When the Air Raid Sirens Start, It’s Too Late

Civil protection systems in the EU member states have been built over decades and in conditions of relative security, predictability, and the stable functioning of state institutions. They are based on assumptions about limited crises, sufficient time for decision-making, and the continued operability of infrastructure even in emergency situations. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has challenged most of these assumptions. When missiles start falling on cities, energy systems stop functioning, and air-raid sirens sound, Europe is unlikely to be fully prepared.

Among those who work in Ukrainian territories that are under daily artillery and air attacks, one phrase is heard most often: “If only we had known, we would have been much better prepared.” The price of this “if only” is human lives, destroyed communities, and lost opportunities to keep the country functioning during war.

On paper, evacuation plans lay out who calls whom, who goes where, which protocols are activated, where sensitive documents are to be taken, and who performs which functions in a crisis. These documents may even be updated. Their plans may even have been practiced during exercises. But new forms of warfare—mass use of FPV drones, new types of weapons, hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure—as well as complex systems of governance in democratic states, mean that this “paper-based” civil protection has little in common with the reality that will unfold in the early hours of a potential full-scale crisis.

This lack of preparedness raises several questions. Are cities and regions ready to act autonomously, without waiting for instructions from the center? If decentralization is high, are they ready to coordinate quickly and act according to a single protection plan?

Is there legislation that will actually work when war begins? This does not refer to general provisions under martial law—such laws exist in almost every country—but to concrete measures such as emergency procurement, response to attacks, management of critical infrastructure, protection of personnel, and restoration of basic services. Peacetime rules do not work in wartime. General principles are not enough.

Ukraine joined the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, a system of mutual assistance in crises, in April 2023. Since then, the EU has implemented the largest civil protection operation in its history, coordinating assistance from all 27 member states and partner countries. As of early 2026, more than 157,000 tons of humanitarian aid have been delivered to Ukraine—from medicines and temporary shelters to generators, transformers, and equipment for energy and water supply. The EU has also organized the medical evacuation of more than 4,800 Ukrainian patients to hospitals in 22 European countries. Since the start of the full-scale war, total EU humanitarian assistance to Ukraine has exceeded €1 billion.

But Ukraine is not only a recipient of assistance. It is also a source of unique practical knowledge and experience.

In the affected regions, massive electricity and water outages, humanitarian crises, business relocation, governance in de-occupied territories, restoration of medical and educational services, education under shelling, and protection of critical infrastructure have all taken place simultaneously—even as hostilities are ongoing. These are the conditions under whichUkrainian communities have lived and worked for more than four years.

This experience is not theoretical or model-based, but was formed in real conditions and over a long period. This makes it extremely valuable for rethinking approaches to civil protection in the EU. Its systematization and adaptation can significantly increase Europe’s readiness for high-intensity crises and, ultimately, save more lives.