The Upcoming National Defense Strategy: What Europe Should Be Watching
By the one-year anniversary of the second Trump term, the administration and Congress will likely have released three major policy documents that together aim to guide US security and defense policymaking in the coming years: the White House’s National Security Strategy (NSS), Congress’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and the Pentagon’s upcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS). For European allies seeking guidance on how the United States will balance the “America First” and Europe-critical political vision of the NSS with the more traditional Atlanticism of the Congressional bill, the NDS will provide concrete details on defense priorities and their implementation.
Whereas the National Security Council authors the National Security Strategy, the Pentagon authors the National Defense Strategy. Typically, the NSS is released first and the NDS follows, and this administration is following tradition by having the White House lead. According to media reports, drafts of the NDS have been ready since the end of the summer, but the government shutdown, divisions within the administration, and scrutiny from Congress have stalled its release. This delay suggests that the content of the strategy is controversial. And Congress’s efforts to rein in the administration’s defense policies through the NDAA may have been a preemptive effort to tone down the anti-European rhetoric expected in the NDS.
Although it will be released last, the National Defense Strategy will likely be more significant than the NSS because of its practical implications across the US Department of Defense. In contrast to the more political NSS, the NDS will inform budgeting and resource allocation policies, including force posture, nuclear posture, and ballistic missile defense reviews.
New Policy Priorities
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth previewed the National Defense Strategy at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 6, highlighting four priorities: defending the US homeland with a focus on threats in the Western Hemisphere; deterring China in the Indo-Pacific; increasing burden-sharing for US allies and partners; and “supercharging” the US defense-industrial base. The threat from Russia appears to have been significantly downgraded: In a departure from previous national defense strategies, but in line with the new NSS, Hegseth mentioned Russia only once—as an issue that “allies in Europe face”. This shift in priorities risks reviving European fears that the US is attempting to normalize relations with Russia to free up financial and military resources for other priorities.
Hegseth’s policy preview contains harsh words for allies around the world on burden-sharing and sets high expectations for them to take responsibility in their theaters, specifically on addressing regional threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Inherent in the secretary’s worldview is the conviction that most US resources should be devoted to the priorities of homeland, Western Hemisphere, and China, and that helping Europeans will leave the United States overstretched in the case of simultaneous conflicts. Further, he indicated that assistance and support for allies will not be evenly distributed. Hegseth promised that “Model allies that step up like Israel, South Korea, Poland, increasingly Germany, the Baltics and others will receive our special favor.” Allies that do not do “their part for collective defense will face consequences”. This more transactional approach could create unhealthy divisions within NATO and potentially reduce cooperation on the development of additional defense capabilities.
There appears to be significant alignment between the White House and the Pentagon on the prioritization of the US homeland, the Western Hemisphere, and China. This is apparent in the administration’s focus on the southern border, the deployment of the National Guard in cities, attacks on boats in the Caribbean (presumably to curtail drug trafficking), and military engagement in Latin America—most recently in Venezuela.
The administration insists that the emphasis on homeland and the Western Hemisphere is not just about “narco-terrorists”. Concrete homeland priorities are building the “Golden Dome” missile defense system and improving cyber defense. In the Western Hemisphere, the Pentagon wants to guarantee “US military and commercial access” to “the Panama Canal, the Caribbean, the Gulf of America, the Arctic, and Greenland”. The administration is no longer framing its approach to Greenland as a land-acquisition question, but the ongoing interest in the territory should still be a concern for Denmark and Arctic allies.
European audiences should note that the elevation of domestic and Western-hemisphere issues to the United States’ top security priority will likely have significant impacts on military training, defense budgets, and readiness more generally. As it is implemented, this approach could create structural barriers to defense cooperation. Effectively, European militaries may find themselves working with US partners who are increasingly training and preparing for drug interdiction and immigration enforcement missions rather than the kind of large-scale combat operations likely to be found in a battle with more traditional adversaries such as Russia.
Regarding the Pentagon’s second priority, Hegseth explained that the administration’s understanding of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is “not dominating China, but rather ensuring they do not have the ability to dominate us or our allies”. This will involve an increase in capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater “along the first island chain and throughout the Indo-Pacific ... [which] means being so strong that aggression is not even considered…. This is deterrence by denial.”
The Pentagon’s Under Secretary for Policy Elbridge Colby, who is authoring the NDS, has argued that the United States should prioritize China over other policy challenges. Yet he has not succeeded in making China the number-one priority, which suggests that the China hawks have less influence in the administration than domestically focused groups do. Still, the prioritization of China over Europe is significant. Put simply, the anticipated focus on China means fewer resources for Europe.
Key Points for European Allies
Europe will likely be mentioned in the NDS, but mainly through the prism of burden-sharing: The administration will continue to pressure Europeans to invest in their regional security to allow US resources to go to the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. European allies seeking reassurance from the United States should expect to be upset by the policies presented in the NDS. But unlike the NSS, the NDS will probably not lecture Europeans on their domestic political matters and will instead provide more details on how the United States will limit its presence across the Atlantic.
European allies should pay particular attention to how Russia is described—or rather, how it is not described. The new strategy may classify Russia not as a threat to the United States, but merely as a regional concern for European allies. However, even if it does classify it as a threat, it is not clear whether the current administration will maintain this stance if Russia escalates aggression against allies.
Lastly, Europeans should consider that while the NDS will likely be a more substantial policy plan than the NSS, overall policy implementation is still subject to the personality politics of the Trump administration. In Trump’s second term, as in his first, the policy-drafting process is tied to senior officials or factions within the administration, and the strategies may have shorter implementation windows than those of other administrations. The Pentagon’s main policy architect is Elbridge Colby, who is facing significant opposition from Republicans in Congress for his unilateral focus on China and opposition to support for Ukraine. If Colby leaves his policy role and the Pentagon leadership changes in the coming months, the speed of implementation of the NDS may be reduced and limited. Yet a complete turnaround is unlikely.
Conclusion
As the Trump administration prepares to release a new National Defense Strategy, European audiences should expect yet another set of major changes to transatlantic priorities and a reduction in security support from the United States. The expected shift toward domestic and Western hemisphere priorities, with a secondary focus on China, would represent one of the largest reorientations of US foreign policy priorities since the end of World War II. Similarly, the NDS is likely to underline the administration’s skepticism of alliances and multilateral structures—a worldview that is likely to have far-reaching consequences for the longevity of political and military relationships across the Atlantic. Although Congress’ recent attempts to slow such transformation through the NDAA may present the administration with roadblocks, it is unlikely to convince the Pentagon to reorient its policy direction. Only a major change of leadership would alter the administration’s course.
European partners will need to deliver on burden-sharing commitments as quickly as possible to meet the expectations of the United States, but more importantly, to provide a robust deterrent against Russia on the European continent. Certain allies (Poland, the Baltic States, Germany) may experience favored status and stronger US support, but the medium-term trajectory will see a significantly reduced US presence, a reluctance to lead, and an increasing willingness to redefine relations with adversaries. After the publication of the NDS, Europeans and Americans will have communicated different strategic outlooks on the threat Russia poses and the way they see the future of the transatlantic alliance. Protecting itself from Russia given ambiguous signals from the United States will be Europe’s first responsibility and greatest worry heading into 2026, and Washington’s willingness to play European countries off of each other may make this process more difficult.