Mareike Ohlberg is a senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Program and leads the Stockholm China Forum. She is based at GMF’s Berlin Office. Before joining GMF, Mareike worked as an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, where she focused on China’s media and digital policies as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s influence campaigns in Europe. Prior to that, she was an An Wang postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a postdoctoral fellow at Shih-Hsin University in Taipei. She spent several years living and working in Greater China. She is co-author of the book Hidden Hand: How the Communist Party of China is Reshaping the World (2020). Mareike has a doctoral degree in Chinese studies from the University of Heidelberg and a master’s degree in East Asian regional studies from Columbia University. She is a frequent commentator in the media on the global implications of China’s rise.

 

 

 

 

Media Mentions

The central tasks of the International Department are political influence abroad and the attempt to establish contacts for this purpose.
Translated from German
""Die Tatsache, dass das System so intransparent ist, heißt, dass wir nach wie vor nicht wissen, warum Qin Gang abgesetzt wurde"", sagt Mareike Ohlberg. Sie ist China-Expertin beim US-Thinktank German Marshall Fund. ""Es kann sein, dass er wegen irgendwelcher Vorwürfe in Gewahrsam genommen wurde. Es ist aber auch schon mal vorgekommen, dass Personen wieder auftauchen und dann in einer anderen Position sind - entweder befördert, abgesetzt oder in einer niedrigeren Position. Wir wissen es einfach nicht"", so Ohlberg weiter.

[...]

Ob das politische System durch die Absetzung Qin Gangs Schaden nimmt, sei noch nicht absehbar, sagt China-Expertin Ohlberg: ""Wir wissen nicht, wie es sich auf Xi Jinping auswirkt oder auf andere mögliche angenommene Machtkämpfe hinter den Kulissen. Wir haben da extrem wenig Einblick. Wir können lange spekulieren und überlegen. Es könnte dies sein, es könnte das sein. Aber das Hauptproblem ist: Wir wissen es nicht.""
Translated from German
“FAU is aware that under these contracts CSC scholarship holders will be unable to fully exercise their academic freedom and freedom of expression as stipulated under German Basic Law,” the email said.

Such wording in contracts “would be unthinkable in Germany, I don’t think you could have this kind of contract with any scholarship holder here”, Mareike Ohlberg, a senior fellow working on China at the German Marshall Fund think tank in Berlin, told University World News.

“Some of the issues in the contract have caused some debate here in Germany. Universities have to ensure people can enjoy the rights they’re normally guaranteed in Germany, like anybody else, such as freedom of speech, freedom of expression,” she said.

More German universities are expected to follow suit. But “it’s probably going to be a hard decision for most universities”, Ohlberg noted.

[...]

As indicated by FAU, the contract requires them to report back to the Chinese embassy on a regular basis, with violations of the conditions subject to disciplinary action. The contract also stipulated that they must return to China after their PhD and that the terms of the CSC contract only expired after two years of having returned home.

According to Ohlberg, who has seen older versions of the CSC contract, if they are in breach, “[t]hey can technically be asked to repay the scholarship, plus some additional fee on top”.

If the person breaks the contract, for example by staying abroad, and does not pay back the money, then the two people that are forced to remain in China would have to pay. “It also sends a political message, that also adds additional incentive and additional pressure on the person not to do anything that could be seen as breaking the contract,” Ohlberg said.
Translated from English
Though ostensibly a reaction to Pelosi’s visit, it is clear China’s exercises had been long planned. I do think they were looking for an opportunity to escalate. This is not something you prep after the announcement (of the visit) and then pull off that quickly and that easily.
China’s siding with Russia and blaming NATO is absolutely unacceptable for most of Central and Eastern Europe. The Chinese government doesn’t seem to understand, or doesn’t want to understand, that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is seen as an existential issue for most countries in the region.
China’s siding with Russia and blaming NATO is absolutely unacceptable for most of Central and Eastern Europe. The Chinese government doesn’t seem to understand, or doesn’t want to understand, that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is seen as an existential issue for most countries in the region.
It really shows that they now feel it’s their responsibility to defend China overseas and fight the public opinion war overseas.
A diplomatic boycott is, of course, a symbolic act. Ultimately, it is about the external effect. How China presents itself. And that is why it is important to the Chinese government that the Olympic Games are not overshadowed by such a diplomatic boycott.
Translated from German
In previous years, the German government's China policy has already been determined in the Chancellor's Office. The Chinese leadership will now rely on Baerbock and the Foreign Office to show restraint.
Translated from German
Messages like these are meant as a demonstration of power: ‘We are telling you that she is fine, and who are you to say otherwise?’ It’s not meant to convince people but to intimidate and demonstrate the power of the state.
The email’s wording and tone were decidedly more 'creepy and eerie' than reassuring... the attempt to portray a 'cutesy' Peng is as creepy as the purported email given its similarity in method to other 'proof of life' photos and videos to ascertain the wellbeing of persecuted individuals like Uyghurs and dissidents.
While the CGTN letter appeared clumsy and even sinister to many observers, it was not necessarily intended to convince anyone. Rather, messages like these are meant as a demonstration of power: ‘We are telling you that she is fine, and who are you to say otherwise?’ It’s not meant to convince people but to intimidate and demonstrate the power of the state.
Messages like these are meant as a demonstration of power. It’s not meant to convince people, but to intimidate and demonstrate the power of the state.
What's new about the strategy, is above all an adaptation to the new media with their new channels and their new formats.
Beijing has no interest in cutting ties overnight, but the gradual aim is to become less dependent on foreign countries while keeping them partly reliant on the Chinese market. Germany would be well served by recognizing that and acting accordingly.
I do think in 2019 [following unrest in Hong Kong] there were already decisions made to take some more radical steps towards saying, ‘OK, fine, we've lost the public on this one and now we need to re-establish control in a very radical manner.’