Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Maria Malmer Stenergard at Stockholm China Forum

Good afternoon and thank you Bonnie for the introduction.

It’s a pleasure to address this knowledgeable audience today, as part of the 31st edition of the Stockholm China Forum. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has proudly co-hosted the forum for the past 18 years.

I would like to thank the German Marshall Fund for our excellent long-term partnership and your tireless dedication to transatlantic cooperation.

In 2025, we celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the EU. This year also marks 75 years since Sweden – as the first Western country – established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

This twin anniversary presents an opportunity to take stock of the state of Swedish and European relations with China, and to assess where we go from here.

Both in the past and today, trade is at the heart of Sweden’s relations with China.

Back in 1731, the Swedish East India company was founded to trade with China, India and the Far East. It put the city of Gothenburg on the map as a European centre for trade in products from the East.

Today, Swedish companies such as Ericsson and SKF have been active in China for over a hundred years and have greatly contributed to the development of the Chinese market.

Overall, our trade relations have continued to expand, and today, China is our 9th largest trading partner for goods and services combined.

More than 80,000 people are employed in Swedish firms in China, and China is an important investor in Sweden.

However, challenges remain, both in terms of trade imbalances and when it comes to economic security.

We are concerned about China’s increasing industrial overcapacity, which affects the long-term stability of global trade and polarises debate about economic openness.  

Countries and trade blocs around the world – including Brazil, Türkiye, the United States and the EU – have imposed defensive trade measures in response to this overcapacity.

As the strongest voice for free trade in the EU, Sweden is generally opposed to tariffs and other trade barriers.

We believe in lowering trade and investment barriers, not raising them.

We seek a relationship that can offer a greater degree of predictability, and we hope that China shares this aspiration.

We support free, sustainable and rules-based trade, with the WTO at its core. However, simply upholding a commitment to WTO agreements that have significant gaps when it comes to distortive practices is not enough. It won’t stop the rules-based system from eroding.

The WTO needs to be revitalised to make the system fit to tackle today’s challenges.

More than half of EU’s external trade is still governed by WTO rules rather than free trade agreements. We have a strong interest in seeing that WTO rules are supported in action, not just in words.

As China becomes a world leader within a number of cutting-edge technologies and a competitive provider of resources and expertise, we must also pay more attention to economic security.

Current global trade tensions – and before that the COVID pandemic – have shown us two things: the risks of over-dependence on a single supplier and the importance of a strong European market.  

Therefore, we support the EU’s approach to de-risk and diversify trade relations.

We also support the European Commission’s efforts to uphold and develop dialogue with China in line with the EU’s interests and values.

Sweden’s and the EU’s doors are always open for constructive talks. We need to find ways to address challenges in our economic relations with China, and we can only move forward on these issues through dialogue.

Another area that is central to Sweden, our Allies and partners when it comes to relations with China is security.

The security of Asia and that of Europe are becoming increasingly interlinked, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine clearly illustrates this trend.

Recently, we’ve seen that the DPRK confirmed it has sent troops to fight in Russia’s war of aggression. The deepened military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is an alarming development with consequences for both Europe and Asia.  

Sweden, the EU and NATO are critical of China’s enabling of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which has a direct negative impact on European security and a negative impact on China’s image in Europe.

We have called on all third parties to refrain from delivering any sort of military support to Russia and to refrain from facilitating all types of sanctions evasion.

Just as the war in Ukraine has global consequences, so too would tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific, including any crisis as a result of an attempt to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait using force, would have far-reaching consequences, also for Sweden and Europe.

Therefore, paying close attention to the security situation in the Indo-Pacific is in our national interest. This is why Sweden has adopted a Defence Policy Direction for cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific and is strengthening ties with several partners in the region.

Whether in Europe or in the Indo-Pacific, we need to safeguard international law and the UN Charter’s basic principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and peaceful settlement of disputes.

We will also continue to raise human rights issues, including our concerns about the situation for human rights in China. We all have a joint interest in upholding respect for international law – including human rights norms and standards.  

Last but not least, Sweden remains concerned about Chinese intelligence and security-threatening activities against Swedish and Allied interests. This is not conducive to the relationship we want to see.

Of course, our relationship with China spans a much wider range of areas than trade and security – it is one of our most important, intricate and multi-dimensional relationships.

Along with close transatlantic cooperation, a joint EU approach remains the cornerstone of Sweden’s China policy. We also believe that EU-China relations should be defined in their own right, not as a reaction to geopolitical turbulence.

Overall, Sweden and the EU view China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.

In practice, this means that we will always put our interests first – but we will also be prepared to work with China when and where our interests align.

We want to strengthen our cooperation with China to address global problems such as climate change, biodiversity, health and disarmament.

The green transition spans several of these fields and is one area in which we also see opportunity for intensified cooperation with China.

Sweden will continue its efforts to stabilise direct dialogue with China on multiple levels and across a broad range of fields.  

In this spirit, we have recently seen both the successful resumption of ministerial visits and of the Sweden-China Joint Commission on trade.

To conclude, establishing a baseline of predictability and stability in a relationship is important for both businesses and governments, especially in these turbulent times.

Because what we see now is a race for resources and strategic assets – from critical raw materials to space, and from the Baltic to the South China Sea.  

Sweden and the EU need to adapt to this new reality and cooperate where we can, compete where we have to – and continue to address security concerns.

We will seek dialogue, discussion and diplomacy to protect and promote our interests.

And we will do what we can to use this twin anniversary of our diplomatic relations to work towards a fairer, more balanced relationship with China.