Polish-Ukrainian “History Wars” Threaten European Security

A political storm has erupted between Poland and Ukraine over the past week, reminding both countries that unresolved historical memory remains one of the most explosive elements of their relationship even in wartime.

The timing is particularly problematic. Relations between Poland and Ukraine had already been under strain following the agricultural trade disputes of 2023-24 and growing fatigue within parts of Polish society regarding the long-term costs of supporting Ukraine. Poland’s presidential transition has further increased the political importance of the country’s Ukraine policy, particularly among conservative constituencies for whom historical memory remains central (and which some political actors continue to mobilize for electoral and reputational gain).

The immediate trigger was President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision to name a military unit after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a WWII-era nationalist formation whose legacy remains deeply divisive in Central and Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, particularly since 2014, the UPA has increasingly been perceived as part of a national tradition of anti-Soviet resistance and the struggle for statehood. In Poland, however, the organization is associated above all with the Volhynia tragedy of 1943-45, during which tens of thousands of Polish civilians were killed by Ukrainian nationalists.

The political backlash in Poland was swift. President Karol Nawrocki publicly suggested that Zelenskyy could lose the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state distinction, awarded to him in 2023. Conservative politicians and commentators described Kyiv’s move as a deliberate provocation, while even more centrist voices questioned the political judgment behind the decision. 

Kyiv, in turn, appeared surprised by the scale of the reaction. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha attempted to de-escalate tensions, emphasizing that the recognition was intended to honor resistance against Soviet domination. However, by that stage, the dispute had already expanded beyond the original decision itself.

When Memory Threatens Security

Disputes over historical memory are often treated as a secondary layer of politics—important domestically, but ultimately subordinate to questions of security, trade, and alliance management. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, this assumption does not hold. “History wars” have become a durable feature of the region’s geopolitical landscape, shaping political narratives and, at times, the stability of strategic partnerships.

They regularly resurface in disputes over Soviet-era occupation, World War II responsibility, and nationalist memory politics: from Poland-Germany disputes over wartime remembrance politics and reparations to Hungary-Ukraine frictions over historical narratives in Transcarpathia. Even among closely aligned states, these issues have at times complicated political dialogue.

The security implications of such repeating historical frictions are often underestimated. Strategic partnerships like the one between Poland and Ukraine are typically analyzed in terms of capabilities, deterrence, and shared threat perceptions. Yet sustained cooperation also depends on a minimum level of narrative compatibility (or, at least, narrative restraint). During the first years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, both governments largely agreed to bracket their historical disagreements in favor of immediate geopolitical necessity. That informal compromise is now weakening.

For the Kremlin, the situation presents an obvious opportunity. Russian information operations have long sought to inflame Polish-Ukrainian historical disputes, recognizing that while military pressure has tended to draw the two countries closer, memory politics can still undermine the political trust that sustains that unity. While disappointment over symbolic decisions is understandable, turning historical disputes into a political confrontation between Poland and Ukraine ultimately serves Russian interests.

Managing a Layered Relationship

Despite the current strain, the strategic logic binding Poland and Ukraine has not changed. Poland remains one of Ukraine’s indispensable military and logistical partners, while Warsaw continues to see Ukrainian resilience as a critical buffer for its own security and for the wider eastern flank of NATO. For both countries, the fundamental reality remains unchanged: The main threat to regional security is Russia. 

The events of recent weeks are therefore less a rupture than a stress test. They show that the Polish-Ukrainian relationship requires constant, attentive political management, restraint in symbolic politics, and a clear understanding that secondary disputes must not be allowed to overshadow the primary strategic reality.

At their core, history wars are contests over legitimacy: who is remembered as a liberator or occupier, defender of the state or agent of violence. Unlike conventional policy disputes, they are not easily resolved through bargaining or institutional compromise. They are embedded in national identity, education systems, commemorative practices, and political culture. This makes them inherently resistant to closure, even when states have strong incentives to cooperate in other domains.

Warsaw and Kyiv do not need identical interpretations of history to remain strategic partners. But they do need political discipline and an awareness that their primary challenge does not come from each other. Historical memory will not be harmonized in the short term, and attempts to politicize it further weaken the bilateral partnership.

A more workable approach is to lower the political temperature around symbolic decisions before they escalate, including greater care with commemorative gestures and honorary recognitions that can be read externally as carrying political meaning. When tensions do arise, both sides should move quickly to clarify intent through official channels rather than allowing public narratives to harden. 

At the same time, Poland and Ukraine need a standing channel that brings together officials and historians specifically to address sensitive memory issues before they reach the political level. Most importantly, both governments should keep core security cooperation insulated from these disputes, so that disagreements over history do not spill into defense, logistics, or wider strategic coordination. This is particularly relevant in relation to broader strategic questions such as Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory, which in parts of the Polish debate has at times been explicitly linked to progress on unresolved historical questions.

Poland and Ukraine are stronger together than apart. The challenge now is whether both sides can act consistently on that fact even when history pulls in the opposite direction.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.