Moldova’s Window of Opportunity for Rapid EU Membership
To achieve its ambitious goal of joining by 2028, Moldova must carry out an intensive diplomatic effort in the next few months.
Moldova has set itself the objective of joining the EU by 2028 and made much progress toward it recently despite major challenges. The bilateral screening meetings that began in July 2024 were completed in record time in September 2025. Since December, the government has launched technical accession consultations with the EU on three of the six negotiation clusters: fundamental values, internal market, and external relations. But technical reforms are only half the battle; the other half is to convince each member state that Moldova is ready for accession.
Moldova has a narrow window of opportunity, created by the rotation calendar of the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, to advance on this diplomatic front. However, it is constrained by the question of whether its accession process should remain linked to Ukraine’s. In Chișinău, there is a growing—if not openly stated—interest in decoupling them, so that the country’s progression is decided purely on its own reform performance.
Technical reforms are only half the battle; the other half is to convince each member state that Moldova is ready for accession.
Many EU officials and analysts argue that decoupling would undermine solidarity, consistency, and the credibility of the enlargement policy, particularly as Ukraine’s war for sovereignty remains central to the EU’s strategic orientation. They say that it could be perceived as placing geopolitical expediency over reform merit, send the wrong strategic signal to Russia, and risk fracturing unity with Kyiv and other candidate countries. Earlier this month, the presidents of the Baltic states’ parliaments urged Moldova to pursue EU membership together with Ukraine and other candidate states, emphasizing that this is the best way to demonstrate unity and sustain momentum toward accession.
However, while acknowledging that discussions are underway on how to address Hungary’s block on Ukraine’s accession talks and insisting that no member state opposes opening negotiations with Moldova, the EU’s commissioner for enlargement, Marta Kos has said that decoupling is not ruled out entirely.
Moldova thus faces a diplomatic dilemma: if it does not object to the calendar for its accession being tied to Ukraine’s, then its 2028 goal becomes practically impossible to achieve. But if it insists on a separate path, it risks being perceived as not standing in solidarity with Ukraine, which could alienate the support of the Baltic states and other Eastern European EU members.
Beyond the Acquis
The accession process is deeply political, shaped by shifting geopolitical priorities, internal EU dynamics, and the credibility of reforms in the candidate country. Without sustained political backing from key member states and clear milestones from Brussels, Moldova’s momentum risks slowing, regardless of its reform efforts.
A membership candidate can implement the acquis communautaire—the 35 chapters of EU legislation—and meet the EU’s technical standards, but the unanimous vote required for accession means it must win the confidence of 27 capitals, each with its own priorities, fears, and political agendas. The government in Chișinău therefore faces a diplomatic mission of considerable scale: to convince not only the technocrats in Brussels, but also political leaders across the EU that Moldova is ready to become a full member by 2028.
This means providing answers to difficult questions that some EU governments have. How will Moldova manage pressure from Russia? What measures are being taken against corruption? How will the economy function in the single market? What impact will accession have on the EU budget and the Common Agricultural Policy?
A Critical Window of Opportunity
In January, Cyprus assumed the presidency of the Council of the EU. Among the member states, it has consistently been one of the most vocal supporters of enlargement to the east and the Balkans, and it has pledged to prioritize and push for tangible progress on Moldova’s accession. Cyprus can draw on its own accession experience as a country affected by an unresolved territorial conflict and heavily reliant on European solidarity to help Chișinău’s case. It joined under Protocol No. 10 of the Treaty on European Union, which allowed EU law to be suspended in areas not under the effective control of the government. This precedent is relevant for Moldova given the issue of its breakaway region of Transnistria. It also gives Cyprus political sensitivity and legal-institutional credibility as it tries to keep the country high on the council’s agenda.
It less clear if Ireland’s presidency in the second half of this year could also be favorable to Moldova’s prospects. Dublin is likely to focus on procedural momentum and cohesion among the member states, and thus it may be reluctant to revisit the political decision regarding the coupling. Prime Minister Micheál Martin has stressed that one of the main goals of Ireland’s presidency will be to accelerate the enlargement agenda, and in particular to agree on opening negotiation chapters with Ukraine. At the same time, though, Ireland has recently opened an embassy in Moldova, a signal of growing political and diplomatic engagement with the country.
Moldova’s task will surely become more complicated when Lithuania holds the presidency of the Council of the EU from January to June 2027. It is highly likely that Vilnius will insist on maintaining the political and procedural coupling of Moldova and Ukraine in the accession process, since it will prioritize solidarity with Kyiv.
Moldova therefore must seek a solution to the decoupling issue before Lithuania’s presidency, and perhaps even before Ireland’s. It must act decisively within the next five months, capitalizing on Cyprus’s likely procedural flexibility and political goodwill to secure at least progress toward decoupling. Otherwise, it risks more uncertainty and delay regarding its candidacy. With its accession progress still joined with Ukraine’s much heavier and more complex one, rather than being assessed on its individual merits, the country would remain dependent on the pace of progress by its war-affected neighbor. This would limit Moldova’s ability to capitalize on its reform tempo and political readiness, potentially stalling momentum at a crucial moment.
There is a precedent that could play in Moldova’s favor. In 2024, the EU agreed to decouple Albania’s accession from North Macedonia’s. The latter has stalled because it has not made the constitutional amendments required under the EU framework as it drifts further away into Russia’s orbit.
Bilateral Visits Are Essential
Experience from earlier successful EU candidacies shows that bilateral visits at the highest level are essential. President Maia Sandu has already become a familiar figure in many EU capitals, intensively explaining Moldova’s case directly to decision-makers, after the ground for key political decisions was prepared by trusted envoys such as former prime minister Dorin Recean and former foreign minister Nicu Popescu. This effort must now be widened and stepped up. Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu, other members of the cabinet, and additional trusted actors from government as well as figures with credibility and access in EU capitals should complement Sandu’s diplomacy by building broader networks, managing expectations, and persuading the member states to support Moldova in the European Council. Expanding high-level engagement beyond the president and her envoys is essential to fully use the window of opportunity in the next months.
Some member states will require special attention. The Nordic countries will emphasize the rule of law and corporate governance. France and Germany will seek guarantees regarding political stability and economic reforms. Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said that Ukraine will not join the EU in 2027, which has obvious consequences for Moldova. Southern countries will be interested in migration management and border security.
Expanding high-level engagement beyond the president and her envoys is essential to fully use the window of opportunity in the next months.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and maybe Poland present a particular challenge. With their experience of Soviet domination and deep understanding of the Russian threat, they will almost certainly insist on maintaining the accession coupling of Moldova with Ukraine. The Baltic states could view the idea of Moldova advancing independently as a lack of solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression, which is non-negotiable for them. Moreover, they and Czechia were among the strongest voices pushing back when the idea gained traction in mid-2025.
Moldova will also need to work closely with key EU allies to argue its case. Alongside Cyprus, neighboring Romania, the country’s closest and natural partner, is the most obvious one. Another is Bulgaria, because of historical ties and the ethnic Bulgarian minority in Moldova. It can add its voice to Romania’s, not only about Moldova’s potential for strengthening security in the Black Sea region, but also by pointing to its own experience in moving forward on justice and anti-corruption reforms with credible EU oversight and conditionality after becoming a member state, most visibly through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.
For Moldova, the entire diplomatic equation must be solved by the end of this year. To achieve this, it must articulate and communicate a nuanced position of full solidarity with Ukraine at the political and strategic level while calling for a pragmatic recognition that each candidate should be evaluated on its own merits. It must convince the member states that, if successful in joining, it will not abandon Ukraine but on the contrary demonstrate that eastward enlargement is possible and beneficial.
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.