An Emerging Middle Powers Alignment?

US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby weighed in on the growing debate over Middle Powers, arguing in a July 14 post on X that these countries do not have a coherent basis for alignment and that efforts to build a collective Middle-Power strategy rest on a flawed understanding of international relations. His comments highlight a larger question that has become increasingly central to international affairs: What role will Middle Powers play in shaping a more multipolar world?

This compendium adds to a long-standing strand of GMF research. More than a decade ago, GMF's Global Swing States project drew attention to the growing influence of countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Türkiye in shaping international order. Subsequent work, including Alliances in a Shifting Global Order and the more recent Pivotal Powers reports, has explored how influential Middle Powers are navigating a more multipolar world and shaping global governance, security, and technology outcomes. This​compendium continues that conversation, bringing together diverse voices from across GMF's network to examine the opportunities, constraints, and choices facing Middle Powers in the years ahead.

There Is No “Middle-Powers Movement”

By Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı

Discussion of the Middle Powers has gained prominence as the international system has shifted toward multipolarity. Great-power competition is intensifying, but major powers are often unable to address global challenges on their own. As a result, other countries with significant capabilities are gaining influence over outcomes in security, trade, technology, and global governance.

Middle Powers are neither great powers capable of shaping the international system on their own nor small states that must simply adapt to choices made by others. They possess sufficient economic, diplomatic, military, or technological capabilities to influence developments beyond their borders.

GMF’s Pivotal Powers report argues that some of those Middle Powers—such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—have gained significant leverage in international affairs and have the potential to shape the future of global order.

Middle Powers are national-interest-driven states seeking to preserve agency in a world increasingly shaped by great-power competition. They do not share a common ideology, identity, or geopolitical agenda. Their interests often diverge and sometimes conflict.

Yet growing influence should not be confused with collective action. There is no "Middle Powers Movement". Unlike the Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War era, Middle Powers do not cooperate as a bloc united by a common ideology or geopolitical project. Their cooperation is driven by overlapping interests rather than shared identity. They often act individually as regional leaders, but they can also form minilateral coalitions to pursue specific objectives without committing to broader alignment.

In some cases, cooperation becomes institutionalized. The EU, whose members are overwhelmingly Middle Powers, represents the most ambitious example of states pooling sovereignty to amplify their collective influence. ASEAN offers a different model. Its members have preserved a strong commitment to national autonomy while building durable habits of consultation and cooperation. Both demonstrate that Middle Powers can cooperate effectively through very different institutional arrangements.

The United States does not need to view Middle-Power autonomy with suspicion. If some states are hedging or diversifying their partnerships, the question is not whether they are balancing against US power, but whether they perceive growing uncertainty in American policy. States balance against threats, not power alone. Most Middle Powers are not searching for alternatives to Washington. Given the choice, they would like nothing more than a cooperative relationship with the United States.

A Very Realist Balancing Strategy

By Dr. Carrie Lee 

The emergence of a Middle-Powers movement is precisely the kind of development that should serve as a wake-up call to those in Washington who believe they can abuse allies without consequence. The United States has maintained its position as the indispensable nation for so long only because it provided the unique combination of capabilities, leadership, and reliability that made other powers comfortable with the way it exercised power. But as the current administration retreats from its leadership role in Europe and repeatedly tries to bully allies into submission, it should not surprise administration officials that previously staunch partners are exploring other options—in particular, options that significantly reduce the leverage the US government has over military decision-making and operations.

The best-case scenario for Washington is that European Middle Powers are pursuing a strategythat will ultimately result in strategic complementarity with the United States. At the same time, these states will take steps to mitigate the worst effects of US inconsistencies. In practice, this means investing in their own industrial bases and privileging European defense contractors in the development of new technologies. The United States’ current monopoly on capabilities may buy some short-term advantage for the American defense industry, but there are plenty of countries and contractors who can and will eventually step into the void, ultimately leaving the United States without either leadership or leverage. Policymakers in Washington should know that anything is possible given the proper incentives, and the administration’s inconsistent and bellicose behavior has given European leaders plenty of reason to mistrust its commitment to the transatlantic relationship.

Washington’s self-declared realists are learning that, for allies, independence comes with a greater ability to pursue interests that may not perfectly align with the US administration’s. They would be wise to engage European and Middle-Power leaders in good faith to help them work toward complementarity, rather than doubling down on an approach that has left the United States increasingly on the outside looking in.

The Middle-Powers Strategy Appeals Across the European Political Spectrum

By Dr. Martin Quencez

Throughout Europe, the idea of a Middle-Powers strategy is gaining traction. Though not explicitly referencing Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s landmark speech, most European political leaders are embracing a vision that aims to avoid complete alignment with one of the two Great Powers and build alternative coalitions and partnerships.

Strikingly, this approach resonates not only with proponents of a stronger EU, but across Europe's political spectrum. Stakeholders view strengthening cooperation with other Middle Powers as the best way to confront pressure from the United States or China, where European countries have limited leverage. Brussels enthusiasts will praise recent FTAs signed with Mercosur and India, while more nationalist parties promote the same logic for their respective country through bilateral agreements or ad hoc coalitions.

Just as Elbridge Colby articulates his criticisms as a “flexible realist”, the European supporters of the Middle-Powers strategy also claim that realism justifies this approach. As the international order is increasingly structured around the US-China relationship and competition, it is in the interests of European countries to strengthen their negotiating positions by developing such partnerships, regardless of ideological preferences.

Colby is right to state that US technological and defense capabilities will remain indispensable for Europe’s security and prosperity. They are, in fact, likely to constitute the two pillars of transatlantic cooperation in the coming years. But arguing that "there is no alternative" is not politically persuasive, especially as growing public skepticism toward the United States incentivizes European leaders to demonstrate to their voters that they can find other solutions.

Africa’s Multipolar Moment?

By Chris Ogunmodede

The gradual retreat of Western powers from their traditional leadership role is creating opportunities for Middle Powers to exercise greater influence in the emerging global order. For African Middle Powers, the question is whether they can function as a coherent collective.

Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, and Morocco possess the diplomatic reach, economic weight, regional influence, and demographic scale to shape international affairs beyond the US-China-EU axis. They generally favor multilateralism and issue-based coalitions over bloc politics, focusing on trade governance, climate finance, debt restructuring, and reform of the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions. These priorities, along with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), align closely with African interests.

The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and debates over the reform of the international financial architecture have expanded opportunities for African states to influence global governance. They are also playing greater roles in regional security, conflict mediation, and economic diplomacy. Yet their collective influence remains constrained by competing regional ambitions and divergent foreign policy priorities.

African states differ widely in economic capacity, strategic interests, and external partnerships. Some lean toward China, others maintain close ties with Western powers.Most cultivate relations with both, at the same time increasing their engagement with the Gulf states. These differences complicate coordination across forums such as the G20, BRICS+, and the UN, and intra-African rivalries further limit unified leadership.

Rather than form a single geopolitical bloc, African Middle Powers are more likely to build issue-specific coalitions, using continental institutions to strengthen their collective voice and shape a more representative international order.

Washington Should Embrace the Tech Middle Powers

By Dr. Sharinee L. Jagtiani

 From the standpoint of technology, a Middle Power is one that occupies, or has the strategic potential to occupy, a critical niche in an emerging technology value chain. This is not new; it predates Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s landmark January 2026 speech on theMiddle Powers. As examples, think of Taiwan's chip power (TSMC's foundry bet since 1987), South Korea's memory chip bet (Samsung's DRAM push from 1983), the Netherlands on lithography (ASML's spin-off from Philips in 1984, and its EUV monopoly by the 2010s), and India's more recent bet on AI diffusion at scale (the India Stack/UPI foundation from the mid-2010s, extending into digital public infrastructure and the IndiaAI Mission today).

Washington should welcome, not resist, allies and partners emerging as tech Middle Powers.This embrace can strengthen the capacity of these states to serve as resilient, burden-sharing partners—a demand the Trump administration has made in the defense context, and one that applies just as well to technology. Independent or collective Middle-Power tech initiatives,including efforts to strengthen technological sovereignty, assist in expanding these countries’strategic partnership options as they build domestic capacity and resilience. The fact that many of these tech Middle Powers have already signed on to the US-led Pax Silica Initiative on AI and supply chain security itself conveys a willingness to work with the United States on technology—not merely around it.

The views expressed herein are those solely of the author(s). GMF as an institution does not take positions.