Trump wants to be on the winning side

An interview with Roland Nelles

This interview with GMF President Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer was originally published in German in Der SPIEGEL on July 6, 2026.

SPIEGEL: Ms. de Hoop Scheffer, can NATO survive Donald Trump?
De Hoop Scheffer: Yes, absolutely. I never believed a Trump administration would withdraw the United States from NATO. That, to me, is a myth.

SPIEGEL: Although Trump has played with the idea.
De Hoop Scheffer: He floats a lot of ideas. The real question is whether he follows through. NATO is a luxury tool for the United States. It shapes European policy, advances US strategic interests, and gives Washington leverage over allies. It also offers privileged access to the European defense market. In short, NATO has long been an extension of US power politics.

SPIEGEL: What does Trump’s second term mean for the alliance?
De Hoop Scheffer: More Europeanization—inevitably. Trump is telling Europeans: Take more responsibility for your own security, spend more, build capabilities. And the United States intends to pull some critical assets back from Europe. Trump is an accelerator of Europeanization of NATO.

SPIEGEL: Trump keeps clashing with European leaders such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni or German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. He called Germany’s NATO contribution “ridiculous”. How can cooperation work if he keeps bashing partners?
De Hoop Scheffer: That is his method. In the current disputes, Iran is central. He argues Europeans haven’t stepped up—in the Iran war, in the Strait of Hormuz, in the broader Middle East. He uses that to pressure allies within the NATO framework: Help us in the Middle East, or we reduce American troops in Europe. In other words, he treats collective defense as leverage. 

Europeans, in my view, responded correctly: You didn’t consult us on Iran. We are prepared to contribute but on European terms. Europeans have set clear rules: We lean in once there is an Iran deal.

SPIEGEL: What will happen at the NATO summit in Ankara – more clashes between Trump and the Europeans or real cooperation?
De Hoop Scheffer: The NATO summit will be about formalizing a new transatlantic deal. Europeans still rely on US leadership and key capabilities to deter Russia. But the United States also needs Europe’s critical assets to project power in the Middle East. Just think of bases, overflight rights, and infrastructure, especially in Germany and Italy. These two wars don’t point to NATO’s collapse. They underline interdependence. The task now is to translate that into new terms for responsibility-sharing: Who does what, with which capabilities, and over what time horizon.

SPIEGEL: Is that Europe maturing?
De Hoop Scheffer: Absolutely. This is less a NATO crisis than Europe’s geopolitical maturation. And it won’t disappear after Trump. Europe has internalized that the underlying US demand—Europe must do more—will not be reversed by the next administration.

SPIEGEL: Regardless of which party governs in Washington?
De Hoop Scheffer: Yes. On Capitol Hill—Democrats, Republicans, MAGA—there is broad agreement: Europeans must step up. Even Democrats tell me it’s getting harder to justify spending money for NATO, Europe, and Ukraine to their voters.

I often think of Bob Gates’s farewell speech under President Barack Obama: He warned Europeans that America’s long-term willingness and capacity to carry Europe’s defense burden would not be what it used to be. That warning resonates today. Trump is simply forcing the acceleration.

SPIEGEL: So, in a way Trump is doing Europe a favor.
De Hoop Scheffer: It is a rough favor because his rhetoric and unilateral decisions risk weakening deterrence faster than Europeans can realistically step up.

SPIEGEL: Where are Europeans weakest?
De Hoop Scheffer: ISR—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance—especially satellites. Second, long-range missiles. Third, heavy airlift and aerial refueling. Europe remains overly reliant on the United States, and the United States won’t always be able to fill the gap because it is stretched globally. In the future many of these capabilities could be a subject of co-production between US and European defense industries. But that requires trust. At a time when the transatlantic industrial base should be co-producing—also with China in mind—trust is not where it needs to be.

SPIEGEL: In Europe, the “Buy European, not American” mood is growing. Is European distrust now stronger than American distrust?
De Hoop Scheffer: Distrust now runs both ways. Europeans doubt US reliability and want to reduce dependence on American kit, while Washington resents being shut out of a rearming Europe. Many US companies are considering how to localize production and “Europeanize” their footprint to avoid the perception of an American takeover of European industry. Some are even calling for a reset of the US arms export control regime, arguing that current rules based on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations slow approvals and hinder allies’ ability to coproduce US weapons at scale. 

SPIEGEL: German defense firms are working closely with Ukraine. How important is that?
De Hoop Scheffer: Extremely. Europe’s future industrial base will be deeply integrated with Ukraine’s innovation ecosystem. German and other European defense and tech companies are accelerating co-production with Ukrainian industries: Diehl Defense is planning to co-produce Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missile in Germany, and MBDA is partnering with Luch to co‑develop the Neptune 2 deep‑strike cruise missile.

SPIEGEL: Regarding war in Ukraine: How does this end? What will happen over the next 12 to 24 months?
De Hoop Scheffer: Ukraine has managed to shift the dynamics on the ground through innovation and resilience. In that context, the most recent G7 declaration in France mattered: Ukraine came first, Iran second. I read that as a recommitment by the US administration. The wind is shifting, and this administration sees it. Trump wants to be on the winning side. He sees Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy holding the cards. 

SPIEGEL: The Trump administration has come across recently as moderately engaged in efforts to push for a peace deal.
De Hoop Scheffer: Indeed, Europe is playing the long game on Ukraine and its own long‑term security, while Washington is playing for an exit from the war. The US and Europe should lean in hard now. This is the moment when support can tilt the balance further and push Russia toward serious negotiations. A ceasefire or peace deal becomes possible when [Russian President Vladimir] Putin concludes the military calculus has turned decisively against him. The Ankara summit will signal strong support for Ukraine and also make clear that the center of gravity of that support has now shifted toward Europe.