Reimagining Public Transportation in Ukraine
For four years, aid to Ukraine has prioritized support for the central government in Kyiv and providing emergency assistance for frontline cities that have borne a disproportionate share of damage from Russian attacks. This approach is logical for triaging Ukraine’s most urgent needs, but risks leaving many areas unaddressed as Ukraine seeks to build a long-term growth strategy.
More than a quarter of Ukraine’s population lives in mid-tier cities with populations between 20,000 and 200,000. While many smaller cities have not experienced extensive destruction, all have seen their economies upended by the war, with population losses, a shrinking tax base, war-related surtaxes, and diminished support from the central government. Added to this is the challenge of accommodating internally displaced arrivals seeking comparative safety, who often have unique needs.
Mobility has emerged as a central challenge for restoring economic dynamism to mid-tier cities. The war has disrupted traditional supply chains and mobility patterns while often making routine activities such as transporting children to school extraordinarily challenging. Russian attacks on energy infrastructure have undermined electrified transit and commuter trains. The military has mobilized both buses and drivers. Furthermore, when large employers mothball operations, furloughed workers resort to gig and temporary employment, leading to variable commuting patterns. Due to the unpredictability of public transit under these conditions, more Ukrainians have sought to acquire cars and driver's licenses, and there are now more personal vehicles in the country than before the war—despite precipitous population decline. While owning and operating a private vehicle is burdensome relative to median Ukrainian income, it nevertheless allows individuals to reach jobs that would otherwise be inaccessible, relocate to safer areas, or ferry goods when needed.
Volunteers' ability to crowdsource military resources and build mutual support networks has been key to Ukrainian resilience, with collective action enabling Ukraine to resist Russia’s vast war machine. Similarly, crowdsourced transportation has also played a vital role in keeping Ukrainian society functioning, with everyday citizens stepping in to address shortcomings in official transit with informal solutions.
Before the war, several mid-tier cities aimed to formalize transportation structure and eliminate remnants of the post-Soviet transition such as “marshrutkas” (privatized systems competing with municipal transit), as well as informal parking lots on municipally owned land and public courtyards. These goals have been sidelined in favor of more utilitarian concerns, forcing a hesitant reembrace of the self-reliance learned in the turbulent 1990s.
What is the future of mobility for Ukraine’s mid-tier cities? What technologies, strategies, and policies introduced in wartime might be retained in the postwar economy? What new technologies and approaches might be most feasible for adoption for cities of this size, and which will likely be capital-constrained for the next several years?
The following are promising technologies and policies that mid-tier Ukrainian cities might consider to overcome war-related mobility constraints.
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Demand-Response Transit (DRT) emerged from paratransit, where individuals with disabilities were eligible for subsidized taxis when they were unable to use fixed-route services. Several Ukrainian cities have introduced “social taxis” that fulfill a similar purpose. Expanding eligibility of these services to include residents underserved by existing fixed-route transit would be an effective way to address public transportation shortcomings. DRT is more costly per trip than a well-utilized fixed route, but can be less expensive than operating an underutilized bus or trolley service. Priority would typically be given to social groups with limited access to transportation. The establishment of enhanced DRT services thereby creates a bridge system for the re-establishment of fixed route services once transit patterns solidify.
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Micromobility, such as shared bikes and scooters, is a low-cost alternative for patching holes in transit services and providing a dynamic and flexible mobility solution. These systems can be municipally or privately operated, but are nonetheless subject to municipal regulation. In addition to providing a short-term solution, micromobility devices are GPS-tracked and can provide valuable data on where residents seek to travel. This data can be used to determine which origins and destinations might be served by fixed-route transit. For this reason, it is an important tool for re-engineering fixed transit routes to be more responsive to emerging needs. While micromobility is currently active in several Ukrainian cities, recent research has evaluated the need to refine Ukrainian legislation on non-motorized transportation.
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Urban Service Boundaries can help disincentivize urban sprawl and developments in hard-to-serve areas. Several Ukrainian cities have difficulty providing high-quality urban services such as transit in areas with low population density. Unlike an urban growth boundary, an urban service boundary would not impose a full ban on development outside the boundary, but would require developments to support their own services through a special fee regime. Though difficult to establish politically, they create certainty about which areas will be eligible to receive municipal services, including transit, as the city recovers.
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Smart shrinking refers to planning policies that help cities adapt to population decline while maintaining—or even improving—services and quality of life. Even before the war, Ukraine faced long-term population decline due to low birth rates and emigration, with its 2040 population projected at only 33 million. Immigration may ease losses, but as newcomers traditionally concentrate in larger cities, many mid-sized cities will continue to shrink. Research on smart shrinking in Ukraine by Prof. Vlad Myknenko at the University of Oxford has shown that a key challenge is overcoming the entrenched pro-growth bias in city administrations. Embracing smart shrinking can help avoid a zero-sum game in which cities compete and seek to undermine each other to attract scarce population.
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Accommodations for visible and invisible disabilities are critical for responding to residents' needs in contemporary Ukrainian cities. However, Soviet urban design did not include disability considerations. To make mobility more accessible, a temporary solution might be to increase the aforementioned DRT. A longer-term strategy should aim to enable individuals with disabilities to use the same transit and transportation options as the general population. For this, the classification of disability must be expanded to include those with hearing loss, PTSD, and other invisible disabilities that have been exacerbated by war, as well as older adults.
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Regional consolidation and megaregional planning can reduce maintenance and fixed costs of transportation infrastructure, which is particularly challenging for cities with falling populations. One strategy for avoiding high carrying costs is to develop interlocal agreements that allow strategic infrastructure assets, such as regional rail and airports, to be shared across jurisdictional boundaries. This is particularly important when urban agglomerations cross oblast boundaries.
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Repurposing drone delivery for peacetime use could be essential for ensuring the timely delivery of essentials to all citizens, even those who are geographically isolated from traditional supply chains. Ukraine has become the global leader in drone innovation, with drones now the most versatile domestic weapon in Ukraine’s arsenal. One of the main challenges in successfully deploying drone service in peacetime will be respecting the hesitance of Ukrainian citizens to embrace a technology whose sound is associated with danger and anxiety.
Embracing policies that anticipate postwar mobility realities will prevent the creation of city or region-specific access transportation “deserts”. Furthermore, it will ensure that mobility constraints in mid-tier cities will not become an impediment to Ukraine’s future growth.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.