Maduro Captured: GMF Experts Offer Analysis of Washington’s Extraordinary Strike on Venezuela and Removal of the Country’s Leader
Introduction
By Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer
The US military operation leading to the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro has had immediate strategic repercussions well beyond Latin America and the Western Hemisphere. Across global capitals, the January 3 action was widely interpreted as a test case for US power projection, international law, and geopolitical competition.
Strategically, the operation reflected a renewed sphere-of-influence logic and a concrete application of principles outlined in the recent US National Security Strategy, which shifts focus to the Western Hemisphere—migration, narcotics, and China’s expanding footprint—while expecting political alignment from allies. Among the United States’ partners, however, policymakers have struggled to articulate a coherent and unified response.
Diverging and scattered European reactions have attempted to balance support for democratic change with concerns over legality, civil protections, and unease about the precedent for forcible regime change. Assessments of the operation’s potential “boomerang effect” have also varied: Some allies argue it will embolden rivals and spoilers across the Middle Eastern, Indo-Pacific, and European theaters to expand their own spheres of influence, while others see it as a deterrent signal. These debates have quickly spilled into Europe’s own strategic calculations, with perceived implications for Greenland, Ukraine, and broader European security interests.
This series examines the ways in which the January 3 operation is reshaping US and transatlantic strategic debates, and how it may influence policy responses in the weeks and months ahead.
Hard Power and Commerce
By Dr. Ian Lesser
The US National Security Strategy, released in November 2025, with its extraordinary emphasis on American interests and prerogatives in the Western Hemisphere, clearly anticipated Washington’s intervention in Venezuela. The document also underscored the centrality of geo-economic drivers in the Trump administration’s worldview.
The emphasis placed on developing Venezuela’s under-capitalized oil resources will now reinforce concerns in Europe and elsewhere that the United States is seeking to “monetize” its hard power in multiple regional settings. Worries over Greenland are bound to grow, although the prospects for direct American intervention there are low. The parallels should not be exaggerated.
For the Transatlantic Economy, Security Over Efficiency
By Penny Naas
The US extraction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro cements the “America First” policies outlined in the November 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) and confirms that the norm-busting approach of the Trump administration will continue in 2026. The race for exclusive commercial control of minerals and natural resources continues, pitting the United States’ drive for oil and natural gas against the green energy priorities of Europe and China. US companies and investors are now being used explicitly as geopolitical actors to implement the Trump administration’s priorities.
US President Donald Trump’s continued statements on Greenland, together with his ambivalence about Ukraine, mean that Europe’s ability to balance security with economic relations will face significant challenges in the months to come. Deep investment ties bind the US and EU economies in unique ways, making recalibration and possible derisking tricky and economically painful for both sides. With US-EU and US-UK trade agreements still incomplete, Europeans will need to recalculate their approach to limiting economic damage and reexamine their dependencies on the United States for financial, economic, and technological purposes, given the new geo-security dimensions.
China Will Stay the Course
By Bonnie Glaser
Washington’s military strikes against Venezuela and the capture of its leader, Nicolás Maduro, provide China with an opportunity to portray the United States as a global hegemon that bullies smaller countries. This advances Beijing’s goal of undermining US legitimacy on the global stage. But China is unlikely to fundamentally alter its strategy toward Taiwan as a result of the American action. Beijing will not see the US disregard for international law as a useful justification for Chinese use of force against Taiwan. China, rather, upholds international law and norms when that is in its interests and otherwise ignores them. China has always viewed Taiwan as an internal affair and will not draw many parallels with the relationship between Washington and Caracas. The operation in Venezuela is not a blueprint for Chinese takeover of Taiwan: Capturing Taiwan President Lai Ching-te would not likely help Beijing achieve reunification.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s approach toward Taiwan is based on his own logic and strategy. He is unlikely to be influenced by developments such as the recent US action or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As the recently released Department of Defense report on China’s military power noted, corruption and purges within the People’s Liberation Army are hindering, at least temporarily, China’s military capabilities, including the PLA’s ability to seize and control Taiwan at an acceptable cost. Beijing is instead relying on a vast toolkit of gray-zone tactics to instill despair among Taiwan’s citizens so that they eventually capitulate. The Chinese believe that time is on their side to achieve reunification without sacrificing blood and treasure.
China will do its utmost to protect its economic and commercial interests in Venezuela, but it will seek to stay out of US President Donald Trump’s crosshairs in a region that is geographically distant and not among Beijing's core interests. This is especially so in the run-up to the planned US-China summit in April in Beijing. That is where China will push for US concessions on its own priority list, which likely includes Taiwan.
The Long-Term Challenge
By Dr. Carrie A. Lee
The Trump administration's move to forcibly replace Venezuelan leader Nicholas Maduro is a stark reminder of the United States' significant capabilities for precise and limited military operations. However, securing a stable Venezuela that includes a leader supported by the country’s powerful security services will require significant and prolonged attention from the US military, and a thoughtful and comprehensive transition plan. The effort could range from providing security assistance as factions compete for power to outright intervention if interim President Delcy Rodriguez is unable to establish effective control.
Previous leaders Hugo Chavez and Maduro, who together held power since 1999, systematically politicized Venezuela’s military by installing loyalists in key positions and creating security services that compete rather than work together. This will complicate attempts by leaders, Venezuelan or American, to consolidate control. The acceptance of those leaders and their publics to accept any prolonged US military engagement in Venezuela could be the difference between strategic success or dealing with an opened Pandora's box.
Intimidating Adversaries or Allies?
By Kristine Berzina
The second Trump administration is defining its foreign policy through bold military actions, first in its 2025 strikes on Iran and now in Venezuela. The crucial foreign policy question is now: Who is the United States seeking to intimidate—adversaries or allies? The US administration’s capture of Maduro could have been seen as a warning to illegitimate regimes, but questionable legal process and Trump’s comments on “needing” Greenland serve to intimidate NATO allies and bring into question the principle of sovereignty. Trump’s actions in Venezuela can embolden adversaries such as Russia to further violate its neighbors’ sovereignty, undermining US efforts to push for peace in Ukraine and maintain security in the North Atlantic.
Implications for the War in Ukraine
By Philip Bednarczyk
In Warsaw, the United States’ military intervention in Venezuela is understood in terms of its potential implications for Russia and Ukraine. The results are mixed. On one hand, US President Donald Trump’s apparent disregard for any notion of international law or democracy and his use of language similar to Putin’s when referring to Ukraine (“extraordinary military operation” vs. “special military operation”) seem to give a tacit green light to Russia’s rationale for invading Ukraine. On the other hand, seeing a United States willing to act, where the interventionist argument is now seemingly dominant, brings more hope that mounting frustration with Moscow will lead to support for Ukraine in the defining days ahead. In that vein, the Kremlin’s official statement of its displeasure with the aggression and its call to resolve problems through dialogue is more than a bit rich.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.