Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer: “The Trump Administration is acting as a catalyst for Europe’s geopolitical and military maturation”

By Adrien Jaulmes, Washington correspondent

This interview was initially published by Le Figaro, in French, on July 6, 2026.

INTERVIEW — With the NATO summit set to begin Tuesday in Ankara, the president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States believes that the alliance’s future depends on Europeans’ ability to take charge of their own defense.

Le Figaro: Can the NATO summit in Ankara resolve the crisis between the United States and its allies, or does it risk cementing a strategic decoupling?

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer: Last year, the agreement to raise defense budgets to 5% of GDP by 2035 served primarily as a political signal to [US President Donald] Trump, rather than as a roadmap for building capabilities. This year, the Ankara summit is taking a different tone: It is no longer about Trump but marks the starting point of a structural evolution within NATO, in which European allies will have to demonstrate how they will assume primary responsibility for their own defense, define which capabilities to develop, within what timeframe, and how roles will be shared with the United States. The goal is to ensure that this shift does not result in an imposed strategic decoupling but rather in a deliberate rebalancing within the alliance. The German Marshall Fund is working with governments and defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic to define this roadmap over the next six months.

Doesn’t the Trump administration’s distrust of NATO and its Canadian and European allies, along with its unpredictability, make it difficult to adopt defense industrial policies, which require at least some long-term vision?

Yes, this undermines the long-term predictability that defense industrial policies require, but this uncertainty is also pushing Europeans and Canadians to build industrial bases, multi-year budgets, and EU-NATO frameworks that no longer depend on American political cycles. They are now pursuing a three-pronged approach: European arms programs whenever possible, with the United States when necessary, and with other partners as needed—such as India, South Korea, or Japan. Poland’s massive purchase of South Korean tanks, which makes Seoul the second-largest arms supplier to European NATO countries for 2021–2025, illustrates this trend toward diversification, which will shape the future of Europe’s defense industrial base.

So have Europeans stopped counting on a hypothetical return to a more traditional partnership after Trump leaves office?

Yes, Europeans are no longer banking on a peaceful “post-Trump” era and have come to view American volatility as a structural reality, linked more to the hyperpolarization of the political system than to any single president. During my travels in Europe over the past 18 months, I have observed a profound shift in traditionally Atlanticist countries—the Nordic, Baltic, and Eastern European nations—that are now approaching their defense differently: maintaining the strategic and industrial partnership with the United States but increasing investment in the European defense industry. This is not a break, but a rebalancing, and it aligns with what Washington is asking of its allies. In this regard, the Trump administration is acting as a catalyst for Europe’s geopolitical and military maturation.

What is the perspective of the American defense industry, which is more concerned than the administration about losing market share in Europe?

Europe remains a vital market for the US defense industry, both in terms of volume and technological credibility, which is why its concern about the rise of “European preference” is often greater than that of the administration. American defense contractors seek to maintain a strong interdependence and view initiatives that reserve European markets for local suppliers with suspicion.

But the wars in Ukraine and Iran have confirmed a harsh reality: The American industry can no longer, on its own, meet Europe’s capability needs. This should prompt Washington to encourage Europeans to fill these gaps themselves, as we are already seeing with European and Ukrainian industrial cooperation on drones and missiles.

Does Ukraine’s presence in Ankara confirm this rapprochement with NATO?

Ukraine’s presence in Ankara primarily confirms a two-pronged trend: On one hand, its lasting integration into NATO mechanisms [the NATO-Ukraine Council, planning, and long-term assistance]; on the other, its gradual integration into the value chains of the European defense industry through joint production, licensing, and technology partnerships. The fact that Kyiv is at the center of discussions on air defense, co-production of ammunition, and industrial investments shows that Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of aid: It is becoming a key partner of NATO and European industry, with which the security and production architecture of the future is already being designed.

The Ankara summit is the first meeting of the allies since the United States signaled its territorial annexation ambitions toward a member state: How has the Greenland issue changed relations within the alliance?

The Greenland crisis was a stress test for NATO: It revealed a gray area not covered by the treaty, that of potential territorial coercion among allies rather than by an external adversary. It has strengthened solidarity with Copenhagen and laid bare the strategic dependence on an American partner that can also become a source of instability; the Ankara summit is therefore taking place in a climate of more conditional trust, with Greenland serving as the backdrop for all discussions on the alliance’s future.

Does the Atlantic alliance still have a future?

Yes, the Atlantic alliance still has a future, but it now depends on Europeans’ ability to assume primary responsibility for the continent’s defense, to strengthen their industrial base, and to clarify what they expect—and what they are prepared to guarantee themselves—in terms of collective security. In a context where Washington wants to “shift the burden”, where external threats are intensifying, and where public opinion is wavering, NATO is not going away: It is transforming into an alliance whose European pillar must become credible and capable of taking action and funding its own security; it otherwise risks not so much “dying” overnight as gradually losing its raison d’être.

We must also accept that an alliance is, by its very nature, in a constant state of identity crisis: It reinvents itself as threats evolve but also as internal political dynamics shift. Today, its two pillars—a community of values and a community of interests—are both under strain at the same time. Ukraine serves as a case in point: Russian aggression poses a vital threat to Europe, one that is critical to its long-term security, but not to the United States, which views China as the true existential threat. It is this divergence in the prioritization of risks that makes it essential to build a robust European pillar capable of aligning NATO with the continent’s security priorities without severing the transatlantic bond.

Even if China supports Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and Russia provides aid to Iran?

The two conflicts—in Ukraine and the Middle East—have precisely highlighted the intersections between the European, Middle Eastern, and Indo-Pacific theaters through arms flows, sanctions regimes, energy crises, and the China-Russia-Iran axis, which realigns with each crisis. They have shown the United States that it is no longer possible to develop a strategy toward Beijing and Moscow by treating these issues in isolation; rather, it must consider the war in Ukraine, the China-Russia-Iran axis, and the way these crises reinforce one another all at the same time.

From the European perspective, Chinese support for Russia and Russian aid to Iran are seen as a major risk but also as a test: Europeans are forced to demonstrate that they can devise their own response—military, industrial, or diplomatic—that is not simply a copy-and-paste of the American framework. We saw this in Ukraine, where Europe became the leading provider of military and industrial aid, but also in the Middle East, where Europeans sought to combine support for their regional allies, mediation, targeted deployment of defense capabilities, and management of the risks of escalation, rather than automatically aligning with Washington. And this applies to China as well: Europeans are tightening controls on sensitive exports and investments in critical sectors while avoiding an abrupt break with a major economic partner, recognizing that their room for maneuver and their level of dependence are not the same as those of the United States.