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Martin Quencez currently serves as the deputy director of GMF’s Paris office and a research fellow in the Security & Defense program. His work includes research on transatlantic security and defense cooperation and U.S. and French foreign policy, on which he regularly writes articles for the French and international press.

He leads different research projects on European defense cooperation and transatlantic defense innovation. He is also an associate researcher for the European Council on Foreign Relations, working in France for its European Powers program. He taught transatlantic relations at the Euro-American campus of Sciences-Po. Prior to joining GMF, he worked for the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, where he focused on French and Indian strategic thinking. He studied international relations at the Uppsala University in Sweden and is a graduate of Sciences-Po Paris. He is currently doing a PhD in contemporary history at the Sorbonne Nouvelle University.

Media Mentions

The electors care about the domestic situation first, and we elect the French president with the intention to have someone to defend French interests.
I don’t imagine Marine Le Pen going to see Vladimir Putin two weeks after getting elected and talking about a great reset in relations. Rather, it would be more like Le Pen, as president, making it more difficult for the EU and the US to agree on a new posture — a new package of sanctions, and to agree within NATO on what we need to do on the eastern flank.
There is an obvious political pressure today. We have terrible images [of Ukraine] in the media and the whole population is watching and so it is normal to have a reaction. In a year or two, where will they be and what will their policy priorities be? We’ll see.
The electors care about the domestic situation first, and we elect the French president with the intention to have someone to defend French interests.
There are really concrete policy reforms that Macron has in mind to strengthen the EU and use it as a vehicle for French interests. Le Pen is the exact opposite.
Le Pen’s campaign platform suggests she would override EU decisions she does not believe in, such as imposing tight border controls around France, and giving French citizens preference in labor markets; both those violate the EU’s core principles. It is hard to see how this would not lead to France pulling out of the EU. There are opt-outs on every situation, to not implement EU decisions if it is against France’s interests.
Although there has been an enormous effort by Marine Le Pen to sort of normalize her image and to cut some of the most controversial slogans from her program, if you look at the details, it hasn't changed that much. The vision that Marine Le Pen promotes is extremely different from the one that Emmanuel Macron supports.
Despite the war, Marine Le Pen is still advocating for an alliance with Russia and still considers that it will be possible for her as president to consider Vladimir Putin as an ally.
This work allowed us to react quickly after February 24. But it has reached its limits. The question of the finality of the sanctions arises. ... Ultimately, there is enormous pressure on the Europeans, especially Warsaw, Berlin and Paris to continue to work together on the Ukrainian issue.
[The war in Ukraine has served as a tragic reminder of why the NATO alliance exists in the first place: to protect member states from a threat that is] very real. In that respect, the war is particularly damning for those candidates who claimed the threat was non-existent.
It was an impossible mission. It was necessary to include a certain number of countries that do not represent democratic values, either because they are important allies in the framework of NATO or other American partnerships in the world, or because there was no question of isolating potentially important countries in the competition with China.
Translated from French