Taiwan's Push for Societal Resilience
Introduction
Societal resilience efforts are not completely new in Taiwan. After the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake, the government began investing in community-level disaster response networks and expanding the role of local governments in emergency management. During the presidencies of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, authorities enhanced civil defense planning, established the National Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission, and promoted public education on disaster awareness and crisis communication. Taiwan also started to build cyber defense capabilities in the late 2000s and launched information security training programs for government employees and schools. Efforts to strengthen societal resilience expanded in the early 2010s to include infrastructure protection, information security, and civic mobilization. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, legislation was passed in 2021 to establish the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency under the Ministry of National Defense, which was tasked with bolstering civil defense as well as strengthening reserve forces, planning and managing mobilization, and coordinating across ministries as well as central and local governments.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 gave new impetus to Taiwan’s societal resilience initiatives, especially preparation for a potential attack from China, although public framing emphasized disaster readiness. To strengthen civil defense awareness and educate citizens on emergency procedures, the government issued the first civil defense handbook for citizens in April 2022. Tsai’s administration also increased defense spending, expanded compulsory military training from four months to one year, pledged NT $564.5 billion over ten years to harden and decentralize the power grid, and started investing in low-orbit satellites to maintain communications if undersea internet cables are severed. Measures were taken to enhance information resilience by countering disinformation campaigns through public education and cooperation with tech companies. Taiwan’s stockpiles of emergency supplies received greater attention based on audits of necessities for daily life and emergency supplies, including combat medication. During Tsai’s tenure civil society organizations dedicated to enhancing resilience flourished, providing community-based first aid, training to identify propaganda and other forms of cognitive warfare, and information about practical steps for emergency preparedness.
After assuming the presidency in May 2024, Lai Ching-te introduced even greater urgency into Taiwan’s societal resilience efforts. One month after his inauguration, Lai launched the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience (WOSDR) Committee, a national-level group under the President’s Office that includes representatives from government, industry, academia, and civil society focused on fortifying Taiwan’s democratic society against potential disruptions. The Committee meets quarterly and is convened by the president. Its work concentrates on five critical areas: energy and critical infrastructure resilience; social services, medical care, and shelters; protection of transportation, communication and financial networks; strategic material and supply chain preparedness; and civilian training and mobilization.
Lai’s government is testing Taiwan’s readiness by holding tabletop exercises and on-site drills. In 2025, the Ministry of Interior’s two longstanding civilian drills—the emergency air-raid drill Wan An and disaster-response Min An—were combined into an Urban Resilience Exercise that was held alongside the military’s annual Han Kuang exercises with the aim of better integrating disaster prevention, civil defense, and national defense. More resources are also being devoted to resilience: In October 2025 the legislature passed a special budget that included about NT$150 billion for resilience work.
Lai’s administration is taking steps to strengthen coordination on resilience work between central and local governments, between the public and private sector, and between government and civil society. For example, PX Mart, the largest supermarket chain in Taiwan with over 1,000 stores, participated in emergency air-raid drills. Urban Resilience Exercises were staged multiple times across the island, to engage with 11 county and city governments. Volunteer civil society organizations also joined Taiwan’s recent resilience exercises. At the township level, district offices are preparing to play the role of disaster prevention and coordination centers that civilians can turn to in an emergency. The government has designated 5,953 sites as rationing stations that would distribute food, water, oil, and salt during a crisis, and have identified 4,520 temporary shelters that could cover 12.76% of the population during a disaster or conflict.
In his public speeches, Lai has been more transparent and franker with the public than his predecessors about the threats that Taiwan faces from China and has underscored the need for greater resilience efforts. His statements and policies convey his firm belief that resilience is not only military, but also societal. For example, on March 13, 2025, President Lai described five major national security threats that Taiwan faces: China’s threat to national sovereignty, its threats from infiltration and espionage activities targeting Taiwan’s military, its threats aimed at obscuring the national identity of the people of Taiwan, its threats from united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges, and its threats involving using “integrated development” to attract Taiwan’s businesspeople and youth. He introduced 17 major strategies to respond to these threats, which included a call to Taiwan’s citizens to “build up whole-of-society resilience” and counter united front operations. “Every citizen stands on the frontline of the defense of democracy and freedom”, Lai stated.
According to Deputy National Security Adviser Lin Fei-fan, the WOSDR is a “comprehensive strategy that combines military preparedness with democratic cohesion, infrastructure hardening, and societal strength.” Its objective is to strengthen “both Taiwan’s capacity and confidence to resist, counter, and prevail” against Beijing’s efforts to use gray-zone pressure to compel surrender or take Taiwan by force.5 Others describe Taiwan’s objective as maintaining the “continuous operation of society” during a Chinese blockade or war; some ministries say they seek to maintain six months of continuous operations, citing the timeframe as an interim goal that will evolve alongside changing circumstances and resource availability. The WOSDR is in its early stages with much more work to be done. Importantly, Taipei views societal resilience as a continuous process of adaptation, not a final, static end-state.
Although Taiwan’s security has been the focus of many studies, tabletop exercises, and wargames in recent years, there has been comparatively little research aimed at understanding and evaluating Taiwan’s recent efforts to bolster societal resilience. Recognizing that the WOSDR is a complex project with numerous lines of effort, in this study we attempt to investigate and assess Taiwan’s progress in three areas that we consider to be crucial to the success of the WOSDR plan: energy, medical, and digital communications resilience. Our research questions are: within these three lines of effort, what are Taiwan’s goals, what has been achieved so far, what challenges have been encountered, and what more should Taiwan do? Our conclusion provides recommendations for Taiwan as well as for like-minded countries who seek to assist Taiwan’s societal resilience efforts.
Our findings are drawn from over two dozen interviews with central government officials (from the National Security Council, Executive Yuan, ministries of defense, health and welfare, economic affairs, digital affairs, and internal affairs), local government officials (from Taichung and New Taipei City), telecommunication and energy company representatives, and members of the WOSDR Committee.