More Turbulence Ahead

The outcome of the US midterm elections on November 3 will determine control of both houses of Congress for the final two years of the second Trump administration, and there will be implications for transatlantic relations. As is the case with all US elections, Americans will vote while their allies must live with the results.

All 435 seats in the House of Representatives, where Republicans hold a slim majority, will be on the ballot, though few races are competitive. Polling of voter intentions shows Democrats with a single-digit percentage point advantage nationwide, an outcome that historically has signaled winning a majority of House seats. The past offers other factors in the party’s favor: Since World War II, the party controlling Congress has lost seats in all but two midterm elections (1998 and 2002), while control of at least one chamber of Congress has flipped in the last five non-presidential elections.

Democrats face a more difficult challenge recapturing the 100-seat Senate, where the Republicans hold a 53-47 majority. Here, only 35 seats are being contested. In addition to picking up four seats to gain a majority, Democrats must defend a hotly contested seat in Michigan. Polls show several close races, but control of the chamber could shift if the national tide swings heavily in the Democrats’ favor. That is, however, far from a given.

The outcome, whether one-party or split control of Congress, has implications for Europe’s strategic and economic interests.

NATO and Ukraine

Above all, arguably, may be the US relationship with NATO. Fully 59% of Americans believe their country benefits from alliance membership. But that support is down from 71% in 2021, largely because backing among Republicans has fallen over the past five years from 55% to 38%, while more than eight in ten Democrats (82% in 2026, 85% in 2021) remain committed to NATO.

At the alliance’s Ankara summit in July, President Donald Trump said he would not withdraw the United States from NATO despite repeated threats to do so. But as European governments dramatically increase defense spending, long an American demand, the Trump administration is still upping the ante. The Pentagon has sent NATO governments a questionnaire about their being “publicly supportive” of the president’s foreign policy, placing “restrictions” on use of US bases, “publicly oppos[ing] regulations” that “inhibit” contracts with US firms, and supporting“made in Europe” procurement rules that the Pentagon opposes.

If Republicans retain control of Congress, given their voters’ declining belief in NATO’s value, there is likely to be little meaningful congressional pushback if the White House pursues this even more transactional relationship with Washington’s allies. If the Democrats control either congressional chamber, they can block any withdrawal effort. But they will be powerless against Trump’s demands for European support of his MAGA foreign policy. The implications for Ukraine, and the Russian threat to Europe, are uncertain.

The United States has not provided any assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Trump’s second term. And the president has reneged on his promise to license Patriot missile technology to Kyiv. But in June, a bipartisan House majority passed the Ukraine Support Act that provides the country with over $1 billion in direct assistance and up to $8 billion in defense loans. The Senate must still act. If it does, such bipartisanship suggests that Ukraine aid may restart regardless of the party controlling Congress in 2027. But this assumes that the Trump administration does not refuse to spend money Congress has appropriated, as it has in the past.

Iran

The Iran war may prove another lingering transatlantic irritant. If the conflict continues into next year, Trump’s frustration with European allies’ perceived lack of support is likely to grow.

In July, the House approved a War Powers resolution directing the president to remove US armed forces from unauthorized hostilities with Iran. Four Republicans voted with the Democrats, providing the majority. But the resolution failed in the Senate by two votes. In 2027, it is likely to come up again because the Constitution gives Congress ultimate authority to conduct war. The closeness of this year’s vote suggests a similar resolution might pass in the next Congress, in part because at least two or more of the Republican senators who did not vote for it are likely to be replaced by Democrats.

Israel

Public views of Israel are negative on both sides of the Atlantic. Fully 60% of Americans are unfavorably disposed toward the country, as is a median of 71% in 10 EU states. It is subsequently unsurprising that nearly three quarters of Democratic voters oppose further military aid to Israel. Moreover, several Democratic congressional candidates—most prominently Abdul El-Sayed, who is running in Michigan for the Senate—advocate reducing or eliminating aid to Israel. Hakeem Jeffries of New York, who would likely become speaker if the Democrats retake the House, has called for a “reset” on Israel policy. Polls in Germany and the United Kingdom show about half of respondents in those countries support halting arms sales to Israel.

But any attempt by congressional Democrats to act could be stymied by a Republican-controlledSenate or a presidential veto. Should European governments act—78% of Labour Party members back halting British arms exports to Israel, for example—another rift could emerge with the White House. Conservative Republican supporters of Israel and some Democrats may cite the move as further evidence of alleged European antisemitism.

US Defense Spending

The Pentagon’s budget will be a domestic point of contention among the Trump administration, Republicans, and Democrats, but Europe is likely to feel an impact.

Republicans, whether in the majority or minority, will want to fund at least some rebuilding of arms stockpiles depleted by the Iran war, probably through controversial cuts in domestic spending. Congressional Democrats and the party’s presidential candidate will not want to enter the 2028 election fending off accusations of leaving the United States unprotected, but they will oppose social spending cuts. This guns-versus-butter fight could delay defense appropriations and further postpone Patriot missile deliveries to European partners.

Trade and Economic Issues

Congressional control is unlikely to end the on-and-off trade skirmishes that the Trump administration wages against Europe. Seven in ten Republicans support the president’s tariffs while seven in ten Democrats oppose them. This partisan split has hobbled action in Congress despite its constitutional authority over trade policy. Even if Democrats gain control of the House and the Senate, the administration will retain targeted tariff authority under existing law. Moreover, businesses that benefit from tariffs in place will lobby for their continuation regardless of who is in power. Such efforts led the Biden administration to keep some duties that Trump imposed in his first term.

Financial Markets

Lastly, the outcome of the midterm elections may influence transatlantic cooperation if an AI bubble on financial markets bursts, which some analysts fear. The European Central Bank has already warned that “US AI fallout would not remain a US problem” but could become “a question of financial stability for the euro area”.

A 2008 US-sparked financial crisis narrowly averted becoming a global depression through cooperation between a Democrat-led Congress, a Republican-held White House, and the backstopping of the global financial system by the US Federal Reserve. But Washington’s hyper polarized political atmosphere, perhaps soon with a divided Congress, a lame-duck president, and new, untested Federal Reserve leadership, could leave the European Central Bank on its own, further poisoning transatlantic relations.

US elections always turn on domestic issues. But this year’s vote could portend even more fundamental challenges for Europe. At the very least, the continent should prepare for more turbulence with and in Washington. 

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.

For an overview of recent US public opinion on some of the issues addressed in this piece, click here.