Russia, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean

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Executive Summary 

This analysis explores the evolving nature of Russia’s interests and priorities in areas to the country’s south, and the implications of this for European security. It is a medium-term assessment, identifying conditions under which Russia’s engagement and ability to project power around the Black Sea and the Mediterranean may wax or wane over the next 3-5 years, and the consequences of that for European security. 

Moscow has several objectives in the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions including: 1) bolstering security in the Black Sea itself; 2) preserving its presence in Syria and Libya; 3) securing its lines of communication and the ability to project power and influence to North Africa, the Sahel, and beyond; and 4) maintaining a stable relationship with Türkiye, one that may be characterized as “competitive cooperation”. 

Russia has traditionally seen the wider Black Sea-Mediterranean region as an integrated strategic space. Developments in recent years, above all the closure of the Straits, have disrupted this linkage. Moscow will, however, seek to consolidate and perhaps expand its activities in Libya and adjacent regions. Indeed, Libya is set to overtake Syria as a focal point for Russian engagement as the Kremlin looks to project influence in Africa. Overall, Russia has adopted an indirect approach, consistent with its limited capabilities, that focuses on support for friendly regimes and factions, arms transfers, the use of irregular forces, information operations, and commercial activities. 

Russia’s freedom of action and capacity for power projection in the Black Sea-Mediterranean region are highly constrained. Once the conflict in Ukraine ends, analysts suggest that Russia is more likely to focus the reconstitution of its military on strategic priorities elsewhere, from the Baltic Sea to the Western theater, and even in the Far East. New Russian investments in political-military initiatives around the Mediterranean would likely have only a marginal effect on Russia’s overall ability to project power in Europe. The Mediterranean will remain a symbolically important theater for Russian engagement on the political level at a time of considerable flux in North-South relations.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.