How To Help Belarus Preserve Its Sovereignty and Democratic Resilience?
Artyom Shraibman is a Warsaw-based Belarusian political analyst and founder of Sense Analytics consultancy. He is a non-resident scholar with the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and consulting partner to the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Summary
Belarus has entered a phase of authoritarian consolidation, built on systemic repression, aimed at preventing any repetition of the mass protests of 2020. “Extremism” designations, criminal prosecutions, constant surveillance, and discrimination against perceived opponents increasingly established in law have pushed most meaningful public activity abroad or into low-visibility forms at home. Governance has become more vertical and personalist. The 2022 constitutional reforms and the empowerment of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly have created a transition architecture, for which there is no timetable, offering a potential base for Lukashenka’s influence if he steps down from the presidency. Civil society has been devastated domestically, with about 2,000 organizations liquidated since 2020. The political opposition remains institutionalized and internationally recognized, but it is becoming more pluralistic, especially after the release of prominent figures arrested around the 2020 election.
The international position of Belarus is anchored in asymmetric dependence on Russia. Moscow remains its key economic donor and security patron, offering privileged market access, logistic routes for sanctions adaptation, preferential energy supplies, and debt relief. The country’s role in the Russia–Ukraine war has evolved: it is now less a staging ground for invasion than a channel for Moscow to apply strategic pressure on NATO, including high-profile signaling through deployments and exercises. At the same time, last year saw a notable foreign-policy shift with a partial thaw with the United States, structured around prisoner releases in exchange for sanctions relief. By contrast, the EU’s approach is essentially frozen: sanctions have continued to expand, and Minsk’s relations with Lithuania and Poland remain especially turbulent.
Three plausible scenarios for 2026 emerge from this landscape. First, engagement with the United States could fail, leading the regime to end political prisoner releases, empower hardliners, and step up repression and “escalation for de-escalation” tactics on its border with the EU. Second, a deeper thaw with Washington could proceed while EU relations remain frozen, producing large-scale prisoner releases without meaningful reforms and reshaping exile politics. Third, a “frozen front” in Ukraine and fragmenting Western unity could create wider diplomatic space for Minsk, reduce the salience of human rights, tighten Lukashenka’s grip on power, and weaken European coherence and the democratic forces.
External actors need to combine deterrence, containment, and long-term societal investment toward Belarus. They should avoid measures that further push Belarusian mobility, education, and travel flows toward Russia. Visa and mobility policies are among the EU’s best instruments for sustaining the connection of Belarusians to democratic societies Europe. War-linked sanctions should continue to constrain Minsk’s ability to support Russia’s war effort. Reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank and maintaining military-to-military communication with Belarus reduce the risk of unintended escalation. At the same time, “non-war” sanctions and broader isolation tools should be leveraged to secure large prisoner releases and reductions in repression as well as to support de-escalation on the Belarus–EU border. Finally, European actors should increase support for Belarusian civil society and democratic forces as US funding has fallen, prioritizing initiatives with real domestic reach and backing low-visibility networks inside Belarus through more flexible support mechanisms.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.