Türkiye’s Stakes in the New US Strategy

The Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) refers to Türkiye only once, and in the context of the Middle East. In the past, this alone might have raised hackles in Ankara, where Türkiye’s strategic importance to the United States and its European vocation have been key talking points. But much has changed on both sides, and the old perceptions and preferences no longer apply. That said, the new strategy is full of implications for Türkiye at a time of rapid geopolitical shifts.

First, Türkiye’s theaters of primary interest are far down the list of American concerns as framed in the NSS. The current administration, not unlike some of its predecessors, wants to step back from America’s traditional role as a security arbiter in the Middle East. It sees the region, above all, as a place of commercial opportunity. Other capable actors can manage the security challenges there. Democracy and governance are no longer key US concerns in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. All this fits well with Türkiye’s regional outlook and ambitions, although it is unclear if this pragmatism will translate into a much warmer relationship with Washington given continuing bipartisan Congressional criticism of the country.

Second, the White House’s explicit and highly critical posture toward Europe, evident in the strategy document and subsequent comments from the president on the continent’s weakness, has much meaning for Ankara. At one time, Turkish integration into Europe was an American interest. Today, Washington and Ankara share a cynical scepticism about Europe and, especially, the EU. The NSS says little about Russia, but the few references indicate a desire to bring a rapid end to the war in Ukraine and Moscow out of the cold. Akara could well have written the relevant sections.

Finally, the new NSS has wider messages for Türkiye. The world described in the document is one without fixed alignments, one where nationalism and sovereignty are the order of the day. In theory, this is a world of nonalignment in which Türkiye should be comfortable—until something goes wrong. And many things can go wrong in Türkiye’s dangerous neighborhood, including with Russia. As a NATO member, Ankara is fully vested in the viability of the alliance and the European security order. The NSS is not encouraging on these fronts, and that should worry Türkiye and its transatlantic partners.

For more on the NSS, click here.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.