a large part of the population, but for how much longer? Trump's attempt to divert attention from the potentially compromising Epstein files with all his might also shows that his presidency is not secure. The values that he and his entourage embody disturb not only Europeans, but also many Americans.
The second factor that argues against an end to transatlantic relations is the US political system. There is much talk of Trump wanting to undermine the system of checks and balances by bypassing Congress or the courts. But his almost manic rush to issue presidential decrees shows that he is well aware of his limits. Other presidents have tried to govern by decree, bypassing parliament, but have had limited success. Courts have blocked numerous decisions by Trump. Several major projects have failed in Congress, partly with the help of Republican lawmakers. And already, the fear of Trump and many of his supporters about the midterm elections at the end of the year is palpable. If these elections shift the balance of power, Republicans will have to ask themselves whether their continued support for an increasingly erratic president amounts to political suicide.
The third reason against severing transatlantic relations is the prospect of a renewed NATO that better reflects the changing strategic interests of America and its allies. As the recently published National Defense Strategy emphasizes, the United States wants to maintain fewer troops in Europe due to the challenge China poses. Conversely, Europeans are expressing the need to become stronger militarily and are increasing their defense budgets. A reform of NATO that leaves the commander-in-chief and some other key posts in American hands, but otherwise gives European allies much more influence within the command structure, would accommodate the American desire for relief and the European desire for more weight in the alliance. Trump, who likes to boast that he has forced NATO to increase defense spending, could even benefit from such a "deal", especially since Congress has passed new legislation ensuring that the number of American troops in Europe cannot fall below 76,000. This is certainly enough to curb Russian President Vladimir Putin's appetite.
None of these developments guarantees that Europe will be immune to further attacks from Trump. Nor can the loss of confidence in the American system among many Europeans be corrected in a short period of time. However, it should be remembered that almost half of American voters did not vote for Trump. This does not mean that a new administration would be synonymous with a return to pre-Trump transatlantic relations because the interests of America and Europe are not always aligned. But civilized interaction, without threats or insults, would probably quickly steer transatlantic relations back onto a predictable course.
Trump sees world politics as a zero-sum game in which America wins and others lose, but this ideology of "America first" is slowly but surely reaching its limits. There is therefore no reason to exaggerate the current disputes as a turning point in history and thus become a prisoner of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Transatlantic relations have been damaged, but they can be repaired. Once again, the end of history must be postponed.
Michael Rühle worked at NATO for more than three decades and held several high-ranking positions including senior political adviser in the NATO secretary general’s policy planning unit.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.