Magyar Beat Orbán at His Own Electoral Game

Hungarians made history on April 12 when they ousted Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party after 16 years in government. The victory of the newcomer Tisza party, led by Fidesz-member-turned-critic Péter Magyar, surpassed all expectations. With a record turnout just short of 80%, Tisza ultimately gained 53% of the popular vote—more than any party in Hungary’s postcommunist history. 

Tisza’s victory dispels the long-held belief that Orbán could not be defeated under an electoral system that his government designed to provide him every advantage. Magyar proved that it was possible to beat the autocrat despite the tilted playing field, and for this reason, his electoral strategy warrants close attention.

The Hungarian electoral system contains a twist: The so-called winner compensation transfers votes from the first-past-the-post single-mandate districts to the proportional national lists. The number of votes by which a winning candidate surpasses the runner-up in a region is transferred to their party’s national list. The result is a system in which the party with the strongest country-wide support receives an additional boost and, as a result, an outsized representation in the parliament.

This electoral system built on Fidesz’s strengths (strong country-wide presence and high-level, cohesive popular support) and the opposition’s weaknesses (support concentrated in the capital and a few cities and fragmented among a high number of ideologically diverse parties). As long as these parameters held, Fidesz could easily ensure its victory. As a result, the governing party managed to retain a two-thirds constitutional majority with only about 50% of the popular vote in each election since 2014.

That changed this April with Péter Magyar breaking the constraints this electoral system imposed on the “old” opposition. Instead of tactical adjustments within the existing party system, he pursued strategic change. After leaving Fidesz in 2024, he did not compete with other opposition parties for, nor did he seek to consolidate the support of existing anti-government voters.

Instead, Magyar launched a broad bid to dismantle Orbán’s system. He called out the government corruption that undermined the country’s opportunities for development. In showcasing Fidesz’s governance failures, he tapped into the growing public dissatisfaction that followed from Hungary’s worsening economic situation and led to the government’s loss of economic legitimacy. Additionally, he called out the governing party’s hypocrisy on issues provoking widespread moral outrage, such as the lack of consequences for child abusers under a self-proclaimed pro-family government. His appeal expanded across ideological lines. What emerged was not just a party, but a country-wide movement whose circles mobilized around the idea of ousting Fidesz and bringing about regime change. These grass-roots circles—so-called Tisza islands—developed organically, fostering a sense of ownership among supporters. 

The Tisza islands strongly resembled the “civic circles” that emerged after Fidesz’s 2002 election defeat, when it set out to organize country-wide. These circles were connected to, but independent from, the formal structures of Fidesz. Although Fidesz gradually stopped maintaining its momentum, this movement had laid the nationwide groundwork for Fidesz’s 2010 comeback, just as the Tisza islands did for Magyar’s rise. 

Magyar, in turn, has been on the campaign trail since entering the scene in 2024, visiting many hundreds of settlements across the country. His sustained personal engagement built the credibility and trust that transformed people’s dissatisfaction into hope and, eventually, a belief in change. In this election, that belief translated into political agency. More than 3.1 million Hungarians of various ideological leanings and party preferences—an unprecedented voter coalition—chose to put an end to Orbán’s 16-year rule.

Tisza’s victory may offer lessons beyond Hungary as well. The Hungarian example shows that even entrenched electoral autocracies can be challenged and defeated. In this case, Magyar broke away from the role the governing party assigned to him as the opposition under its electoral system. He refused to confine himself to the space designated for the limited and fragmented left and liberal opposition. He refused to compete but also to cooperate with the “old” opposition for a slice of their electorate. Knowing that the system favors the strongest force, he built it—by channelling discontent regardless of ideological divides, offering hope, and building belief and agency. In doing so, he left behind the constraints binding the “old” opposition and exploited the governing party’s own logic—well-known to him—to defeat it. He even copied some of its methods. Ultimately, he beat Orbán at his own game.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.