A Reckoning for Orbán?

In the run-up to Hungary’s April 12 parliamentary election, a striking paradox has emerged. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of the Fidesz party, a self-declared champion of nationalsovereignty, has been flanked by an array of foreign allies during his campaign. Meanwhile, his challenger, Péter Magyar of the Tisza party—whom the government seeks to frame as thepuppet of external actors—is traversing the country, building his domestic base. This contradiction captures a growing political disconnect. In recent years, as Orbán has invested heavily in building a transnational illiberal network and seeking international acclaim, he seemingly has become detached from domestic realities. While he can now showcase endorsements from foreign partners such as US President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and France’s Marine Le Pen, recent polls suggest that he nolonger has the confidence of Hungarian voters.

Foreign Recognition as a Substitute for a Positive Domestic Record

Fidesz’s campaign has been defined less by domestic policy than by an external focus. Central messages revolved around noninvolvement in the war in Ukraine, opposition to the EU, and protection of Hungary’s sovereignty amid alleged external (Western) interference. These issues have allowed the government to frame the election as an existential choice rather than as a referendum on domestic achievements. The pivot is strategic. After Fidesz’s16 years in power, and at a time when the country is experiencing economic stagnation and the government’s image is marred by corruption and abuse of power, the party’s traditional message of continuity has limited appeal.

To present itself as the only legitimate alternative, Fidesz has sought to smear its challenger by portraying opposition head Péter Magyar and his Tisza party as the vanguard of foreign interests—particularly those of Ukraine and the European Union. At the same time, Orbán has welcomed his far-right political allies at the annual CPAC Hungary conference, organized by the Hungarian Centre for Fundamental Rights and the American Conservative Union, and at the first Patriots’ Grand Assembly in March. Just ahead of the election, US Vice President JD Vance also paid a visit to Budapest to campaign for the Hungarian prime minister. He praised Orbán as an exceptional leader, confirming their shared ideological agenda and disdain for the EU.

The contradiction is evident: Orbán warns against foreign interference while simultaneously leveraging it to bolster his own legitimacy. But while Orbán’s political brand has evolved from domestic strongman to a role model of the transnational far right, the electoral utility of his foreign-facing strategy is increasingly uncertain.

Economic Strain and Systemic Failures

The governing party’s international success among its far-right counterparts starkly contrasts with its domestic governance failures. After 16 years of centralized control and state capture, the regime’s weaknesses and underperformance are starting to show, not least in the economic domain.

Hungary has struggled with high inflation since 2020, reaching the highest levels in the EU in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although inflation has since moderated, growth has also stalled, with forecasts repeatedly downgraded amid fiscal pressures and uncertainty over frozen EU funds.

Living standards reflect these pressures. Once leading among the new EU member states, Hungary now ranks near or at the bottom in terms of GDP per capita and actual individual consumption respectively, the latter being a key indicator of citizens’ actual economic well-being. This decline is particularly striking given the scale of EU transfers received over the past decade.

Economic decline went hand in hand with systemic corruption that ultimately led the EU to freeze a large share of its structural funds allocated for Hungary and to block Budapest’saccess to the Recovery and Resilience Facility in late 2022. Hungary nonetheless ranks consistently as the most corrupt country in the EU according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with its score falling to historic lows in recent years.

Public services mirror these trends. Amid radical governmental centralization paired with poor financing of the educational system, teachers and students have grown increasingly dissatisfied with the quality and conditions of education. This has resulted in a series of protests and ultimately the government’s adoption of further restrictions. Healthcare ischronically underfunded, with workforce shortages resulting in long wait times and regional inequalities. Despite its lengthy term in power, the Fidesz government delivered no solutions to the sector’s longstanding structural challenges. Even flagship policies such as Orbán’s extensive family support programs have failed to achieve their core objective of demographic growth: After a period of gradual growth in the 2010s, Hungary’s fertility rate has seen a steeper decline in the 2020s.

Taken together, these indicators point to a model that has consolidated the political control of the few but failed to deliver broad-based prosperity for the many.

Shifting Ground

Against this backdrop, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza party marks a significant shift in Hungarian politics. Unlike previous, fragmented opposition efforts, Magyar has centered his campaign on domestic concerns—particularly the cost of living, corruption, and declining public services.

His message appears to resonate. Polling suggests a lead for Tisza and a growing expectation among voters that Fidesz could lose power. Desire for change is especially strong among younger voters, with whom the governing party appears to have lost touch. Fewer than 1 in 10 support Fidesz in the under-30 cohort.

Crucially, Magyar has reframed the election narrative. Rather than engaging on Orbán’s preferred territory of geopolitical confrontation and cultural battles, he has linked Hungary’s isolation from the European democratic mainstream to internal decline. His message is that strained EU relations and frozen funds are direct consequences of governance failures and particularly its abuse of power.

This creates a stark contrast between the two leading candidates. Orbán offers continuity, framed as sovereignty and stability. Magyar offers change, framed as restoration—of European commitment, economic opportunity, and personal agency.

The outcome of the election remains uncertain. Hungary’s electoral system, reshaped under Fidesz, continues to favor the incumbent, and a transition of power would be complicated byinstitutional constraints and potential instability. Yet the broader dynamic is clear. Orbán spent the past few years building his transnational illiberal network and his external image, but failed to deliver for his own people.

The trouble for him is that his illiberal allies are not the ones who will vote in the Hungarian election on Sunday—Hungarian citizens are the ones who will. And for the first time in over a decade, a significant number appear ready to choose differently.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.