Europe Between the United States and China
Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
Security Connections Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific
The European and Indo-Pacific theaters are intrinsically linked—a reality that became undeniable when North Korean soldiers began to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Europe needs to tailor its strategy accordingly and take into consideration the dynamics of US-China competition across theaters.
A key challenge consists in correctly assessing US strategy. The signals coming out of Washington on the US approach to China and the Indo-Pacific are often contradictory. Leading figures in the US administration such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby are “China hawks”, pushing for a more assertive US posture toward China and a prioritization of the Indo-Pacific—if necessary to the detriment of Europe. President Trump himself might first and foremost pursue a deal with China using the United States’ economic leverage. Yet, recent information on the upcoming National Defense Strategy suggests that the United States might focus on the Western hemisphere instead of the Indo-Pacific.
Given the current lack of clarity, European states must prepare for a future in which competition remains, but the way in which it is managed fluctuates. They must therefore brace for two risks, the contours of which are already visible. The first is coercion: If the United States leverages its weight in NATO, one can well imagine a scenario in which Washington demands alignment of European states on its approach in the Indo-Pacific as a trade-off for its commitment to Europe—as it has just done with the EU-US trade deal. The second is the return to a logic of spheres of influence, in which Washington signals European states—as it did recently in the case of the British naval forces—that it does not want their military engagement in the Indo-Pacific. According to this logic, Indo-Pacific powers are the ones who should focus on balancing China in Asia. Such an approach could trigger open transatlantic tensions, given that states such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have substantially stepped up their engagement, including through multilateral cooperation, in recent years.
Navigating Chinese grand strategy in times of US-China competition is equally challenging. China cannot rely on security allies to force Europeans into alignment, but Beijing can easily leverage European economic dependencies on China for coercion or retaliation. Adaptations of Chinese strategy in the US-China competition could also target Europe as an effort to deliberately weaken US allies or focus US attention on Europe. Furthermore, European actors increasingly point out the implications of China’s actions in the European security theater. The most recent EU White Paper on defense, published in March 2025, elaborates in detail how China poses a “systemic challenge” for Europe. Brussels regularly calls upon Beijing to abstain from material support that might sustain Russia’s defense-industrial base. Following the rapprochement between Russia and China, concern about attacks on European cyber or critical infrastructure by Chinese actors is growing. Lastly, China has the potential to influence thinking and narratives about European grand strategy: Beijing is eagerly calling for Europeans to enhance “strategic autonomy” and not follow the United States’ approach, which might generate sympathy in Europe when transatlantic relations are tense. While Europe has made significant progress in defining its interests and instruments related to China in the economic sphere, this strategic reflection has barely extended to global security and grand strategy.
What Europe Cannot Do: Influence the Trajectory of Competition
Europe’s role as a security actor will depend on the nature of US-China competition. In any case, European states and the EU itself will have very limited tools to shape the trajectory of that competition. Although the EU’s GDP and European military spending are on a level similar to China’s—with the United States still ahead—the lack of military capabilities and a significant collective action problem impede Europe’s ability to change the parameters of the US-China relationship.
The higher the degree of strategic competition, the more challenging it will be for European states to navigate their approaches to the Indo-Pacific. The most obvious and most dangerous case is a military escalation, either because of an incident between the United States and China or because of escalation over Taiwan. But even when tensions between the United States and China remain heightened “only” because of military exercises that the other side perceives as provocative, it will be challenging for European states to respond. From an operational perspective, increased military tensions between the United States and China limit the individual European states’ room for maneuver. Because such tensions could increase the risk of misperceptions, European states might become more hesitant to participate in freedom-of-navigation operations or crossings of the Taiwan strait, as conducted by the French, British, or German navies, or in exercises with partners. Furthermore, a return to the logic of “spheres of influence” in Washington might prevent further EU naval engagement in Southeast Asia. The EU’s own maritime missions are located in the Western parts of the Indo-Pacific and focused on anti-piracy efforts and the protection of commercial vessels, and it seems unlikely that this would change even if Washington pressures Europe to focus its security efforts on the European continent.
US-China competition comes with risks for European security. European states benefit from US security guarantees through NATO, but the alliance and these security guarantees also present a formidable tool for the United States to coerce allies. The recent EU-US trade deal has demonstrated that the EU bends to US pressure if its security is at stake. Europe must therefore find ways to reduce US leverage.
Beijing’s approach to the US-China competition also increasingly shapes the EU’s perceptions of European security, particularly in light of the enhanced coordination between Russia and China and reports that Beijing would not want to see Russia lose its war in Ukraine. China may also attempt to bind US attention and resources to the European theater instead of the Indo-Pacific, especially as President Trump has put a peace deal with Ukraine high on his agenda and invested significant political capital in this endeavor.
The ripple effects of increased US-China tensions and strategic adaptations will shape the scope of the threats Europe faces. The good news for Europe is that European states have already taken steps toward more agency, for example through the EU’s new security and defense initiatives, the planned massive military expenditure, and the attendant strategic adaptations. These will hardly be constrained by US-China competition, but could be catalyzed by it.
What Europe Can Do: Carve Out Space for Action
The limited influence of Europe on US and Chinese grand strategy does not mean that Europe is simply a playground for US-China competition. Rather, Europe can carve out space for itself as a security actor and for initiatives serving its interests in the European and the Indo-Pacific theaters, as well as across theaters, but this requires strategy. Two elements will determine success: whether Europe leverages its assets and whether it seizes the momentum and space for action where they already exist or might emerge. To take these steps, Europe must break three intellectual taboos and shift its paradigms. It must accept that US policy might undermine European interests, that putting European interests in the center of its actions is legitimate, and that policies promoting these interests might also be confrontational.
Creating space for European action under increased US-China competition will be most challenging in the Indo-Pacific. However, this does not mean that Europe should scale back its engagement. US-China competition and risks of escalation will affect partners in the region more than European states. Many of these countries are reluctant to choose a side in the competition and share European concerns about the erosion of the rules-based international order and the freedom of navigation. This opens up space for Europe, either as individual states or through the EU, to engage with partners on security. This could include bilateral frameworks similar to the EU security partnerships that are already in place with Korea and Japan, and are currently being negotiated with Australia and explored with India; issue-specific minilaterals (such as France’s formats with India and Australia, and with India and the UAE respectively); and broader multinational initiatives. The latter become particularly relevant if military tensions between the United States and China heighten: Europe can pull its diplomatic weight and work with Indo-Pacific partners in international organizations, for example on resolutions in the UN General Assembly. Although these are not binding, the signal to the United States and China would be an important one. European states could also use the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presence to offer to conduct freedom-of-navigation missions or joint maritime patrols together with regional partners. This would arguably be in most partners’ interest, given that around 30 percent of global trade volume passes through the Strait of Malacca.
Regardless of the trajectory of US-China competition, European states will need to live up to their commitments to take on more responsibility. A stronger US focus on competition with China might accelerate Washington’s retrenchment. European states must step up accordingly in terms of conventional capabilities and critical enablers, and themselves suggest a model for a European-led European security order. Reducing dependence on the United States in terms of security will make Europe less vulnerable to US coercion. Leveraging the EU’s existing tools for defense-industrial support and shifting collective action on “Europe only” responsibilities, such as crisis-management in the European neighborhood or collective defense against low-threshold threats, can make Europe less vulnerable to US pressure. In parallel, Europe must revisit its approaches to Chinese participation in critical infrastructure in order to reduce risks; the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework and the European Competitiveness Fund should incentivize European choices. Such decisions can enhance European autonomy and make Europe more resilient against the ripple effects of US-China competition.
The central challenge for Europe is to address US-China competition holistically across theaters. Although the EU and European states individually have revisited their strategies on defense—which define priorities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific—the EU lacks strategies for dealing with the United States or China. Once European interests are defined, Europe can move to leverage its existing economic and diplomatic assets to pursue its security interests. This could include active use of the economic security toolbox and trade defense instruments in the economic field to react to coercion or threats. But Europe should also think in terms of new trade agreements with partners other than the United States and China, for example boosting global free trade through the WTO or connecting existing EU trade agreements into a broader economic space. Diplomatically, Europe could condition its support for US initiatives in international organizations or broader multilateral frameworks on assurances for European security priorities in both theaters—and should also consider using threats to jeopardize US foreign policy goals.
The Ultimate Challenge: A “Two-Theater Tragedy”
The ultimate challenge for Europe in its role as a security actor remains, however, a military escalation in the Indo-Pacific. The potential economic shock would render Europe more vulnerable to pressure, either from the United States in the form of insistence on alignment or from China in the form of retaliation for potential sanctions. Furthermore, unmanaged military competition and a war in the Indo-Pacific could rapidly alter the dynamics in the European security theater, for example through US hyper-focus on Asia and Russia seizing the momentum for aggression against Europe. A “two-theater tragedy” seems unmanageable given Europe’s limited capabilities and lack of strategy today. Europe must not waste time in adapting its strategy to the reality of connected theaters and use its assets in Europe and the Indo-Pacific in a smarter way.